Economics and Politics

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.17 0 0 0 0.08 1997 0.2 16 30 0 0 2 0.13 0.08 1998 0.25 0.23 14 34 16 4 0 0.1 1999 0.23 0.32 15 47 30 7 0 1 0.07 0.16 2000 0.03 0.43 15 120 29 1 0 2 0.13 0.19 2001 0.2 0.39 15 52 30 6 0 2 0.13 0.17 2002 0.47 0.42 15 20 30 14 0 1 0.07 0.2 2003 0.3 0.47 14 18 30 9 0 1 0.07 0.22 2004 0.34 0.51 15 47 29 10 0 8 0.53 0.23 2005 0.59 0.58 15 36 29 17 0 12 0.8 0.27
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:1:p:1-31 The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth (2000).
Cited: 64 times.

(2) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:1:p:69-81 Causality and Feedback Between Institutional Measures and Economic Growth (2000).
Cited: 27 times.

(3) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:9:y:1997:i:3:p:205-205 Introduction (1997).
Cited: 19 times.

(4) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:1:p:1-27 Political Institutions and Policy Volatility (2004).
Cited: 15 times.

(5) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:37-75 PROPOSAL FOR A NEW MEASURE OF CORRUPTION, ILLUSTRATED WITH ITALIAN DATA (2005).
Cited: 11 times.

(6) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:1:p:63-83 Political Control of Administrative Spending: The Case of Local Governments in Norway (1998).
Cited: 11 times.

(7) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:171-199 Does Distributional Skewness Lead to Redistribution? Evidence from the United States (1999).
Cited: 11 times.

(8) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:1:p:53-76 The Influence of IMF Programs on the Re-election of Debtor Governments (2004).
Cited: 10 times.

(9) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:1:p:1-17 Rationalizing the Political Business Cycle: A Workhorse Model (1998).
Cited: 10 times.

(10) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:201-220 The Political Economy of the IRS (2001).
Cited: 10 times.

(11) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:3:p:275-295 Delays of Inflation Stabilizations (2000).
Cited: 10 times.

(12) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:177-213 WHICH VARIABLES EXPLAIN DECISIONS ON IMF CREDIT? AN EXTREME BOUNDS ANALYSIS (2005).
Cited: 10 times.

(13) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:3:p:225-245 Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance (2000).
Cited: 9 times.

(14) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:3:p:225-253 Aid, Taxation and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (1999).
Cited: 9 times.

(15) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:3:p:237-256 Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants: Evidence From Argentina (2001).
Cited: 9 times.

(16) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:2:p:155-182 Corruption, Income Distribution, and Growth (2000).
Cited: 8 times.

(17) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:109-144 Do Gatt Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments? (1999).
Cited: 7 times.

(18) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:3:p:275-297 Aid, Growth and Democracy (1999).
Cited: 7 times.

(19) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:129-157 Do Crises Induce Reform? Simple Empirical Tests of Conventional Wisdom (2001).
Cited: 7 times.

(20) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:2:p:109-135 Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information (2000).
Cited: 7 times.

(21) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i::p:321-345 VOTING TRANSPARENCY, CONFLICTING INTERESTS, AND THE APPOINTMENT OF CENTRAL BANKERS (2004).
Cited: 7 times.

(22) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:9:y:1997:i:1:p:27-54 Politically Motivated Fiscal Deficits: Policy Issues in Closed and Open Economies (1997).
Cited: 7 times.

(23) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:15:y:2003:i:2:p:135-162 Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot Be Divorced from Its Governance (2003).
Cited: 7 times.

(24) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:14:y:2002:i:3:p:225-257 Democracy and the Variability of Economic Performance (2002).
Cited: 6 times.

(25) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:151-176 ELECTIONS AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY CYCLES (2005).
Cited: 6 times.

(26) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:2:p:127-142 Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

(27) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:2:p:117-146 Adjustments in Different Government Systems (2004).
Cited: 5 times.

(28) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:18:y:2006:i:2:p:103-120 SOCIAL COHESION, INSTITUTIONS, AND GROWTH (2006).
Cited: 4 times.

(29) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:3:p:257-279 Campaign Contributions and Agricultural Subsidies (2001).
Cited: 4 times.

(30) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:1:p:31-47 Cooption and Repression in the Soviet Union (2001).
Cited: 4 times.

(31) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:1-35 ACCOUNTABILITY AND CORRUPTION: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS MATTER (2005).
Cited: 4 times.

(32) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:14:y:2002:i:2:p:99-131 Factor or Industry Cleavages in Trade Policy? An Empirical Analysis of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (2002).
Cited: 4 times.

(33) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:159-184 Political Competition in Weak States (2001).
Cited: 4 times.

(34) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:113-128 Strategic Trade, Competitive Industries and Agricultural Trade Disputes (2001).
Cited: 4 times.

(35) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:129-150 FISCAL CONSTRAINTS, COLLECTION COSTS, AND TRADE POLICIES (2005).
Cited: 4 times.

(36) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:2:p:161-183 To Shock or Not to Shock? Economics and Political Economy of Large-Scale Reforms (1998).
Cited: 3 times.

(37) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:14:y:2002:p:41-63 Private Investment and Political Institutions (2002).
Cited: 3 times.

(38) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:145-169 Russias Tax Crisis: Explaining Falling Revenues in a Transitional Economy (1999).
Cited: 3 times.

(39) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:1:p:33-50 Estimating Presidential Elections: The Importance of State Fixed Effects and the Role of National Versus Local Information (1999).
Cited: 3 times.

(40) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:18:y:2006:i:3:p:339-365 PROMISES MADE, PROMISES BROKEN: A MODEL OF IMF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION (2006).
Cited: 3 times.

(41) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:9:y:1997:i:2:p:133-149 The Evolutionary Stability of Moral Objections to Free Riding (1997).
Cited: 3 times.

(42) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:213-223 New Deal or Same Old Shuffle? The Distribution of New Deal Dollars Across Alabama (1999).
Cited: 3 times.

(43) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i::p:233-251 DID TIME INCONSISTENCY CONTRIBUTE TO THE GREAT INFLATION? EVIDENCE FROM THE FOMC TRANSCRIPTS (2004).
Cited: 3 times.

(44) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:2:p:189-212 Inequality, Democracy, and Persistence: Is There a Political Kuznets Curve? (2004).
Cited: 3 times.

(45) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:1:p:1-29 Choosing Democracy (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(46) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i:3:p:297-330 REAL EXCHANGE RATE CYCLES AROUND ELECTIONS (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(47) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:14:y:2002:i:2:p:133-161 On the Political Economy of Temporary Stabilization Programs (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(48) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:15:y:2003:i:1:p:33-59 Will Gradualism Work When Shock Therapy Doesnt? (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(49) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:1:p:95-112 Why Do Poor democracies Collect a Lot of Tariff Revenue? (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(50) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:2:p:213-231 Donor Strategy under the Fungibility of Foreign Aid (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 | 2002

Latest citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:cam:camdae:0540 Growth, Governance and Corruption in the Presence of Threshold Effects: Theory and Evidence (2005). Faculty of Economics (formerly DAE), University of Cambridge / Cambridge Working Papers in Economics

(2) RePEc:cem:jaecon:v:8:y:2005:n:2:p:203-225 Sustaining fixed rates: The political economy of currency pegs in Latin America (2005). Journal of Applied Economics

(3) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1502 Costly Revenue-Raising and the Case for Favoring Import-Competing Industries (2005). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(4) RePEc:csl:devewp:202 Prolonged Use and Conditionality Failure: Investigating the IMF Responsibility (2005). Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano / Development Working Papers

(5) RePEc:csl:devewp:206 IMF Concern for Reputation and Conditional Lending Failure: Theory and Empirics (2005). Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano / Development Working Papers

(6) RePEc:fgv:epgewp:597 Special Interests and Political Business Cycles (2005). Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil) / Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE)

(7) RePEc:idc:wpaper:idec05-5 Short-run and Long-run Effects of Corruption on Economic Growth: Evidence from State-Level Cross-Section Data for the United States (2005). International and Development Economics / International and Development Economics Working Papers

(8) RePEc:kof:wpskof:05-118 Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions (2005). Swiss Institute for Business Cycle Research (KOF), Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH), / Working papers

(9) RePEc:taf:regstd:v:39:y:2005:i:5:p:603-617 Public capital and total factor productivity: New evidence from the Italian regions, 1970--98 (2005). Regional Studies

(10) RePEc:tky:fseres:2005cf348 Short-run and Long-run Effects of Corruption on Economic Growth: Evidence from State-Level Cross-Section Data for the United States (2005). CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo / CIRJE F-Series

(11) RePEc:usi:wpaper:447 IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: theory and empirics (2005). Department of Economics, University of Siena / Experimental Economics

(12) RePEc:wpa:wuwpit:0510016 Political and Public Finance Motives for Tariffs (2005). EconWPA / International Trade

Latest citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:cam:camdae:0438 Core Indicators for Determinants and Performance of Electricity Sector in Developing Countries’ (2004). Faculty of Economics (formerly DAE), University of Cambridge / Cambridge Working Papers in Economics

(2) RePEc:cam:camdae:0439 ‘Electricity Sector Reform in Developing Countries: A Survey of Empirical Evidence on Determinants and Performance’ (2004). Faculty of Economics (formerly DAE), University of Cambridge / Cambridge Working Papers in Economics

(3) RePEc:cie:wpaper:0408 When Are Stabilizations Delayed? Alesina-Drazen Revisited (2004). Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM / Working Papers

(4) RePEc:cty:dpaper:0401 Regulatory Effectiveness: The impact of regulation and regulatory governance arrangements on electricity industry outcomes: a review paper (2004). Department of Economics, City University, London / City University Economics Discussion Papers

(5) RePEc:por:fepwps:138 Political models of budget deficits: a literature review (2004). Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto / FEP Working Papers

(6) RePEc:wdi:papers:2004-712 Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness (2004). William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School / William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series

(7) RePEc:wpa:wuwpif:0310004 Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions (2004). EconWPA / International Finance

(8) RePEc:wpa:wuwpif:0404004 IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with Conditionality (2004). EconWPA / International Finance

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:got:cegedp:21 Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict (2003). Center for Globalization and Europeanization of the Economy, University of Goettingen (Germany). / CeGE Discussion Papers

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv02-34 The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence using Stock Market Data (2002). Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competitiveness and Industrial Change (CIC) / CIC Working Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.