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RAND Journal of Economics Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.
Most cited documents in this series: (1) RePEc:rje:randje:v:17:y:1986:i:summer:p:176-188 The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling (1986). (2) RePEc:rje:randje:v:25:y:1994:i:summer:p:242-262 Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation (1994). (3) RePEc:rje:randje:v:19:y:1988:i:winter:p:495-515 Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S. Manufacturing Industries (1988). (4) RePEc:rje:randje:v:15:y:1984:i:winter:p:546-554 Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly (1984). (5) RePEc:rje:randje:v:16:y:1985:i:spring:p:70-83 Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation (1985). (6) RePEc:rje:randje:v:17:y:1986:i:spring:p:48-58 Free Entry and Social Inefficiency (1986). (7) RePEc:rje:randje:v:25:y:1994:i:summer:p:334-347 Entrepreneurial Decisions and Liquidity Constraints (1994). (8) RePEc:rje:randje:v:16:y:1985:i:winter:p:473-486 Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition (1985). (9) RePEc:rje:randje:v:15:y:1984:i:summer:p:171-196 Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984). (10) RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:spring:p:172-187 A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value of Innovations (1990). (11) RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:spring:p:1-26 Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior (1990). (12) RePEc:rje:randje:v:26:y:1995:i:summer:p:163-179 Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem (1995). (13) RePEc:rje:randje:v:17:y:1986:i:spring:p:1-17 Business Cycles and the Relationship Between Concentration and Price-Cost Margins (1986). (14) RePEc:rje:randje:v:17:y:1986:i:spring:p:18-32 Relying on the Information of Interested Parties (1986). (15) RePEc:rje:randje:v:29:y:1998:i:spring:p:1-37 Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing (1998). (16) RePEc:rje:randje:v:31:y:2000:i:winter:p:674-692 Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation (2000). (17) RePEc:rje:randje:v:18:y:1987:i:autumn:p:452-458 The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives (1987). (18) RePEc:rje:randje:v:33:y:2002:i:winter:p:549-570 Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics Of Payment Card Associations (2002). (19) RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:spring:p:106-112 Optimal Patent Length and Breadth (1990). (20) RePEc:rje:randje:v:34:y:2003:i:2:p:309-28
Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers. (2003). (21) RePEc:rje:randje:v:16:y:1985:i:autumn:p:319-327 A Theory of Yardstick Competition (1985). (22) RePEc:rje:randje:v:17:y:1986:i:winter:p:527-543 An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development (1986). (23) RePEc:rje:randje:v:26:y:1995:i:spring:p:20-33 On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation (1995). (24) RePEc:rje:randje:v:29:y:1998:i:spring:p:57-76 The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts (1998). (25) RePEc:rje:randje:v:25:y:1994:i:winter:p:555-589 Computing Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria: Numerical Implications of a Dynamic Differentiated Product Model (1994). (26) RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:spring:p:27-44 The Evolution of New Industries and the Determinants of Market Structure (1990). (27) RePEc:rje:randje:v:16:y:1985:i:winter:p:504-520 On the Licensing of Innovations (1985). (28) RePEc:rje:randje:v:15:y:1984:i:autumn:p:404-415 Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information (1984). (29) RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:spring:p:113-130 How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be? (1990). (30) RePEc:rje:randje:v:26:y:1995:i:autumn:p:537-556 Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies (1995). (31) RePEc:rje:randje:v:19:y:1988:i:summer:p:221-234 Mix and Match: Product Compatibility without Network Externalities (1988). (32) RePEc:rje:randje:v:24:y:1993:i:summer:p:198-211 The Profitability of Innovating Firms (1993). (33) RePEc:rje:randje:v:32:y:2001:i:3:p:387-407 Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts. (2001). (34) RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:spring:p:131-146 Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law (1990). (35) RePEc:rje:randje:v:36:y:2005:1:p:16-38 Market Value and Patent Citations (2005). (36) RePEc:rje:randje:v:15:y:1984:i:summer:p:255-267 Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency (1984). (37) RePEc:rje:randje:v:19:y:1988:i:autumn:p:408-419 Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger (1988). (38) RePEc:rje:randje:v:17:y:1986:i:autumn:p:404-415 Long-Run Competition in Capacity, Short-Run Competition in Price, and the Cournot Model (1986). (39) RePEc:rje:randje:v:30:y:1999:i:summer:p:214-231 Information Revelation and Certification Intermediaries (1999). (40) RePEc:rje:randje:v:23:y:1992:i:spring:p:52-63 Patent Policy and Costly Imitation (1992). (41) RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:summer:p:314-340 Environmental Regulation and U.S. Economic Growth (1990). (42) RePEc:rje:randje:v:23:y:1992:i:summer:p:263-283 Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results (1992). (43) RePEc:rje:randje:v:22:y:1991:i:spring:p:89-106 The Impact of Cyclical Demand Movements on Collusive Behavior (1991). (44) RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:spring:p:147-160 Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information (1990). (45) RePEc:rje:randje:v:28:y:1997:i:winter:p:629-640 Auditing Without Commitment (1997). (46) RePEc:rje:randje:v:29:y:1998:i:spring:p:38-56 Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination (1998). (47) RePEc:rje:randje:v:25:y:1994:i:spring:p:37-57 Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee (1994). (48) RePEc:rje:randje:v:29:y:1998:i:summer:p:280-305 Collusion and Delegation (1998). (49) RePEc:rje:randje:v:24:y:1993:i:autumn:p:380-398 Competition in a Market for Informed Experts Services (1993). (50) RePEc:rje:randje:v:19:y:1988:i:spring:p:147-155 Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack (1988). Latest citations received in: | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 Latest citations received in: 2004 (1) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse8_2003 Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract (2004). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers (2) RePEc:cdl:oplwec:1165 Privacy and Information Acquisition in Competitive Markets (2004). Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics / Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series (3) RePEc:cep:stitep:/2004/478 Knowledge Disclosure, Patents and Optimal Organization of Research and Development (2004). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE / STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series (4) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1292 Consumer Search and Oligopolistic Pricing: An Empirical Investigation (2004). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series (5) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4206 The U-Shaped Investment Curve: Theory and Evidence (2004). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers (6) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4363 Underpricing and Market Power in Uniform Price Auctions (2004). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers (7) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20040071 Consumer Search and Oligopolistic Pricing: An Empirical Investigation (2004). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers (8) RePEc:ecm:feam04:514 External Recruitment as an Incentive Device (2004). Econometric Society / Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings (9) RePEc:ecm:latm04:180 The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions (2004). Econometric Society / Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings (10) RePEc:ecm:nasm04:54 External Recruitment as an incentive Device (2004). Econometric Society / Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings (11) RePEc:ecm:nasm04:545 Optimal Allocation Mechanisms When Bidders Ranking for the objects is common (2004). Econometric Society / Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings (12) RePEc:fip:fedmsr:347 Rent-seeking and innovation (2004). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis / Staff Report (13) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1298 Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract (2004). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers (14) RePEc:oxf:wpaper:193 Principal and Expert Agent (2004). University of Oxford, Department of Economics / Economics Series Working Papers (15) RePEc:oxf:wpaper:211 Strategic Disclosure of Intermediate Research Results (2004). University of Oxford, Department of Economics / Economics Series Working Papers (16) RePEc:ses:arsjes:2004-iv-3 Learning from Financial Markets: Auctioning Tariff-Rate Quotas in Agricultural Trade (2004). Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES) (17) RePEc:ste:nystbu:04-22 Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption: Entrepreneurs and Bureaucrats (2004). New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics / Working Papers (18) RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0407001 The Other Side of Limited Liability: Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing (2004). EconWPA / Industrial Organization (19) RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0411010 Little Firms and Big Patents: The Incentives To Disclose Competencies (2004). EconWPA / Industrial Organization (20) RePEc:zbw:zewdip:2883 Is Silence Golden? : Patents versus Secrecy at the Firm Level (2004). ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research / ZEW Discussion Papers Latest citations received in: 2003 (1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:1:p:133-149 Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions (2003). American Economic Review (2) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1070 Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation (2003). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series (3) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_992 Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction (2003). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series (4) RePEc:cir:cirwor:2003s-64 Directors and Officers Insurance and Shareholders Protection (2003). CIRANO / CIRANO Working Papers (5) RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000098 Efficient Sorting in a Dynamic Adverse Selection Model (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Theory workshop papers (6) RePEc:clm:clmeco:2003-05 Ordinal Cheap Talk (2003). Claremont Colleges / Claremont Colleges Working Papers (7) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3976 Endogenous Contracts Under Bargaining in Competing Vertical Chains (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers (8) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp355 Adding the Noise: A Theory of Compensation-Driven Earnings Management (2003). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series (9) RePEc:ide:wpaper:589 Efficient Patent Pools (2003). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers (10) RePEc:ide:wpaper:641 Quality Signaling through Certification. Theory and an Application to Agricultural Seed Market (2003). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers (11) RePEc:ide:wpaper:654 Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets (2003). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers (12) RePEc:mlb:wpaper:885 BUYER-SUPPLIER INTERACTION, ASSET SPECIFICITY, AND PRODUCT CHOICE (2003). The University of Melbourne / Department of Economics - Working Papers Series (13) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9518 Time in Purgatory: Determinants of the Grant Lag for U.S. Patent Applications (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (14) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9978 Lessons from Patents: Using Patents To Measure Technological Change in Environmental Models (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (15) RePEc:net:wpaper:0305 Network Interconnection With Competitive Transit (2003). NET Institute / Working Papers (16) RePEc:net:wpaper:0311 Adoption Delay in a Standards War (2003). NET Institute / Working Papers (17) RePEc:nus:nusewp:wp0311 Competing Payment Schemes (2003). National University of Singapore, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers (18) RePEc:nus:nusewp:wp0314 Multihoming and compatibility (2003). National University of Singapore, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers (19) RePEc:rne:rneart:v:2:y:2003:i:2:p:50-68 Theory of Credit Card Networks: A Survey of the Literature (2003). Review of Network Economics (20) RePEc:rne:rneart:v:2:y:2003:i:2:p:97-124 The Theory of Interchange Fees: A Synthesis of Recent Contributions (2003). Review of Network Economics (21) RePEc:usn:usnawp:3 Mergers with Quality Differentiated Products (2003). United States Naval Academy Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers (22) RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0308001 Do Buyer-Size Discounts Depend on the Curvature of the Surplus Function? Experimental Tests of Bargaining Models (2003). EconWPA / Experimental (23) RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:spii2003-24 Buyers Alliances for Bargaining Power (2003). Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competitiveness and Industrial Change (CIC) / CIC Working Papers Latest citations received in: 2002 (1) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3214 The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences (2002). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers (2) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3215 How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions (2002). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers (3) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200234 Socially optimal mechanisms (2002). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (4) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200244 The effectiveness of caps on political lobbying (2002). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (5) RePEc:ide:wpaper:660 The Activities of a Monopoly Firm in Adjacent Competitive Markets: Economic Consequences and Implications for Competition Policy (2002). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers (6) RePEc:nbr:nberte:0280 Identification and Inference in Nonlinear Difference-In-Differences Models (2002). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Technical Working Papers (7) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8976 Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Strategic Behavior (2002). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (8) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8989 Ownership Form and Trapped Capital in the Hospital Industry (2002). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (9) RePEc:nuf:econwp:0214 Buyer Countervailing Power versus Monopoly Power: Evidence from Experimental Posted-Offer Markets (2002). Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford / Economics Papers (10) RePEc:soz:wpaper:0212 Estimating Vertical Foreclosure in U.S. Gasoline Supply (2002). University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute / Working Papers (11) RePEc:van:wpaper:0221 Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signalling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses In Settlement Bargaining (2002). Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University / Working Papers (12) RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0201003 Competition or Predation? Schumpeterian Rivalry in Network Markets (2002). EconWPA / Industrial Organization (13) RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0209001 Price Adjustments and Asymmetry in the Philippine Retail Gasoline Market (2002). EconWPA / Industrial Organization (14) RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0211012 Plastic Clashes: Competition among Closed and Open Systems in the Credit Card Industry. (2002). EconWPA / Industrial Organization Latest citations received in: 2001 (1) RePEc:cir:cirwor:2001s-64 Real Options, Preemption, and the Dynamics of Industry Investments (2001). CIRANO / CIRANO Working Papers (2) RePEc:cre:uqamwp:20-10 Real Options, Preemption, and the Dynamics of Industry Investments (2001). Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques / Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM (3) RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp260 Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure with Convex Downstream Costs (2001). DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research / Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin (4) RePEc:hhs:osloec:2001_018 The TV industry : advertising and programming (2001). Oslo University, Department of Economics / Memorandum (5) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp327 A Product Market Theory of Training and Turnover in Firms (2001). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers (6) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:4:y:2001:i:3:p:203-219 Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game (2001). Experimental Economics (7) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8445 Consumers and Agency Problems (2001). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (8) RePEc:sef:csefwp:76 The Political Economy of Finance (2001). Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy / CSEF Working Papers Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results. Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series. |
