EconWPA / Game Theory and Information
Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.
Raw data: | |
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IF |
AIF |
DOC |
CIT |
D2Y |
C2Y |
SC(%) |
CiY |
II |
AII |
1996 | 0.23 | 0.16 | 28 | 17 | 40 | 9 | 0 | 3 | 0.11 | 0.07 |
1997 | 0.1 | 0.17 | 38 | 77 | 41 | 4 | 75 | 6 | 0.16 | 0.09 |
1998 | 0.33 | 0.19 | 25 | 72 | 66 | 22 | 36.4 | 5 | 0.2 | 0.12 |
1999 | 0.27 | 0.29 | 22 | 79 | 63 | 17 | 5.9 | 3 | 0.14 | 0.19 |
2000 | 0.45 | 0.39 | 13 | 19 | 47 | 21 | 0 | 1 | 0.08 | 0.2 |
2001 | 0.26 | 0.34 | 23 | 30 | 35 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 0.04 | 0.18 |
2002 | 0.17 | 0.39 | 40 | 42 | 36 | 6 | 33.3 | 3 | 0.08 | 0.2 |
2003 | 0.24 | 0.41 | 61 | 66 | 63 | 15 | 13.3 | 14 | 0.23 | 0.21 |
2004 | 0.37 | 0.47 | 69 | 59 | 101 | 37 | 8.1 | 22 | 0.32 | 0.25 |
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Impact Factor:
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Immediacy Index:
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Documents published:
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Citations received:
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  Most cited documents in this series: (1) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9703010 Efficient Mechanism Design (1998). Cited: 33 times. (2) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0303011 A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency (2003). Cited: 27 times. (3) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9409002 An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction (1994). Cited: 22 times. (4) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9901004 The Generalized War of Attrition (1999). Cited: 22 times. (5) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9906003 Professional Advice (1999). Cited: 18 times. (6) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9904003 Prices and the Winners Curse (1999). Cited: 16 times. (7) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9410003 Evolution and Endogenous Interactions (1994). Cited: 13 times. (8) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9501002 Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoners Dilemma (1995). Cited: 11 times. (9) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0203002 The Stability of Price Dispersion under Seller and Consumer Learning (2002). Cited: 11 times. (10) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9307001 The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision (1994). Cited: 11 times. (11) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9705005 Credit in a Random Matching Model With Private Information (1997). Cited: 10 times. (12) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9702001 Learning to Like What You Have - Explaining the Endowment Effect (1997). Cited: 10 times. (13) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0401004 Knowledge Creation as a Square Dance on the Hilbert Cube (2004). Cited: 10 times. (14) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9407002 How Noise Matters (1994). Cited: 10 times. (15) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0103003 Quantum Market Games (2001). Cited: 9 times. (16) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9903001 Preference Evolution and Reciprocity (1999). Cited: 9 times. (17) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9707002 Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games (1997). Cited: 8 times. (18) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0408001 Pairwise Kidney Exchange (2005). Cited: 8 times. (19) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9405003 Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms (1994). Cited: 7 times. (20) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9307003 Rational Expectations and Rational Learning (1993). Cited: 7 times. (21) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9805004 Gale-Shapley Matching in an Evolutionary Trade Network Game (1998). Cited: 7 times. (22) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0004010 Alternative Semantics for Unawareness (2000). Cited: 7 times. (23) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9503004 Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies (1995). Cited: 7 times. (24) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0508004 Expected utility without utility (2005). Cited: 6 times. (25) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9507001 The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations (1998). Cited: 6 times. (26) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9809004 Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring (1998). Cited: 6 times. (27) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0403004 Payoffs-dependent Balancedness and Cores (2004). Cited: 6 times. (28) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9707009 Learning in Cournot Oligopoly - An Experiment (1997). Cited: 6 times. (29) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9811004 Through Trial & Error to Collusion (1998). Cited: 6 times. (30) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0004002 Cooperation and Punishment (2000). Cited: 5 times. (31) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9707004 A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty. (1997). Cited: 5 times. (32) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9703006 A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (1997). Cited: 5 times. (33) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0201003 Aspirational Bargaining (2002). Cited: 5 times. (34) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9705003 Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field (1997). Cited: 5 times. (35) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9803001 A Model of Financial Fragility (1998). Cited: 5 times. (36) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0404002 A Theory of Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions (2004). Cited: 5 times. (37) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9410002 Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection (1994). Cited: 5 times. (38) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9902003 A Model of Expertise (1999). Cited: 5 times. (39) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0107001 Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes and `Coverups (2001). Cited: 5 times. (40) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9708002 Interdependent Preference Formation (1997). Cited: 5 times. (41) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0203004 A vague theory of choice over time (2002). Cited: 4 times. (42) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0309001 Correlated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with Quantum Signals (2003). Cited: 4 times. (43) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9810001 Market Experimentation in a Dynamic Differentiated-Goods Duopoly (1999). Cited: 4 times. (44) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0504007 Individual Preferences for Giving (2005). Cited: 4 times. (45) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9609002 Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs (1996). Cited: 4 times. (46) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0410001 The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games (2004). Cited: 4 times. (47) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0504002 Collusion as an Informed Principal Problem (2005). Cited: 4 times. (48) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0506002 Political renegotiation of regulatory contracts (2005). Cited: 4 times. (49) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0503005 Search in the Formation of Large Networks: How Random are Socially Generated Networks? (2005). Cited: 4 times. (50) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9407001 Loss Aversion in a Multi-Period Model (1997). Cited: 4 times. Latest citations received in: | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 Latest citations received in: 2004 (1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0039 The Communication Requirements of of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets (2004). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers (2) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1117 The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity: Evidence from US Cities (2004). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series (3) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4233 The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity: Evidence from US Cities (2004). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers (4) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200453 Obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree situations and their monotonicity properties (2004). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (5) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200470 Social network formation with consent (2004). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (6) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2004025 The Fuzzy Core and the (Π, β)- Balanced Core (2004). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda (7) RePEc:ecm:feam04:629 Procurement Auctions for Differentiated Goods (2004). Econometric Society / Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings (8) RePEc:ecm:nasm04:91 The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity: Evidence from US cities (2004). Econometric Society / Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings (9) RePEc:ecm:nawm04:255 The performance of reverse auctions versus request for quotes when procuring goods with quality differences (2004). Econometric Society / Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings (10) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.34 The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity: Evidence from US Cities (2004). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers (11) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.92 Cities and Cultures (2004). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers (12) RePEc:mse:wpsorb:b04093 Transfer rate rules and core selections in NTU games (2004). Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) / Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques (13) RePEc:mse:wpsorb:b05023 Stable pricing in monopoly and equilibrium-core of cost games. (2004). Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) / Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques (14) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10904 The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity: Evidence from US Cities (2004). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (15) RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp465 On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games (2004). Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia / FEUNL Working Paper Series (16) RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp466 Nash Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players (2004). Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia / FEUNL Working Paper Series (17) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0403001 Realizing efficient outcomes in cost spanning problems (2004). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information (18) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0411001 Transfer Rate Rules and Core Selections in NTU Games (2004). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information (19) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0412008 On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games (2004). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information (20) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0412009 Nash Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players (2004). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information (21) RePEc:wpa:wuwpur:0404006 Dynamic Urban Models: Agglomeration and Growth (2004). EconWPA / Urban/Regional (22) RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:spii2004-19 Informational Cascades Elicit Private Information (2004). Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competitiveness and Industrial Change (CIC) / CIC Working Papers Latest citations received in: 2003 (1) RePEc:cla:levarc:666156000000000319 Experiments with Network Formation (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive (2) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3966 Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behaviour (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers (3) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200353 The role of trust in costly network formation (2003). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (4) RePEc:esx:essedp:563 Learning in Networks: a survey (2003). University of Essex, Department of Economics / Economics Discussion Papers (5) RePEc:grs:wpegrs:2003-08 Self-Organizing Innovation Networks: When do Small Worlds Emerge? (2003). Groupement de Recherches Economiques et Sociales / Working Papers of GRES - Cahiers du GRES (6) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0112005 Calculus of Bargaining Solution on Boolean Tables (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information (7) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0303008 A general model of best response adaptation (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information (8) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0303009 Fictitious play in 2xn games (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information (9) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0309001 Correlated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with Quantum Signals (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information (10) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0310005 Agreeing to agree (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information (11) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0311004 Nash and Limit Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information (12) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0311006 Symmetric Approximate Equilibrium Distributions with Finite Support (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information (13) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0312005 What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information? (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information (14) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0308001 Speculation in First-Price Auctions with Resale (2003). EconWPA / Microeconomics Latest citations received in: 2002 (1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:92:y:2002:i:5:p:1669-1686 Improving Efficiency of On-Campus Housing: An Experimental Study (2002). American Economic Review (2) RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000003 Walrasian Bargaining (2002). UCLA Department of Economics / Theory workshop papers (3) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0207002 some economic applications of scott domains (2002). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information Latest citations received in: 2001 (1) RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0110001 On the Measurement of the Predictive Success of Learning Theories in Repeated Games (2001). EconWPA / Experimental Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results. Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.
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