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 Updated May, 1 2008 147.392 documents processed, 3.154.300 references and 1.403.701 citations

 

 
 

Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.160000.07
19970.170000.09
19980.190000.12
19990.290000.19
20000.3922000.2
20010.50.34211121020.10.18
20020.090.3932342325030.090.2
20030.130.41332253757.120.060.21
20040.230.47322765156.790.280.25
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
 
Impact Factor:
 
Immediacy Index:
 
Documents published:
 
Citations received:
 

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp298 Individual and Group Decisions in the Centipede Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players? (2002).
Cited: 11 times.

(2) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp421 Shapley Value (2006).
Cited: 10 times.

(3) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp321 Limit Order Book as a Market for Liquidity (2003).
Cited: 8 times.

(4) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp297 Intergroup conflict: Individual, group and collective interests. (2002).
Cited: 8 times.

(5) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp359 Strategic Merger Waves: A Theory of Musical Chairs (2004).
Cited: 6 times.

(6) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp266 Scapegoats and Optimal Allocation of Responsibility (2001).
Cited: 5 times.

(7) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp330 Bounded Rationality and Socially Optimal Limits on Choice in a Self-Selection Model (2002).
Cited: 5 times.

(8) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp394 Tight Correlated Equilibrium (2005).
Cited: 4 times.

(9) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp377 Optimal Use of Communication Resources (2004).
Cited: 4 times.

(10) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp343 Type Indeterminacy: A Model of the KT(Kahneman-Tversky)-man (2003).
Cited: 3 times.

(11) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp438 Honesty of Signaling and Pollinator Attraction: The Case of Flag-Like Bracts (2006).
Cited: 3 times.

(12) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp385 Declining Valuations in Sequential Auctions (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(13) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp315 Bargaining with an Agenda (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(14) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp361 Assessing Strategic Risk (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(15) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp284 Long Cheap Talk (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(16) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp372 Adaptive Heuristics (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(17) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp434 Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto Games (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(18) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp357 A Theory of Optimal Deadlines (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(19) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp319 Markets Versus Negotiations: An Experimental Investigation (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(20) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp316 Online Matching Pennies (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(21) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp414 Tournaments with Midterm Reviews (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(22) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp285 On the Misperception of Variability (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(23) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp461 Rationalizable Expectations (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(24) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp309 Regret-Based Continuous-Time Dynamics (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(25) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp273 Predictably Incoherent Judgements (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(26) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp295 Stochastic games: Existence of the MinMax (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(27) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp263 Stability and Segregation in Group Formation (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(28) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp363 A Law of Large Numbers for Weighted Majority (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(29) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp291 A Note on Revenue Effects of Asymmetry in Private-Value Auctions (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(30) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp350 On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(31) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp261 Learnability and Rationality of Choice (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(32) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp411 Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(33) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp337 An Axiomatization of the Consistent Non-Transferable Utility Value (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

(34) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp378 Binary Effectivity Rules (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(35) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp459 Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(36) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp303 Repeated Price Competition Between Individuals and Between Teams (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(37) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp403 Longevity and Aggregate Savings (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(38) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp272 Real Algebraic Tools in Stochastic Games (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(39) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp369 Unilateral face-to-face communication in ultimatum bargaining - A video experiment (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(40) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp425 Bargaining with a Bureaucrat (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(41) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp292 On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(42) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp351 Maximizing expected value with two stage stopping rules (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(43) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp387 When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect? (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(44) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp262 Singular Games in bvNA (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(45) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp362 Social Indeterminacy (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(46) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp381 On the Computational Power of Iterative Auctions I: Demand Queries (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(47) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp360 On the Non-Emptiness of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(48) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp410 Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(49) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp358 Time of the Essence (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(50) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp396 Let the Dummy Talk! Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001

Latest citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1364 Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games (2004). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(2) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000466 Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(3) RePEc:esi:discus:2004-06 The Jena video laboratory for economic experiments (2004). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(4) RePEc:hal:papers:hal-00242940_v1 Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals (2004). HAL, CCSd/CNRS / Pre- and Post-Print documents

(5) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp363 A Law of Large Numbers for Weighted Majority (2004). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(6) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp375 Optimal Two Choice Stopping on an Exponential Sequence (2004). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(7) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp376 Bargaining Sets of Voting Games (2004). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(8) RePEc:upf:upfgen:783 Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (2004). Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Economics Working Papers

(9) RePEc:upf:upfgen:804 Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games (2004). Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Economics Working Papers

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4091 Does Anonymity Matter in Electronic Limit Order Markets? (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp336 Online Concealed Correlation by Boundedly Rational Players (2003). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-24 Multiple Equilibrium Problem and Non-Canonical Correlation Devices (2002). Brown University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(2) RePEc:esi:discus:2002-27 Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments (2002). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(3) RePEc:esi:discus:2005-02 Trust between individuals and groups: Groups are less rusting than individuals but just as trustworthy (2002). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:att:bielme:2001326 The positive core of a cooperative game (2001). University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics / Working papers

(2) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp279 Social Choice and Threshold Phenomena (2001). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

©2008 Jose Manuel Barrueco | mail: barrueco@uv.es