Citations in Economics

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Updated May, 1 2008 147.392 documents processed, 3.154.300 references and 1.403.701 citations

Social Choice and Welfare

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:

	IF	AIF	DOC	CIT	D2Y	C2Y	SC(%)	CiY	II	AII
1996		0.17	30	55	0		0			0.08
1997	0.03	0.2	40	58	30	1	0			0.08
1998	0.07	0.23	39	109	70	5	0	7	0.18	0.1
1999	0.22	0.32	43	103	79	17	0	3	0.07	0.16
2000	0.13	0.43	32	62	82	11	0	2	0.06	0.19
2001	0.2	0.39	45	144	75	15	0	7	0.16	0.17
2002	0.21	0.42	56	89	77	16	0	7	0.13	0.2
2003	0.37	0.47	63	70	101	37	0	8	0.13	0.22
2004	0.2	0.51	60	40	119	24	0	5	0.08	0.23

IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.

AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y

Impact Factor:

Immediacy Index:

Documents published:

Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:1:p:135-153 Core in a simple coalition formation game (2001).
Cited: 45 times.

(2) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:4:p:655-708 A crash course in implementation theory (2001).
Cited: 29 times.

(3) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:4:p:639-653 Characterizations of Lorenz curves and income distributions (2000).
Cited: 24 times.

(4) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:3:p:431-464 The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting (2001).
Cited: 21 times.

(5) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:4:p:557-567 Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods (1999).
Cited: 17 times.

(6) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:2:p:187-199 Opting out of publicly provided services: A majority voting result (1998).
Cited: 15 times.

(7) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1997:i:4:p:513-525 Non-cooperative implementation of the core (1997).
Cited: 15 times.

(8) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:2:p:263-287 The measurement of opportunity inequality: a cardinality-based approach (1998).
Cited: 15 times.

(9) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:3:p:343-355 Redistribution and compensation (*) (1996).
Cited: 14 times.

(10) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:2:p:183-196 Intersecting generalized Lorenz curves and the Gini index (1999).
Cited: 14 times.

(11) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:3:p:445-454 Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions (1998).
Cited: 13 times.

(12) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1997:i:3:p:427-438 A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation (1997).
Cited: 12 times.

(13) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:2:p:455-471 Equality of opportunity: A progress report (2002).
Cited: 11 times.

(14) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:2:p:349-367 Envy, malice and Pareto efficiency: An experimental examination (2002).
Cited: 11 times.

(15) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:4:p:567-582 Axiomatizations of the normalized Banzhaf value and the Shapley value (1998).
Cited: 11 times.

(16) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:1:p:69-93 Multidimensional poverty indices (2002).
Cited: 10 times.

(17) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:24:y:2005:i:2:p:253-267 Multi-profile welfarism: A generalization (2005).
Cited: 10 times.

(18) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:3:p:349-371 On the power of poverty orderings (1999).
Cited: 10 times.

(19) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:4:p:619-653 An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions (2001).
Cited: 10 times.

(20) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:129-145 Utilities, preferences, and substantive goods (1996).
Cited: 8 times.

(21) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:1:p:17-40 Consequences, opportunities, and procedures (1998).
Cited: 8 times.

(22) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1997:i:1:p:67-80 Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights (1997).
Cited: 8 times.

(23) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:3:p:533-558 Negatively interdependent preferences (2000).
Cited: 8 times.

(24) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:25:y:2005:i:2:p:457-474 Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting (2005).
Cited: 7 times.

(25) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:20:y:2003:i:3:p:457-465 How to cut a pizza fairly: Fair division with decreasing marginal evaluations (2003).
Cited: 7 times.

(26) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:24:y:2005:i:1:p:171-197 Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations (2005).
Cited: 7 times.

(27) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:3:p:527-541 Locating libraries on a street (2001).
Cited: 7 times.

(28) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:57-64 Equitable opportunities in economic environments (1996).
Cited: 7 times.

(29) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:4:p:481-488 When is Condorcets Jury Theorem valid? (1998).
Cited: 6 times.

(30) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:1:p:145-157 Multidimensional inequality and multidimensional generalized entropy measures: An axiomatic derivation (1998).
Cited: 6 times.

(31) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:4:p:655-672 Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule (2000).
Cited: 6 times.

(32) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:20:y:2003:i:2:p:307-350 From preference to happiness: Towards a more complete welfare economics (2003).
Cited: 6 times.

(33) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:21:y:2003:i:2:p:347-384 On the informational basis of social choice (2003).
Cited: 6 times.

(34) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:21:y:2003:i:1:p:39-61 Farsighted stability in hedonic games (2003).
Cited: 6 times.

(35) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:3:p:371-382 Ranking opportunity sets on the basis of their freedom of choice and their ability to satisfy preferences: A difficulty (1998).
Cited: 6 times.

(36) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:3:p:373-394 Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: A survey and open questions (1999).
Cited: 6 times.

(37) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:4:p:513-532 Comparison functions and choice correspondences (1999).
Cited: 6 times.

(38) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:2:p:233-258 Using equivalent income of equivalent adults to rank income distributions (1999).
Cited: 6 times.

(39) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:4:p:569-583 Cooperative production with unequal skills: The solidarity approach to compensation (1999).
Cited: 6 times.

(40) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:25:y:2005:i:2:p:381-418 The news of the death of welfare economics is greatly exaggerated (2005).
Cited: 5 times.

(41) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:2:p:283-292 Interpretation of electoral mixed strategies (2000).
Cited: 5 times.

(42) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:2:p:239-261 Connecting and resolving Sens and Arrows theorems (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

(43) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:21:y:2003:i:2:p:243-263 The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian (2003).
Cited: 5 times.

(44) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:2:p:231-249 The TAL-Family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems (2006).
Cited: 5 times.

(45) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:47-56 Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies (1996).
Cited: 5 times.

(46) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:289-301 Characterizing uncertainty aversion through preference for mixtures (2001).
Cited: 5 times.

(47) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:2:p:297-311 Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

(48) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:4:p:487-496 Social welfare functions and fairness (1996).
Cited: 5 times.

(49) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:3:p:569-580 Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules (2002).
Cited: 5 times.

(50) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:4:p:521-542 Extended Pareto rules and relative utilitarianism (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001

Latest citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:aub:autbar:623.04 Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint (2004). Unitat de Fonaments de l'AnÃ lisi EconÃ²mica (UAB) and Institut d'AnÃ lisi EconÃ²mica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(2) RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2004:i:11:p:1-7 Good and bad objects: the symmetric difference rule (2004). Economics Bulletin

(3) RePEc:rug:rugwps:04/240 Equality of opportunity versus equality of opportunity sets (2004). Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration / Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent Univers

(4) RePEc:tky:fseres:2004cf304 Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems (2004). CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo / CIRJE F-Series

(5) RePEc:usi:wpaper:429 Freedom, Time Constraints and Progressive Taxation (2004). Department of Economics, University of Siena / Experimental Economics

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1421 Robust Mechanism Design (2003). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2003:i:26:p:1-5 Intergenerational preferences and sensitivity to the present (2003). Economics Bulletin

(3) RePEc:gco:abcdef:69 Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores: A Comment (2003). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition

(4) RePEc:icr:wpmath:01-2003 The convexity-cone approach to comparative risk and downside risk. (2003). ICER - International Centre for Economic Research / ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series

(5) RePEc:icr:wpmath:10-2003 A folk theorem for minority games. (2003). ICER - International Centre for Economic Research / ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series

(6) RePEc:icr:wpmath:15-2003 Unequal uncertainties and uncertain inequalities: an axiomatic approach. (2003). ICER - International Centre for Economic Research / ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series

(7) RePEc:icr:wpmath:18-2003 Decision Making with Imprecise Probabilistic Information. (2003). ICER - International Centre for Economic Research / ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series

(8) RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:41 On the Generic Strategic Stability of Nash Equilibria if Voting is Costly (2003). Tor Vergata University, CEIS / Research Paper Series

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:att:bielme:2002340 Dividing the indivisible : procedures for allocating cabinet ministries to political parties in a parliamentary system (2002). University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics / Working papers

(2) RePEc:aub:autbar:535.02 A Maximal Domain of Preferences for Tops-only Rules in the Division Problem (2002). Unitat de Fonaments de l'AnÃ lisi EconÃ²mica (UAB) and Institut d'AnÃ lisi EconÃ²mica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(3) RePEc:cvs:starer:02-06 Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System (2002). C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University / Working Papers

(4) RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0017 Optimal Utilitarian Taxation and Horizontal Equity (2002). The Ratio Institute / Ratio Working Papers

(5) RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2002_019 Optimal Utilitarian Taxation and Horizontal Equity (2002). Uppsala University, Department of Economics / Working Paper Series

(6) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8973 Democratic Policy Making with Real-Time Agenda Setting: Part 1 (2002). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(7) RePEc:usg:dp2002:2002-30 A Little Fairness may Induce a Lot of Redistribution in Democracy (2002). Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen / University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2002

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:att:bielme:2001322 Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory? (2001). University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics / Working papers

(2) RePEc:aub:autbar:479.01 Bidding for the Surplus: Realizing Efficient Outcomes in General Economic Environments (2001). Unitat de Fonaments de l'AnÃ lisi EconÃ²mica (UAB) and Institut d'AnÃ lisi EconÃ²mica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(3) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3042 Optimal Majority Rules and Enhanced Cooperation (2001). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(4) RePEc:gco:abcdef:22 Coalition Formation Games with Separable Preferences, (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition

(5) RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2001-11 TOPS RESPONSIVENESS, STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND COALITION FORMATION PROBLEMS (2001). Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) / Working Papers. Serie AD

(6) RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-25 Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle. (2001). Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques / Cahiers de recherche

(7) RePEc:wop:safiwp:01-08-039 On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agents (2001). Santa Fe Institute / Working Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.