Journal of Legal Studies

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.19 0.17 19 28 54 10 0 0.08 1997 0.03 0.2 22 56 38 1 0 0.08 1998 0.05 0.23 31 72 41 2 0 3 0.1 0.1 1999 0.19 0.32 17 18 53 10 0 0.16 2000 0.27 0.43 42 106 48 13 0 7 0.17 0.19 2001 0.12 0.39 34 33 59 7 0 2 0.06 0.17 2002 0.14 0.42 38 30 76 11 0 3 0.08 0.2 2003 0.1 0.47 11 3 72 7 0 0.22 2004 0.1 0.51 16 9 49 5 0 0.23
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:1-17 A Fine is a Price. (2000).
Cited: 54 times.

(2) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:18:y:1989:i:2:p:325-63 An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law. (1989).
Cited: 27 times.

(3) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:27:y:1998:i:1:p:1-43 Allocating Resources among Prisons and Social Programs in the Battle against Crime. (1998).
Cited: 22 times.

(4) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:21:y:1992:i:1:p:115-57 Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry. (1992).
Cited: 21 times.

(5) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:503-25 The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right. (2001).
Cited: 15 times.

(6) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:18:y:1989:i:2:p:427-47 Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule. (1989).
Cited: 15 times.

(7) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:1-68 Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns. (1997).
Cited: 12 times.

(8) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:22:y:1993:i:1:p:161-86 Alcohol-Control Policies and Motor-Vehicle Fatalities. (1993).
Cited: 12 times.

(9) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:21:y:1992:i:1:p:159-87 An Attempt at Measuring the Total Monetary Penalty from Drug Convictions: The Importance of an Individuals Reputation. (1992).
Cited: 11 times.

(10) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:585-608 Expressive Law and Economics. (1998).
Cited: 11 times.

(11) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:22:y:1993:i:1:p:135-59 Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining. (1993).
Cited: 10 times.

(12) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:203-37 Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification. (1997).
Cited: 10 times.

(13) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:23:y:1994:i:2:p:721-47 The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach. (1994).
Cited: 9 times.

(14) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:255-86 An Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Procedure and Proposed Reforms. (2000).
Cited: 9 times.

(15) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:27:y:1998:i:1:p:187-207 The Bankruptcy Puzzle. (1998).
Cited: 9 times.

(16) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:23:y:1994:i:1:p:307-401 The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis. (1994).
Cited: 8 times.

(17) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:23:y:1994:i:2:p:895-910 Noncompensatory Damages and Potential Insolvency. (1994).
Cited: 8 times.

(18) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:287-300 Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When Violators Have Heterogeneous Probabilities of Apprehension. (2000).
Cited: 8 times.

(19) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:17:y:1988:i:2:p:437-50 Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer. (1988).
Cited: 8 times.

(20) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:23:y:1994:i:2:p:667-81 Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income. (1994).
Cited: 7 times.

(21) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:19:y:1990:i:2:p:617-51 Apportioning Damages among Potentially Insolvent Actors. (1990).
Cited: 7 times.

(22) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:575-612 The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System. (1997).
Cited: 7 times.

(23) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:18:y:1989:i:1:p:157-79 Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or Ill Be Suing You. (1989).
Cited: 7 times.

(24) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:413-31 Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective. (1997).
Cited: 7 times.

(25) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:25:y:1996:i:2:p:371-403 An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11. (1996).
Cited: 6 times.

(26) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:623-61 The Predictability of Punitive Damages. (1997).
Cited: 6 times.

(27) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:24:y:1995:i:2:p:427-62 The Selection of Employment Discrimination Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis. (1995).
Cited: 6 times.

(28) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:205-32 The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the Rate of Litigation: The Election versus Appointment of State Judges. (1999).
Cited: 6 times.

(29) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:22:y:1993:i:1:p:187-210 Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation. (1993).
Cited: 6 times.

(30) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:21:y:1992:i:2:p:259-70 Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information about Risk. (1992).
Cited: 6 times.

(31) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:23:y:1994:i:1:p:41-76 Multidefendant Settlements: The Impact of Joint and Several Liability. (1994).
Cited: 6 times.

(32) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:21:y:1992:i:2:p:271-318 Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies. (1992).
Cited: 6 times.

(33) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:25:y:1996:i:1:p:1-25 A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue. (1996).
Cited: 6 times.

(34) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:17:y:1988:i:1:p:151-64 The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability. (1988).
Cited: 6 times.

(35) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:23:y:1994:i:1:p:517-42 Multidefendant Settlements under Joint and Several Liability: The Problem of Insolvency. (1994).
Cited: 6 times.

(36) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:29:y:2000:i:2:p:797-820 Taxes versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View. (2000).
Cited: 5 times.

(37) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:23:y:1994:i:1:p:435-63 An Economic Model of Legal Discovery. (1994).
Cited: 5 times.

(38) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:27:y:1998:i:1:p:67-112 Profit-Sharing Contracts in Hollywood: Evolution and Analysis. (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

(39) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:23:y:1994:i:2:p:832-67 The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability. (1994).
Cited: 5 times.

(40) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:237-53 Do People Want Optimal Deterrence? (2000).
Cited: 5 times.

(41) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:34:y:2005:p:515-555 Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: Why Are So Few Challenged? (2005).
Cited: 5 times.

(42) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:24:y:1995:i:1:p:29-62 Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial. (1995).
Cited: 5 times.

(43) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:27:y:1998:i:1:p:141-57 Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs? (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

(44) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:19:y:1990:i:1:p:247-60 The Courts and the Market: An Economic Analysis of Contingent Fees in Class-Action Litigation. (1990).
Cited: 5 times.

(45) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:24:y:1995:i:1:p:1-28 Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis. (1995).
Cited: 5 times.

(46) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:21:y:1992:i:2:p:365-70 Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension. (1992).
Cited: 5 times.

(47) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:31:y:2002:i:2:p:233-71 Corporate Laws Limits. (2002).
Cited: 4 times.

(48) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:24:y:1995:i:1:p:123-38 Some Experimental Evidence on Differences between Student and Prisoner Reactions to Monetary Penalties and Risk. (1995).
Cited: 4 times.

(49) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:23:y:1994:i:1:p:111-57 Should We Abolish Chapter 11? The Evidence from Japan. (1994).
Cited: 4 times.

(50) RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:19:y:1990:i:2:p:337-58 Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests. (1990).
Cited: 4 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001

Latest citations received in: 2004

Latest citations received in: 2003

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:clt:sswopa:1132 The Willingness to Pay/Willingness to Accept Gap, The Endowment Effect and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations (2002). California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences / Working Papers

(2) RePEc:gue:guelph:2002-16 Incomplete Property Rights and the Optimal Value of an Asset (2002). University of Guelph, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(3) RePEc:hhs:sifrwp:0011 Corporate Governance and the Home Bias (2002). Swedish Institute for Financial Research / SIFR Research Report Series

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:tky:fseres:2001cf126 When are Judges and Bureaucrats Left Independent? Theory and History from Imperial Japan, Postwar Japan, and the United States (2001). CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo / CIRJE F-Series

(2) RePEc:tky:fseres:2001cf131 The Myth of the Main Bank: Japan and Comparative Corporate Governance (2001). CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo / CIRJE F-Series

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.