Review of Economic Design

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.17 0 0 0 0.08 1997 0.2 6 14 0 0 0.08 1998 0.17 0.23 16 32 6 1 0 0.1 1999 0.23 0.32 22 39 22 5 0 1 0.05 0.16 2000 0.18 0.43 18 0 38 7 0 0.19 2001 0.08 0.39 13 0 40 3 0 0.17 2002 0.42 24 26 31 0 1 0.04 0.2 2003 0.03 0.47 0 37 1 0 0.22
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:35-55 Responsibility, talent, and compensation: A second-best analysis (1999). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 10 times.

(2) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:13-33 Monotonic extensions on economic domains (1999). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 6 times.

(3) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:371-387 Efficient venture capital financing combining debt and equity (1998). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 6 times.

(4) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:2:p:93-127 The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Efficient networks (1998). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 6 times.

(5) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:57-72 Feasible implementation of taxation methods (1999). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 6 times.

(6) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:29-43 Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods (1997). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 5 times.

(7) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:461-480 First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge (2002). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 5 times.

(8) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:2:p:137-147 Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market (1998). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 5 times.

(9) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:45-56 How to get firms to invest: A simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation (2002). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 5 times.

(10) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:237-255 A mechanism design approach to an optimal contract under ex ante and ex post private information (1998). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 4 times.

(11) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:413-428 Trust and social efficiencies (2002). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 4 times.

(12) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:329-345 Managerial costs for one-shot decentralized information processing (1998). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 4 times.

(13) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:371-396 Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment (2002). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 4 times.

(14) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:15-27 The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Essential networks (1997). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 3 times.

(15) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:75-89 Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian (1997). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 3 times.

(16) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:75-91 Achieving the first best in sequencing problems (2002). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 3 times.

(17) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:357-379 Taxation in an economy with private provision of public goods (1999). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 3 times.

(18) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:215-236 On durable goods monopolies and the Coase-Conjecture (1998). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 3 times.

(19) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:307-343 A profit-center game with incomplete information (1999). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 3 times.

(20) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:273-292 Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment (1999). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 3 times.

(21) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:45-55 Redistribution and individual characteristics (1997). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 3 times.

(22) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:195-213 Fair allocation in a general model with indivisible goods (1998). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 2 times.

(23) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:255-272 Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem (1999). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 2 times.

(24) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:353-370 Mediation and the Nash bargaining solution (2002). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 2 times.

(25) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:257-269 Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior (1998). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 2 times.

(26) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:27-43 Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory (2002). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 2 times.

(27) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:303-328 On optimality of illegal collusion in contracts (1998). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 2 times.

(28) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:345-356 Solutions for cooperative games with r alternatives (1999). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 1 times.

(29) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:1-15 A study of proportionality and robustness in economies with a commonly owned technology (2002). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 1 times.

(30) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:295-305 Organizational restructuring in response to changes in information-processing technology (1999). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 1 times.

(31) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:2:p:167-191 An extensive form solution to the adverse selection problem in principal/multi-agent environments (1998). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 1 times.

(32) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:2:p:127-151 Natural and double implementation of public ownership solutions in differentiable production economies (1999). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 1 times.

(33) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:1-12 Decision-making under risk: Editing procedures based on correlated similarities, and preference overdetermination (1999). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 1 times.

(34) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:359-369 Process innovation and the persistence of monopoly with labour-managed firms (1998). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 1 times.

(35) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:2:p:179-187 A note on van Dammes mechanism (1999). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 1 times.

(36) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:381-387 Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness (1999). Review of Economic Design
Cited: 1 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 | 2000

Latest citations received in: 2003

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:ind:isipdp:02-05 Understanding reciprocity (2002). Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India / Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers

Latest citations received in: 2001

Latest citations received in: 2000

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.