Economics of Governance

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.17 0 0 0 0.08 1997 0.2 0 0 0 0.08 1998 0.23 0 0 0 0.1 1999 0.32 0 0 0 0.16 2000 0.43 14 9 0 0 0.19 2001 0.39 15 17 14 0 4 0.27 0.17 2002 0.14 0.42 16 50 29 4 0 2 0.13 0.2 2003 0.16 0.47 17 39 31 5 0 2 0.12 0.22 2004 0.36 0.51 20 26 33 12 0 2 0.1 0.23
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2002:i:2:p:87-99 Trust breeds trust: How taxpayers are treated (2002).
Cited: 31 times.

(2) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2002:i:1:p:23-45 Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty? (2002).
Cited: 10 times.

(3) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:2:p:91-102 On the negative social value of central banks knowledge transparency (2003).
Cited: 9 times.

(4) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:5:y:2004:i:3:p:255-267 A political economy model of immigration quotas (2004).
Cited: 9 times.

(5) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:2:p:143-160 Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility (2003).
Cited: 9 times.

(6) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:1:p:81-89 Lobbying contests with alternative instruments (2003).
Cited: 7 times.

(7) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:5:y:2004:i:3:p:235-253 Moral suasion: An alternative tax policy strategy? Evidence from a controlled field experiment in Switzerland (2004).
Cited: 7 times.

(8) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:6:y:2005:i:2:p:177-197 Influence costs and hierarchy (2005).
Cited: 7 times.

(9) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:2:y:2001:i:3:p:173-202 The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not (2001).
Cited: 6 times.

(10) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:1:p:1-18 Trade intensity, country size and corruption (2003).
Cited: 4 times.

(11) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:6:y:2004:i:1:p:75-90 Does better governance foster efficiency? An aggregate frontier analysis (2004).
Cited: 4 times.

(12) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:1:p:57-80 Voting on public pensions with hands and feet (2003).
Cited: 4 times.

(13) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:6:y:2004:i:1:p:13-31 Frames of reference, the environment, and efficient taxation (2004).
Cited: 3 times.

(14) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:1:y:2000:i:1:p:3-11 The state: Agent or proprietor? (2000).
Cited: 3 times.

(15) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:3:p:177-186 On evolutionarily stable behavior in contests (2003).
Cited: 3 times.

(16) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2002:i:2:p:153-170 The flypaper effect and political strength (2002).
Cited: 3 times.

(17) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2002:i:1:p:1-21 When should central bankers be fired? (2002).
Cited: 3 times.

(18) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:2:y:2001:i:3:p:231-242 Optimal law enforcement when victims are rational players (2001).
Cited: 3 times.

(19) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2002:i:3:p:227-239 Central government subsidies to local public goods (2002).
Cited: 3 times.

(20) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:1:y:2000:i:1:p:25-51 Property rights and the evolution of the state (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(21) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:2:y:2001:i:1:p:59-67 Social decision rules are not immune to conflict (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(22) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:2:y:2001:i:1:p:3-24 Targeting and political support for welfare spending (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(23) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:1:y:2000:i:2:p:105-122 Federalism, distributive politics and representative democracy (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(24) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:2:y:2001:i:3:p:203-229 Endogenous institutions in bureaucratic compliance games (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(25) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:3:p:229-243 How corruption affects persistent capital flows (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(26) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:1:p:3-29 When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in conflict (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(27) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:3:p:187-214 Organizational structure and innovative activity (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

(28) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:3:p:211-227 No Pretense to Honesty: County Government Corruption in Mississippi (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(29) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:8:y:2007:i:3:p:233-261 Political institutions and economic growth (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(30) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:1:p:53-73 On thugs and heroes: Why warlords victimize their own civilians (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(31) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:8:y:2007:i:2:p:111-128 Party alternation, divided government, and fiscal performance within US States (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(32) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:6:y:2005:i:3:p:245-252 Preemptive behavior in sequential-move tournaments with heterogeneous agents (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(33) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2001:i:1:p:35-58 How to understand, and deal with dictatorship: an economists view (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(34) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:5:y:2004:i:2:p:167-186 The impact of performance-based budgeting on state fiscal performance (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(35) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:3:p:271-291 Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(36) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:6:y:2005:i:2:p:159-175 Maximin choice of voting rules for committees (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(37) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:3:p:229-243 The Nature of Corruption Deterrence in a Competitive Media Sector (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(38) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2002:i:3:p:183-209 Corruption, economic growth, and income inequality in Africa (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(39) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:2:y:2001:i:1:p:85-99 Social identity, inequality and conflict (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(40) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:1:p:75-87 Fighting against the odds (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(41) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:6:y:2004:i:1:p:1-12 The rise of environmentalism, pollution taxes and intra-industry trade (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(42) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:8:y:2007:i:3:p:179-179 Introduction (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(43) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:2:y:2001:i:1:p:35-58 How to understand, and deal with dictatorship: an economists view (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(44) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:8:y:2007:i:1:p:37-49 Budgetary Procedures and Deficits in Norwegian Local Governments (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(45) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:1:y:2000:i:3:p:199-212 Social pressure, uncertainty, and cooperation (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

(46) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:5:y:2004:i:2:p:119-135 The break-up of municipalities: Voting behavior in local referenda (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(47) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:3:p:245-269 Corruption, Growth, and Income Distribution: Are there Regional Differences? (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(48) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:1:y:2000:i:1:p:77-103 The rationality of revolution (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

(49) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:6:y:2005:i:2:p:105-111 A note on CEO compensation, elimination tournaments and bankruptcy risk (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001

Latest citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:bol:bodewp:520 A positive analysis of immigration policy (2004). Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna / Working Papers

(2) RePEc:mar:volksw:200426 Illegal, Immoral, Fattening or What?: How Deterrence and Responsive Regulation Shape Tax Morale (2004). Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) / Working Pap

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000315 The W effect of incentives (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(2) RePEc:diw:diwvjh:72-20-2 Bildung im Zeitalter mobilen Humankapitals (2003). Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_760 Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis (2002). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(2) RePEc:uct:uconnp:2002-29 Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker? (2002). University of Connecticut, Department of Economics / Working papers

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3050 Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages (2001). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2001-01 A method to define strata boundaries (2001). Department of Economics University of Milan Italy / Departemental Working Papers

(3) RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2001-02 Statistical analysis of the inhomogeneous telegraphers process (2001). Department of Economics University of Milan Italy / Departemental Working Papers

(4) RePEc:nzt:nztwps:01/26 Three Steps Towards More Effective Development Assistance (2001). New Zealand Treasury / Treasury Working Paper Series

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.