Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.16 0 0 0 0.07 1997 0.17 0 0 0 0.09 1998 0.19 0 0 0 0.12 1999 0.29 0 0 0 0.19 2000 0.39 8 24 0 0 0.2 2001 0.25 0.34 25 67 8 2 50 7 0.28 0.18 2002 0.3 0.39 22 28 33 10 30 2 0.09 0.2 2003 0.51 0.41 13 13 47 24 20.8 5 0.38 0.21 2004 0.4 0.47 11 22 35 14 7.1 8 0.73 0.25 2005 0.46 0.45 0 24 11 0 0.29
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:gco:abcdef:7 Strongly Stable Networks (2001).
Cited: 25 times.

(2) RePEc:gco:abcdef:16 A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency (2000).
Cited: 22 times.

(3) RePEc:gco:abcdef:78 The Formation of Networks with Transfers among Players (2004).
Cited: 9 times.

(4) RePEc:gco:abcdef:10 Stable Organizations with Externalities (2002).
Cited: 8 times.

(5) RePEc:gco:abcdef:6 A Computational Laboratory for Evolutionary Trade Networks (2001).
Cited: 7 times.

(6) RePEc:gco:abcdef:24 Coalition Formation as a Dynamic Process (2001).
Cited: 6 times.

(7) RePEc:gco:abcdef:19 NP-completeness in Hedonic Games (2002).
Cited: 6 times.

(8) RePEc:gco:abcdef:49 Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions (2002).
Cited: 5 times.

(9) RePEc:gco:abcdef:23 Coalition Formation and Stability (2001).
Cited: 5 times.

(10) RePEc:gco:abcdef:31 Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies (2001).
Cited: 4 times.

(11) RePEc:gco:abcdef:43 When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts (2002).
Cited: 4 times.

(12) RePEc:gco:abcdef:57 Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities (2001).
Cited: 4 times.

(13) RePEc:gco:abcdef:70 Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games (2004).
Cited: 4 times.

(14) RePEc:gco:abcdef:33 Migration-proof Tiebout equilibrium: Existence and asymptotic efficiency (2001).
Cited: 4 times.

(15) RePEc:gco:abcdef:52 The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible (2001).
Cited: 3 times.

(16) RePEc:gco:abcdef:73 Defining rules in cost spanning tree problems through the canonical form (2004).
Cited: 3 times.

(17) RePEc:gco:abcdef:25 Farsighted Stability in Hedonic Games (2001).
Cited: 3 times.

(18) RePEc:gco:abcdef:13 Models of Network Formation in Cooperative Games (2003).
Cited: 3 times.

(19) RePEc:gco:abcdef:76 Counting Combinatorial Choice Rules (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(20) RePEc:gco:abcdef:4 Bargaining on Networks: An Experiment (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(21) RePEc:gco:abcdef:14 Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-Intern Markets (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(22) RePEc:gco:abcdef:37 A Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium for Strategic Form Games (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(23) RePEc:gco:abcdef:22 Coalition Formation Games with Separable Preferences, (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(24) RePEc:gco:abcdef:12 Fair Allocation in Evolving Networks (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(25) RePEc:gco:abcdef:28 Coalitions, Agreements and Efficiency (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(26) RePEc:gco:abcdef:15 Allocation Rules for Network Games (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(27) RePEc:gco:abcdef:72 Stable Matchings for Three-Sided Systems: A Comment (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(28) RePEc:gco:abcdef:55 The Stable Demand Set: General Characterization and Application to Weighted Majority Games (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(29) RePEc:gco:abcdef:21 Tops Responsiveness, Strategy-Proofness and Coalition Formation Problems (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(30) RePEc:gco:abcdef:62 Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(31) RePEc:gco:abcdef:18 Equitable and Decentralized Solution for the Allocation of Indivisible Objects (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

(32) RePEc:gco:abcdef:26 The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

(33) RePEc:gco:abcdef:54 The Nucleolus as a Consistent Power Index in Noncooperative Majority Games (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(34) RePEc:gco:abcdef:67 The Core in Normal Form Games (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

(35) RePEc:gco:abcdef:77 Search and the Strategic Formation of Large Networks: When and Why do We See Power Laws and Small Worlds? (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(36) RePEc:gco:abcdef:60 On Potential Maximization as a Refinement of Nash Equilibrium (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(37) RePEc:gco:abcdef:17 Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power and Wealth Distribution (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

(38) RePEc:gco:abcdef:40 The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(39) RePEc:gco:abcdef:75 A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(40) RePEc:gco:abcdef:59 Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

(41) RePEc:gco:abcdef:39 Calculus of Bargaining Solution on Boolean Tables (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(42) RePEc:gco:abcdef:34 Decentralized Job Matching (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 | 2002

Latest citations received in: 2005

Latest citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0039 The Communication Requirements of of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets (2004). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers

(2) RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000000123 Pair-wise envy free and stable matchings for two-sided systems with techniques (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(3) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2004111 Enemies and friends in hedonic games : individual deviations, stability and manipulation (2004). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(4) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200464 The role of middlemen in efficient and strongly pairwise stable networks (2004). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(5) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200470 Social network formation with consent (2004). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(6) RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2004:i:15:p:1-9 Pair-wise envy free and stable matchings for two sided systems with techniques (2004). Economics Bulletin

(7) RePEc:esx:essedp:582 Dynamic Learning, Herding and Guru Effects in Networks (2004). University of Essex, Department of Economics / Economics Discussion Papers

(8) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0403001 Realizing efficient outcomes in cost spanning problems (2004). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:clt:sswopa:1161 A survey of models of network formation: Stability and efficiency (2003). California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences / Working Papers

(2) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200353 The role of trust in costly network formation (2003). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(3) RePEc:esx:essedp:563 Learning in Networks: a survey (2003). University of Essex, Department of Economics / Economics Discussion Papers

(4) RePEc:gco:abcdef:69 Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores: A Comment (2003). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition

(5) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0303011 A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:gco:abcdef:48 Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters (2002). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition

(2) RePEc:upf:upfgen:645 Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict (2002). Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Economics Working Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.