|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Games and Economic Behavior Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.
Most cited documents in this series: (1) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:122-142 Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History (1995). (2) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:6-38 Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games (1995). (3) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:124-143 Potential Games (1996). (4) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:47:y:2004:i:2:p:268-298 A theory of sequential reciprocity (2004). (5) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:387-424 The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction (1993). (6) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:3:p:347-369 Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments (1994). (7) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:3:p:346-380 Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games (1994). (8) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:60-79 Psychological games and sequential rationality (1989). (9) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:4:p:327-360 Renegotiation in repeated games (1989). (10) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:2:y:1990:i:1:p:29-46 Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria (1990). (11) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:26:y:1999:i:2:p:286-336 A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures (1999). (12) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:90-123 Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division (1996). (13) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:38:y:2002:i:2:p:201-230 The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures (2002). (14) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:218-254 On Players Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence (1995). (15) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:2:p:170-190 Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs (1989). (16) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:16:y:1996:i:2:p:181-191 Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games (1996). (17) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:95-121 Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining (1995). (18) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:320-367 Learning Mixed Equilibria (1993). (19) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:20:y:1997:i:2:p:201-237 Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities (1997). (20) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:2:p:293-315 A theory of reciprocity (2006). (21) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:1:p:82-100 Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games (1991). (22) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:2:p:260-281 How to identify trust and reciprocity (2004). (23) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:30:y:2000:i:2:p:163-182 Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game (2000). (24) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:19:y:1997:i:1:p:46-76 Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results (1997). (25) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:13:y:1996:i:1:p:100-110 Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs (1996). (26) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:15:y:1996:i:2:p:132-148 Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games (1996). (27) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:13-24 The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations (1999). (28) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:2:y:1990:i:4:p:378-394 Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility (1990). (29) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:1:p:62-91 Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game (1994). (30) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:4:p:295-326 Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games (1989). (31) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:3:p:445-468 A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects (1994). (32) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:79-109 Social Norms and Random Matching Games (1995). (33) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:425-454 An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction (1993). (34) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:41:y:2002:i:2:p:265-291 On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games (2002). (35) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:34:y:2001:i:2:p:331-341 A Dynamic Model of Network Formation (2001). (36) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:12:y:1996:i:2:p:187-218 Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoners Dilemma Games (1996). (37) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:2:p:295-300 The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice (1994). (38) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:4:p:514-531 Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games (1993). (39) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:21:y:1997:i:1-2:p:40-55 Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium (1997). (40) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:5-39 Cooperation and bounded recall (1989). (41) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:25:y:1998:i:2:p:147-148 Introduction (1998). (42) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:44:y:2003:i:2:p:217-226 The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games (2003). (43) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:1:p:134-158 An experimental study of price dispersion (2006). (44) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:34:y:2001:i:2:p:177-199 Minimum-Effort Coordination Games: Stochastic Potential and Logit Equilibrium (2001). (45) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:11:y:1995:i:2:p:111-145 The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision (1995). (46) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:1:p:60-81 Bayesian learning in normal form games (1991). (47) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:45:y:2003:i:1:p:97-113 Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games (2003). (48) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:55:y:2006:i:2:p:297-320 Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction (2006). (49) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:43:y:2003:i:1:p:57-85 Networks of collaboration in oligopoly (2003). (50) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:33:y:2000:i:2:p:206-230 On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings (2000). Latest citations received in: | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 Latest citations received in: 2005 (1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0050 Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games (2005). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers (2) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0059 Minorities and Storable Votes (2005). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers (3) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0060 A Simple Scheme to Improve the Efficiency of Referenda (2005). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers (4) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:2:p:340-345 The Neuroeconomics of Mind Reading and Empathy (2005). American Economic Review (5) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse33_2005 Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2x2 Games (2005). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers (6) RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-01 Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games (2005). Brown University, Department of Economics / Working Papers (7) RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-02 An Axiomatization of the Inner Core Using Appropriate Reduced Games (2005). Brown University, Department of Economics / Working Papers (8) RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2005-08 Enlargement and the Balance of Power: an Experimental Study (2005). The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham / Discussion Papers (9) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1583 Minorities and Storable Votes (2005). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series (10) RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000876 A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive (11) RePEc:cla:levarc:784828000000000034 Willpower and the Optimal Control of Visceral Urges (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive (12) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000914 The Swing Voters Curse in the Laboratory (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography (13) RePEc:cla:levrem:172782000000000073 The Brain as a Hierarchical Organization (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography (14) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000205 The Brain as a Hierarchical Organization (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography (15) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000539 Discussion of BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography (16) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000609 Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography (17) RePEc:clu:wpaper:0506-02 Minorities and storable votes (2005). Columbia University, Department of Economics / Discussion Papers (18) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5278 Minorities and Storable Votes (2005). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers (19) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5291 Efficiency, Equity and Timing in Voting Mechanisms (2005). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers (20) RePEc:cte:werepe:we055726 INFORMATION TRANSMISSION IN COALITIONAL VOTING GAMES (2005). Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía / Economics Working Papers (21) RePEc:ctl:louvec:2005036 Networks of Manufacturers and Retailers (2005). Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques / Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Workin (22) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1479r Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2005). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers (23) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1503 Aggregation of Expert Opinions (2005). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers (24) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2005117 Learning to be prepared (2005). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (25) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200553 An axiomatization of minimal curb sets (2005). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (26) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200584 Stable networks and convex payoffs (2005). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (27) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200594 The cutting power of preparation (2005). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (28) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2005018 The Coordinate-Wise Core for Multiple-Type Housing Markets is Second-Best Incentive Compatible (2005). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda (29) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2005053 A Reason for Sophisticated Investors not to seize Arbitrage Opportunities in Markets without Frictions (2005). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda (30) RePEc:edn:esedps:135 Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria (2005). Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh / ESE Discussion Papers (31) RePEc:emo:wp2003:0507 Temptation and Self-Control: Some Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (2005). Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta) / Emory Economics (32) RePEc:gue:guelph:2005-7 Competitive Burnout: Theory and Experimental Evidence (2005). University of Guelph, Department of Economics / Working Papers (33) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0583 The cutting power of preparation (2005). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance (34) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0589 An axiomatization of minimal curb sets (2005). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance (35) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0590 Learning to be prepared (2005). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance (36) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1890 Affect as a Source of Motivation in the Workplace: A New Model of Labor Supply, and New Field Evidence on Income Targeting and the Goal Gradient (2005). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers (37) RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2005-13 Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs (2005). Department of Economics, Louisiana State University / Departmental Working Papers (38) RePEc:pen:papers:05-014 Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2005). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive (39) RePEc:pen:papers:05-016 Aggregation of Expert Opinions (2005). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive (40) RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0507001 Enlargement and the Balance of Power: An Experimental Study (2005). EconWPA / Experimental (41) RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0511006 Auctions with Anticipated Regret (2005). EconWPA / Experimental (42) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0503010 Dynamic Behavior in Minimum Effort Coordination Games - Some Theory of Group Size and Inter-Group Competition as Coordination Devices (2005). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information (43) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0407005 Rationalizing Boundedly Rational Choice: Sequential Rationalizability and Rational Shortlist Methods. (2005). EconWPA / Microeconomics (44) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0510014 Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations over a Single Good (2005). EconWPA / Microeconomics (45) RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:05-02 A Network Experiment in Continuous Time: (2005). Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim / Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications Latest citations received in: 2004 (1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:94:y:2004:i:3:p:484-498 Distinguishing Informational Cascades from Herd Behavior in the Laboratory (2004). American Economic Review (2) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:94:y:2004:i:4:p:857-869 Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments (2004). American Economic Review (3) RePEc:aub:autbar:634.04 An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments (Revised Version) (2004). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anà lisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anà lisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers (4) RePEc:boc:bocoec:620 Pairwise Kidney Exchange (2004). Boston College Department of Economics / Boston College Working Papers in Economics (5) RePEc:bri:cmpowp:04/108 Efficient Contracts for Digital Content (2004). Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK / The Centre for Market and Public Organisation (6) RePEc:cej:primer:v:2:y:2004:i:1:p:189-212 Gradual Nash bargaining with endogenous agenda. A path-dependent model (2004). Colombian Economic Journal (7) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000153 Self-Correcting Information Cascades (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography (8) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000236 Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal Form Games (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography (9) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000350 Pairwise Kidney Exchange (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography (10) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000750 Incentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography (11) RePEc:cla:uclatw:121473000000000021 Multidimensional Private Value Auctions (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Theory workshop papers (12) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2004111 Enemies and friends in hedonic games : individual deviations, stability and manipulation (2004). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (13) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2004114 Symmetric convex games and stable structures (2004). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (14) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200453 Obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree situations and their monotonicity properties (2004). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (15) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200457 On representative social capital (2004). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (16) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2004018 The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2004). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda (17) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20040100 Gift Exchange in a Multi-worker Firm (2004). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers (18) RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2004:i:45:p:1-11 Matching Markets: the Particular Case of Couples (2004). Economics Bulletin (19) RePEc:ecm:feam04:472 A Unified Approach to Information, Knowledge, and Stability (2004). Econometric Society / Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings (20) RePEc:esa:iesawp:0407 How do subjects assess the Social Trade-off invilved in the Prisoners Dilemma? (2004). Institute for Social Syudies of Andalusia - Higher Council for Scientific Research / IESA Working Papers Series (21) RePEc:esi:discus:2004-01 Age and the development of trust and reciprocity (2004). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction (22) RePEc:esi:discus:2004-36 Express Yourself: The Price of Fairness in a Simple Distribution Game (2004). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction (23) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.97 Defining Rules in Cost Spanning Tree Problems Through the Canonical Form (2004). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers (24) RePEc:gco:abcdef:73 Defining rules in cost spanning tree problems through the canonical form (2004). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition (25) RePEc:hhs:aareco:2004_016 Can Information Backfire? - Experimental Evidence from the Ultimatum Game (2004). Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics / Working Papers (26) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1145 On Representative Social Capital (2004). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers (27) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1203 Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control (2004). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers (28) RePEc:kyo:wpaper:582 Trade with Heterogeneous Multiple Priors (2004). Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research / Working Papers (29) RePEc:lau:crdeep:04.15 Verified Trust: Reciprocity, Altruism, and Noise in Trust Games (2004). Université de Lausanne, Ecole des HEC, DEEP / Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) (30) RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:0412 Who is Post-Walrasian Man? (2004). Middlebury College, Department of Economics / Middlebury College Working Paper Series (31) RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2004_14 Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision and Public-Sector Pricing: A Contribution to the Foundations of Public Economics (2004). Max Planck Institute for Reserach on Collective Goods / Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Reserach on Collective Goods (32) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10698 Pairwise Kidney Exchange (2004). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (33) RePEc:trf:wpaper:11 Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights (2004). SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, University of Mannheim / Discussion Papers (34) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:robson-04-02-12-12-44-46 Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Bayesian Views (2004). Microeconomics.ca Website / Micro Theory Working Papers (35) RePEc:upf:upfgen:788 Global Nash Convergence of Foster and Youngs Regret Testing (2004). Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Economics Working Papers (36) RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0406001 A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness (2004). EconWPA / Experimental (37) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0402004 Defining rules in cost spanning tree problems through the canonical form (2004). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information (38) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0403001 Realizing efficient outcomes in cost spanning problems (2004). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information (39) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0405001 Additivity in cost spanning tree problems (2004). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information (40) RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:04-42 Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision (2004). Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim / Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications Latest citations received in: 2003 (1) RePEc:att:wimass:200320 Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs (2003). Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems / Working papers (2) RePEc:bol:bodewp:495 Dynamic R&D with Spillovers: Competition vs Cooperation (2003). Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna / Working Papers (3) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse6_2003 Splitting Leagues (2003). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers (4) RePEc:cir:cirwor:2003s-32 Testing Equilibrium Behaviour At First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auctions With Discrete Bid Increments (2003). CIRANO / CIRANO Working Papers (5) RePEc:cla:levarc:666156000000000374 A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive (6) RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000042 Excess Payoff Dynamics, Potential Dynamics, and Stable Games (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Theory workshop papers (7) RePEc:clt:sswopa:1185 A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets (2003). California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences / Working Papers (8) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3784 Delay in Contests (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers (9) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3884 Are we Better Off if our Politicians Have More Information? (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers (10) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1423 Multidimensional Private Value Auctions (2003). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers (11) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20030041 Hybrid R&D (2003). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers (12) RePEc:esx:essedp:563 Learning in Networks: a survey (2003). University of Essex, Department of Economics / Economics Discussion Papers (13) RePEc:esx:essedp:564 Hybrid R&D (2003). University of Essex, Department of Economics / Economics Discussion Papers (14) RePEc:got:cegedp:21 Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict (2003). Center for Globalization and Europeanization of the Economy, University of Goettingen (Germany). / CeGE Discussion Papers (15) RePEc:hal:papers:hal-00242993_v1 Geometry, Correlated Equilibria and Zero-Sum Games (2003). HAL, CCSd/CNRS / Pre- and Post-Print documents (16) RePEc:hhs:osloec:2003_005 The semantics of preference-based belief operators. (2003). Oslo University, Department of Economics / Memorandum (17) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp318 Dissolving a Common Value Partnership in a Repeated queto Game (2003). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series (18) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1372 Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms (2003). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers (19) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1373 No-Regret with Bounded Computational Capacity (2003). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers (20) RePEc:pen:papers:03-027 Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information (2003). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive (21) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0306002 Bargaining with commitments (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information (22) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0311001 Stable Outcomes For Contract Choice Problems (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information Latest citations received in: 2002 (1) RePEc:aub:autbar:523.02 24 (2002). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anà lisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anà lisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers (2) RePEc:aub:autbar:539.02 Stable Condorcet Rules (2002). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anà lisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anà lisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers (3) RePEc:boc:bocoec:478 Coalition Formation as a Dynamic Process (2002). Boston College Department of Economics / Boston College Working Papers in Economics (4) RePEc:cam:camdae:0205 Modelling Experience as Signal Accumulation (2002). Faculty of Economics (formerly DAE), University of Cambridge / Cambridge Working Papers in Economics (5) RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:19-02 Double Auctions, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, and the Hold-Up Problem (2002). Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara / University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series (6) RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:wp19-02 Double Auctions, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, and the Hold-Up Problem (2002). Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara / University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series (7) RePEc:clt:sswopa:1149 Social Networks in Determing Employment and Wages: Patterns, Dynamics, and Inequality (2002). California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences / Working Papers (8) RePEc:clu:wpaper:0102-64 The relation between implementability and the core (2002). Columbia University, Department of Economics / Discussion Papers (9) RePEc:clu:wpaper:0102-65 Random paths to stability in the roommate problem (2002). Columbia University, Department of Economics / Discussion Papers (10) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200226 Two-stage bargaining with reversible coalitions : the case of apex games (2002). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (11) RePEc:ebg:heccah:0757 Perturbed Markov Chains (2002). Groupe HEC / Les Cahiers de Recherche (12) RePEc:esi:discus:2002-29 A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility (2002). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction (13) RePEc:gco:abcdef:19 NP-completeness in Hedonic Games (2002). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition (14) RePEc:gco:abcdef:20 Unique Stability in Simple Coalition Formation Games (2002). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition (15) RePEc:gco:abcdef:49 Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions (2002). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition (16) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp284 Long Cheap Talk (2002). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series (17) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp295 Stochastic games: Existence of the MinMax (2002). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series (18) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp297 Intergroup conflict: Individual, group and collective interests. (2002). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series (19) RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:115 The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games (2002). Institute for Advanced Studies / Economics Series (20) RePEc:ind:isipdp:02-04 Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games (2002). Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India / Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers (21) RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2002-26 BUILDING UP SOCIAL CAPITAL IN A CHANGING WORLD (2002). Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) / Working Papers. Serie AD (22) RePEc:nid:ovolij:016 A Remark on Bargaining and Non-Expected Utility (2002). Oscar Volij / Economic theory and game theory (23) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1341 Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring (2002). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers (24) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1342 Perturbed Markov Chains (2002). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers (25) RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2002-01 The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation (2002). University of Oregon Economics Department / University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers (26) RePEc:trn:utwpce:0214 Coordination and information in critical mass games: an experimental study (2002). Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia / CEEL Working Papers (27) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0211005 The Strategy-Proof Provision of Public Goods under Congestion and Crowding Preferences (2002). EconWPA / Microeconomics (28) RePEc:wrk:warwec:640 DYNAMIC CLUB FORMATION WITH COORDINATION (2002). University of Warwick, Department of Economics / The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results. Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series. |
