Review of Economic Design
Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.
  Most cited documents in this series: (1) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:35-55 Responsibility, talent, and compensation: A second-best analysis (1999). Cited: 10 times. (2) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:13-33 Monotonic extensions on economic domains (1999). Cited: 6 times. (3) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:371-387 Efficient venture capital financing combining debt and equity (1998). Cited: 6 times. (4) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:2:p:93-127 The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Efficient networks (1998). Cited: 6 times. (5) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:57-72 Feasible implementation of taxation methods (1999). Cited: 6 times. (6) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:29-43 Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods (1997). Cited: 5 times. (7) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:461-480 First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge (2002). Cited: 5 times. (8) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:2:p:137-147 Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market (1998). Cited: 5 times. (9) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:45-56 How to get firms to invest: A simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation (2002). Cited: 5 times. (10) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:237-255 A mechanism design approach to an optimal contract under ex ante and ex post private information (1998). Cited: 4 times. (11) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:413-428 Trust and social efficiencies (2002). Cited: 4 times. (12) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:329-345 Managerial costs for one-shot decentralized information processing (1998). Cited: 4 times. (13) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:371-396 Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment (2002). Cited: 4 times. (14) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:15-27 The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Essential networks (1997). Cited: 3 times. (15) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:75-89 Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian (1997). Cited: 3 times. (16) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:75-91 Achieving the first best in sequencing problems (2002). Cited: 3 times. (17) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:357-379 Taxation in an economy with private provision of public goods (1999). Cited: 3 times. (18) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:215-236 On durable goods monopolies and the Coase-Conjecture (1998). Cited: 3 times. (19) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:307-343 A profit-center game with incomplete information (1999). Cited: 3 times. (20) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:273-292 Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment (1999). Cited: 3 times. (21) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:45-55 Redistribution and individual characteristics (1997). Cited: 3 times. (22) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:195-213 Fair allocation in a general model with indivisible goods (1998). Cited: 2 times. (23) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:255-272 Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem (1999). Cited: 2 times. (24) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:353-370 Mediation and the Nash bargaining solution (2002). Cited: 2 times. (25) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:257-269 Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior (1998). Cited: 2 times. (26) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:27-43 Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory (2002). Cited: 2 times. (27) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:303-328 On optimality of illegal collusion in contracts (1998). Cited: 2 times. (28) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:345-356 Solutions for cooperative games with r alternatives (1999). Cited: 1 times. (29) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:1-15 A study of proportionality and robustness in economies with a commonly owned technology (2002). Cited: 1 times. (30) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:295-305 Organizational restructuring in response to changes in information-processing technology (1999). Cited: 1 times. (31) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:2:p:167-191 An extensive form solution to the adverse selection problem in principal/multi-agent environments (1998). Cited: 1 times. (32) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:2:p:127-151 Natural and double implementation of public ownership solutions in differentiable production economies (1999). Cited: 1 times. (33) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:1-12 Decision-making under risk: Editing procedures based on correlated similarities, and preference overdetermination (1999). Cited: 1 times. (34) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:359-369 Process innovation and the persistence of monopoly with labour-managed firms (1998). Cited: 1 times. (35) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:2:p:179-187 A note on van Dammes mechanism (1999). Cited: 1 times. (36) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:381-387 Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness (1999). Cited: 1 times. Latest citations received in: | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 Latest citations received in: 2004 Latest citations received in: 2003 Latest citations received in: 2002 (1) RePEc:ind:isipdp:02-05 Understanding reciprocity (2002). Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India / Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers Latest citations received in: 2001 Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results. Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.
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