University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences / CARESS Working Papres

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.2 0.16 10 6 20 4 50 0.07 1997 0.13 0.17 33 139 30 4 25 8 0.24 0.09 1998 0.23 0.19 15 75 43 10 0 4 0.27 0.12 1999 0.42 0.29 14 24 48 20 5 0.19 2000 0.69 0.39 15 16 29 20 0 2 0.13 0.2 2001 0.17 0.34 0 29 5 0 0.18 2002 0.39 0 15 0 0.2 2003 0.41 0 0 0 0.21 2004 0.47 0 0 0 0.25
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-20 Optimal Prediction Under Asymmetric Loss (1997).
Cited: 46 times.

(2) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-12 Who Wants a Good Reputation? (1998).
Cited: 25 times.

(3) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-02 An Economic Model of Representative Democracy (1995).
Cited: 17 times.

(4) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-05 Democratic Choice of an Education System: Implications for Growth and Income Distribution (1997).
Cited: 16 times.

(5) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-8 Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory (1997).
Cited: 11 times.

(6) RePEc:wop:pennca:99-09 Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (1999).
Cited: 10 times.

(7) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-11 Your Reputation Is Who Youre Not, Not Who Youd Like To Be (1998).
Cited: 10 times.

(8) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-14 Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models (1995).
Cited: 10 times.

(9) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-18 The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information* (1995).
Cited: 9 times.

(10) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-08 The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives (1998).
Cited: 9 times.

(11) RePEc:wop:pennca:rep-is-sep Your Reputation Is Who Youre Not, Not Who Youd Like To Be (1998).
Cited: 8 times.

(12) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-06 Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search (1998).
Cited: 8 times.

(13) RePEc:wop:pennca:endo-one Endogenous Interactions (1997).
Cited: 8 times.

(14) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-01 Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory (1998).
Cited: 7 times.

(15) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-19 Measuring Predictability: Theory and Macroeconomic Applications (1997).
Cited: 7 times.

(16) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-23 Child Health and Schooling Achievement: Association, Causality and Household Allocations (1997).
Cited: 7 times.

(17) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-22 How Strongly is Child Schooling Associated with Household Income'DONE' (1997).
Cited: 7 times.

(18) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-6 Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions (1997).
Cited: 6 times.

(19) RePEc:wop:pennca:00-04 Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem'DONE' (2000).
Cited: 6 times.

(20) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-13 Efficient Non-Contractible Investments (1998).
Cited: 6 times.

(21) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-02 Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching (1997).
Cited: 5 times.

(22) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-15 An Anti-Folk Theorem for a Class of Asynchronously Repeated Games (1995).
Cited: 5 times.

(23) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-07 Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

(24) RePEc:wop:pennca:imp-mon Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

(25) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-4 Indeterminacy, Home Production, and the Business Cycle: a Calibrated Analysis (1997).
Cited: 5 times.

(26) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-04 Justifying Rational Expectations (1995).
Cited: 4 times.

(27) RePEc:wop:pennca:99-06 Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence (1999).
Cited: 4 times.

(28) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-05 Learning Correlated Equilibria in Potential Games (1998).
Cited: 4 times.

(29) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-05 Co-operation and Timing (1995).
Cited: 4 times.

(30) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-2 Policy Persistence (1997).
Cited: 4 times.

(31) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-18 Evaluating Density Forecasts (1997).
Cited: 4 times.

(32) RePEc:wop:pennca:99-14 Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility (1999).
Cited: 3 times.

(33) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-9 A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search, Bargaining, and Money (1997).
Cited: 3 times.

(34) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-17 A Rudimentary Model of Search with Divisible Money and Prices (1995).
Cited: 3 times.

(35) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-01 Contagion (1997).
Cited: 3 times.

(36) RePEc:wop:pennca:00-03 Endogenous Lobbying (2000).
Cited: 3 times.

(37) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-14 Earnings and Wealth Inequality and Income Taxation: Quantifying the Trade-Offs of Switching to a Proportional Income Tax in the U.S. (1998).
Cited: 3 times.

(38) RePEc:wop:pennca:99-12 A Theory of Negotiation and Formation of Coalition (1999).
Cited: 2 times.

(39) RePEc:wop:pennca:00-08 Reducing Overlapping Generations Economies to Finite Economies (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(40) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-17 Technological Innovations: Slumps and Booms (1997).
Cited: 2 times.

(41) RePEc:wop:pennca:eff-inv-large Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(42) RePEc:wop:pennca:00-02 The Drawbacks of Electoral Competition (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(43) RePEc:wop:pennca:96-04 Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms (1996).
Cited: 2 times.

(44) RePEc:wop:pennca:99-13 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case (1999).
Cited: 2 times.

(45) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-7 A Model of Commodity Money, With Application to Greshams Law and the Debasement Puzzle (1997).
Cited: 2 times.

(46) RePEc:wop:pennca:99-11 Quantity Discounts for Taste-Varying Consumers (1999).
Cited: 2 times.

(47) RePEc:wop:pennca:00-05 Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(48) RePEc:wop:pennca:96-06 Approximate Common Knowledge Revisited (1996).
Cited: 2 times.

(49) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-12 Generic Existence of Sunspot Equilibria: The Case of real Assets (1995).
Cited: 1 times.

(50) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-10 The Dynamics of Technological Adoption in Hardware/Software Systems: The Case of Compact Disc Players (1997).
Cited: 1 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001

Latest citations received in: 2004

Latest citations received in: 2003

Latest citations received in: 2002

Latest citations received in: 2001

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.