International Journal of Game Theory

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.02 0.17 30 131 45 1 0 3 0.1 0.08 1997 0.18 0.2 0 55 10 0 0.08 1998 0.13 0.23 81 257 30 4 0 8 0.1 0.1 1999 0.14 0.32 35 119 81 11 0 1 0.03 0.16 2000 0.37 0.43 31 47 116 43 0 7 0.23 0.19 2001 0.26 0.39 29 48 66 17 0 5 0.17 0.17 2002 0.2 0.42 29 21 60 12 0 2 0.07 0.2 2003 0.19 0.47 28 24 58 11 0 4 0.14 0.22 2004 0.12 0.51 28 25 57 7 0 2 0.07 0.23
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:269-299 Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness (1998).
Cited: 52 times.

(2) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:245-256 Link formation in cooperative situations (1998).
Cited: 38 times.

(3) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:24:y:1995:i:4:p:323-44 An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives. (1995).
Cited: 32 times.

(4) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:22:y:1993:i:2:p:171-98 Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information. (1993).
Cited: 32 times.

(5) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:3:p:379-401 The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities (1998).
Cited: 30 times.

(6) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:289-301 On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games. (1996).
Cited: 30 times.

(7) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:15:y:1986:i:3:p:187-200 On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse. (1986).
Cited: 27 times.

(8) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:19:y:1990:i:1:p:59-89 Evolutionary Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties. (1990).
Cited: 26 times.

(9) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:3:p:273-91 A Bounded-Rationality Approach to the Study of Noncooperative Games. (1989).
Cited: 23 times.

(10) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:3:p:375-392 Population uncertainty and Poisson games (1998).
Cited: 22 times.

(11) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:131-152 Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An experimental study (1999).
Cited: 17 times.

(12) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:3:p:277-93 Games with Permission Structures: The Conjunctive Approach. (1992).
Cited: 16 times.

(13) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:2:p:245-58 The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments. (1996).
Cited: 15 times.

(14) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:303-27 Expectations and Fairness in a Simple Bargaining Experiment. (1996).
Cited: 14 times.

(15) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:3:p:263-300 Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge (1999).
Cited: 14 times.

(16) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:4:p:419-27 Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games. (1992).
Cited: 14 times.

(17) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:4:p:393-418 Characterization and Computation of Nash-Equilibria for Auctions with Incomplete Information. (1992).
Cited: 13 times.

(18) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2001:i:4:p:487-494 Stability in coalition formation games (2001).
Cited: 12 times.

(19) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:23:y:1994:i:1:p:75-83 Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities. (1994).
Cited: 12 times.

(20) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:241-252 Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game (1999).
Cited: 12 times.

(21) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:1:p:37-44 A Set of Axioms for a Value for Partition Function Games. (1989).
Cited: 12 times.

(22) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:2:p:185-87 Credible Coalitions and the Core. (1989).
Cited: 12 times.

(23) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:385-406 Voter Turnout as a Participation Game: An Experimental Investigation. (1996).
Cited: 12 times.

(24) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:113-136 Order of Play in Strategically Equivalent Games in Extensive Form (1998).
Cited: 12 times.

(25) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:3:p:249-66 The Shapley Value for Cooperative Games under Precedence Constraints. (1992).
Cited: 11 times.

(26) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:4:p:389-407 The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games. (1989).
Cited: 11 times.

(27) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:3:p:293-310 On Equilibria in Repeated Games with Absorbing States. (1989).
Cited: 11 times.

(28) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:1:p:57-89 Lower Equilibrium Payoffs in Two-Player Repeated Games with Non-observable Actions. (1989).
Cited: 11 times.

(29) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:4:p:511-520 Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems (1999).
Cited: 11 times.

(30) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:27-43 An Axiomatization of the Disjunctive Permission Value for Games with a Permission Structure (1998).
Cited: 10 times.

(31) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:3:p:399-424 Cores of non-atomic market games (2006).
Cited: 9 times.

(32) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:223-227 Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games (1998).
Cited: 9 times.

(33) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:2:p:269-287 Loss aversion equilibrium (2000).
Cited: 9 times.

(34) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:3:p:335-351 Ternary Voting Games (1998).
Cited: 9 times.

(35) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:1:p:27-39 Weighted Values and the Core. (1992).
Cited: 9 times.

(36) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:17:y:1988:i:4:p:279-300 Bargaining in Cooperative Games. (1988).
Cited: 8 times.

(37) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:157-171 The core of an economy with a common pool resource: A partition function form approach (1999).
Cited: 8 times.

(38) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2005:i:4:p:505-514 A characterization of the position value* (2005).
Cited: 8 times.

(39) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:17:y:1988:i:2:p:89-99 An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value. (1988).
Cited: 8 times.

(40) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:1:p:13-25 Cautious Utility Maximization and Iterated Weak Dominance. (1992).
Cited: 8 times.

(41) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:269-87 An Experimental Study of Constant-Sum Centipede Games. (1996).
Cited: 8 times.

(42) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:111-130 Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games (1999).
Cited: 8 times.

(43) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:2:p:227-40 A Value for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation. (1989).
Cited: 8 times.

(44) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:19:y:1990:i:2:p:191-217 Nash Equilibria of n-Player Repeated Games with Semi-standard Information. (1990).
Cited: 8 times.

(45) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:2:p:177-88 Mediated Talk. (1996).
Cited: 8 times.

(46) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:1-14 The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications (1999).
Cited: 7 times.

(47) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:23:y:1994:i:3:p:261-81 Collusion Properties of Values. (1994).
Cited: 7 times.

(48) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:31:y:2002:i:1:p:69-89 On the impact of low-balling: Experimental results in asymmetric auctions (2002).
Cited: 7 times.

(49) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:22:y:1993:i:3:p:279-302 Adjustment Patterns and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Signaling Games. (1993).
Cited: 7 times.

(50) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:3:p:211-26 On the Equilibrium Payoffs Set of Two Player Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. (1992).
Cited: 7 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001

Latest citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:mtl:montde:2004-14 Nearly Serial Sharing Methods (2004). Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques / Cahiers de recherche

(2) RePEc:upf:upfgen:788 Global Nash Convergence of Foster and Youngs Regret Testing (2004). Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Economics Working Papers

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:icr:wpmath:25-2003 Archimedean Copulae and Positive Dependence. (2003). ICER - International Centre for Economic Research / ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series

(2) RePEc:icr:wpmath:28-2003 Some Counterexamples in Positive Dependence. (2003). ICER - International Centre for Economic Research / ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series

(3) RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0310003 Learning about Learning in Games through Experimental Control of Strategic Interdependence (2003). EconWPA / Experimental

(4) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0312004 A Wide Range No-Regret Theorem (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1356 Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations (2002). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0205002 The Amsterdam Auction (2002). EconWPA / Microeconomics

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0011 The Demand Bargaining Set: General Characterization and Application to Majority Games (2001). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers

(2) RePEc:att:bielme:2001324 The dummy paradox of the bargaining set (2001). University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics / Working papers

(3) RePEc:att:bielme:2001325 Reconfirming the prenucleolus (2001). University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics / Working papers

(4) RePEc:att:bielme:2001326 The positive core of a cooperative game (2001). University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics / Working papers

(5) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp267 Reconfirming the Prenucleolus (2001). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

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Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.