University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics / Working papers

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.16 0 0 0 0.07 1997 0.17 0 0 0 0.09 1998 0.19 0 0 0 0.12 1999 0.29 6 1 0 0 0.19 2000 0.39 3 1 6 0 0.2 2001 0.11 0.34 8 8 9 1 100 3 0.38 0.18 2002 0.36 0.39 11 16 11 4 0 7 0.64 0.2 2003 0.26 0.41 2 0 19 5 0 0.21 2004 0.47 10 1 13 0 0.25
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:att:bielme:2002330 Moral property rights in bargaining (2002).
Cited: 5 times.

(2) RePEc:att:bielme:2001328 The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering : a defense (2001).
Cited: 4 times.

(3) RePEc:att:bielme:2002332 Convex fuzzy games and participation monotonic allocation schemes (2002).
Cited: 4 times.

(4) RePEc:att:bielme:2002335 Centralized common pool management and local community participation (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(5) RePEc:att:bielme:2001323 A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(6) RePEc:att:bielme:2002339 How to cope with division problems under interval uncertainty of claims? (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(7) RePEc:att:bielme:2002345 Power measurement as sensitivity analysis : a unified approach (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(8) RePEc:att:bielme:1999308 Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions (1999).
Cited: 1 times.

(9) RePEc:att:bielme:2002331 Hypercubes and compromise values for cooperative fuzzy games (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(10) RePEc:att:bielme:2004360 Cephoids : Minkowski sums of prisms (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(11) RePEc:att:bielme:2000319 Formation of cartels in glove markets and the modiclus (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

(12) RePEc:att:bielme:2001325 Reconfirming the prenucleolus (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(13) RePEc:att:bielme:2001321 Game theory (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001

Latest citations received in: 2004

Latest citations received in: 2003

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse23_2002 Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment (2002). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2002115 Fuzzy clan games and bi-monotonic allocation rules (2002). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(3) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2002116 On cores and stable sets for fuzzy games (2002). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(4) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200214 Hypercubes and compromise values for cooperative fuzzy games (2002). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(5) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200297 Egalitarianism in convex fuzzy games (2002). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(6) RePEc:esi:discus:2002-47 An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions (2002). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(7) RePEc:usg:dp2002:2002-30 A Little Fairness may Induce a Lot of Redistribution in Democracy (2002). Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen / University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2002

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:att:bielme:2001325 Reconfirming the prenucleolus (2001). University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics / Working papers

(2) RePEc:att:bielme:2001326 The positive core of a cooperative game (2001). University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics / Working papers

(3) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp267 Reconfirming the Prenucleolus (2001). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.