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Journal of Law, Economics and Organization Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.
Most cited documents in this series: (1) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:222-79 The Quality of Government. (1999). (2) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:0:p:24-52 Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. (1991). (3) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:2:p:181-214 Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations. (1986). (4) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:8:y:1992:i:3:p:523-46 The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform. (1992). (5) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:13:y:1997:i:1:p:1-25 The (1997). (6) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:74-102 The Firm as a Subeconomy. (1999). (7) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:18:y:2002:i:1:p:221-277 Courts and Relational Contracts (2002). (8) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:13:y:1997:i:2:p:387-409 Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach. (1997). (9) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:141-61 The Theory of the Firm Revisited. (1988). (10) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:2:p:335-61 Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment. (1995). (11) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:1:p:1-24 The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach. (1996). (12) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:56-73 Informal Authority in Organizations. (1999). (13) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:3:y:1987:i:2:p:243-77 Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control. (1987). (14) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:0:p:84-105 Privatization and Incentives. (1991). (15) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:2:p:201-46 The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation. (1994). (16) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:6:y:1990:i:2:p:381-409 Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency. (1990). (17) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:2:p:279-303 Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards. (1986). (18) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:1:p:1-31 The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development. (1995). (19) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:19:y:2003:i:1:p:119-140 Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments (2003). (20) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:1:p:1-32 The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement. (1986). (21) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:2:p:407-26 The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy. (1994). (22) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:205-29 Monopolization by Sequential Acquisition. (1993). (23) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:1:p:1-25 The Costs of Organization. (1991). (24) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:2:p:365-94 On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias. (2000). (25) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:1:p:155-65 Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests. (2000). (26) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:1:p:1-49 A Theory of Legal Presumptions. (2000). (27) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:1:y:1985:i:1:p:101-24 Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition. (1985). (28) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:1:p:142-59 Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany. (1994). (29) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:8:y:1992:i:2:p:321-45 Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective. (1992). (30) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:230-55 Judicial Modification of Contracts between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach. (1993). (31) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:95-117 Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence. (1988). (32) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:1:p:205-26 Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History. (1995). (33) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:5:y:1989:i:1:p:109-26 Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry. (1989). (34) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:181-98 A Legal Basis for the Firm. (1988). (35) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:119-39 Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm. (1988). (36) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:199-213 Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited. (1988). (37) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:2:p:334-64 The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment. (2000). (38) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:2:p:247-67 A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance. (1994). (39) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:1:p:25-61 The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier. (1996). (40) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:14:y:1998:i:2:p:205-31 Why Dont More Households File for Bankruptcy? (1998). (41) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:2:p:201-28 Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form. (1991). (42) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:14:y:1998:i:1:p:84-113 Strategic Motives for Vertical Separation: Evidence from Retail Gasoline Markets. (1998). (43) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:9:y:1993:i:1:p:1-29 Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy. (1993). (44) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:2:p:362-78 Start-ups, Spin-offs, and Internal Projects. (1995). (45) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:19:y:2003:i:2:p:281-306 The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina (2003). (46) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:8:y:1992:i:2:p:253-79 Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization. (1992). (47) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:5:y:1989:i:1:p:99-108 Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law. (1989). (48) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:18:y:2002:i:2:p:428-454 An Experimental Bribery Game (2002). (49) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:615-36 Endogenous Business Networks. (1999). (50) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:1:p:55-87 The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation? (1991). Latest citations received in: | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 Latest citations received in: 2004 (1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:94:y:2004:i:5:p:1635-1653 International Protection of Intellectual Property (2004). American Economic Review (2) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.141 Bidding for Incompete Contracts (2004). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers (3) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10587 The Costs of Entrenched Boards (2004). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (4) RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0407 The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees (2004). Universitat Bern, Volkswirtschaftliches Institut / Diskussionsschriften (5) RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0409 Conditional versus Contingent Fees (2004). Universitat Bern, Volkswirtschaftliches Institut / Diskussionsschriften Latest citations received in: 2003 (1) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200381 The trade-off between risk and control in corporate ownership (2003). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (2) RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200317 Corporate control concentration measurement and firm performance (2003). Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center / Discussion Paper (3) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9470 Investor Sentiment in Japanese and U.S. Daily Mutual Fund Flows (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (4) RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:5:y:2003:i:8:p:117-146 Instituciones, costos de transacción y polÃticas públicas: un panorama (2003). Revista de Economía Institucional Latest citations received in: 2002 (1) RePEc:aea:jecper:v:16:y:2002:i:3:p:153-170 The Central Role of Entrepreneurs in Transition Economies (2002). Journal of Economic Perspectives (2) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse23_2002 Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment (2002). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers (3) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3626 Does the New Economy Need New Governance? Ownership, Knowledge and Performance (2002). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers (4) RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0482 Contractual heterogeneity in strategic alliances. (2002). IESE Business School / IESE Research Papers (5) RePEc:ibm:ibmecp:wpe_31 Moving out of Committed Relationships (2002). Ibmec Working Paper, Ibmec São Paulo / Ibmec Working Papers (6) RePEc:kie:kieliw:1114 Regulatory Choices and Commitment — Challenges for Electricity Market Regulation in Kosovo (2002). Kiel Institute for World Economics / Working Papers (7) RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:0239 Reputation Flows (2002). Middlebury College, Department of Economics / Middlebury College Working Paper Series (8) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8890 Courts: the Lex Mundi Project (2002). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (9) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9362 Explaining the Flood of Asbestos Litigation: Consolidation, Bifurcation, and Bouquet Trials (2002). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (10) RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2910 Boondoggles and Expropriation: Rent-seeking and Policy Distortion when Property Rights are Insecure (2002). The World Bank / Policy Research Working Paper Series (11) RePEc:wdi:papers:2002-517 Bank Discrimination in Transition Economies: Ideology, Information or Incentives? (2002). William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School / William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series Latest citations received in: 2001 (1) RePEc:cdl:aredav:1027 Insider Privatization with a Tail: The Buyout Price and Performance of Privatized Firms in Rural China (2001). Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Davis / Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Davis, Working Paper Series Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results. Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series. |
