Experimental Economics

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.17 0 0 0 0.08 1997 0.2 0 0 0 0.08 1998 0.23 17 156 0 0 1 0.06 0.1 1999 0.35 0.32 8 40 17 6 16.7 2 0.25 0.16 2000 0.44 0.43 17 103 25 11 18.2 10 0.59 0.19 2001 0.36 0.39 13 48 25 9 0 1 0.08 0.17 2002 0.47 0.42 12 46 30 14 0 3 0.25 0.2 2003 0.36 0.47 16 72 25 9 0 7 0.44 0.22 2004 0.68 0.51 15 50 28 19 0 4 0.27 0.23 2005 1.06 0.58 21 42 31 33 0 6 0.29 0.27
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:1:y:1998:i:1:p:9-41 Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games (1998).
Cited: 44 times.

(2) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:10:y:2007:i:2:p:171-178 z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments (2007).
Cited: 40 times.

(3) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:1:y:1998:i:1:p:101-108 Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players? (1998).
Cited: 27 times.

(4) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:2:y:2000:i:3:p:227-238 Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games (2000).
Cited: 26 times.

(5) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:1:y:1998:i:2:p:115-131 On the Validity of the Random Lottery Incentive System (1998).
Cited: 26 times.

(6) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:1:y:1998:i:3:p:207-219 Measuring Motivations for the Reciprocal Responses Observed in a Simple Dilemma Game (1998).
Cited: 22 times.

(7) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:6:y:2003:i:1:p:75-90 The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a Simple Bargaining Experiment (2003).
Cited: 16 times.

(8) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:7:y:2004:i:2:p:171-188 Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis (2004).
Cited: 15 times.

(9) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:2:y:1999:i:1:p:5-30 Heterogeneity and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods (1999).
Cited: 15 times.

(10) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:4:y:2001:i:3:p:203-219 Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game (2001).
Cited: 14 times.

(11) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:5:y:2002:i:1:p:5-27 Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment (2002).
Cited: 13 times.

(12) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:8:y:2005:i:4:p:347-367 Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium (2005).
Cited: 12 times.

(13) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:3:y:2000:i:1:p:55-79 Framing Effects in Public Goods Experiments (2000).
Cited: 12 times.

(14) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:6:y:2003:i:3:p:235-251 Learning to Open Monty Halls Doors (2003).
Cited: 11 times.

(15) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:5:y:2002:i:1:p:53-84 Risk Attitudes of Children and Adults: Choices Over Small and Large Probability Gains and Losses (2002).
Cited: 11 times.

(16) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:2:y:1999:i:2:p:107-127 Eliciting Individual Discount Rates (1999).
Cited: 10 times.

(17) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:4:y:2001:i:3:p:257-269 The Endowment Effect and Repeated Market Trials: Is the Vickrey Auction Demand Revealing? (2001).
Cited: 10 times.

(18) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:9:y:2006:i:3:p:193-208 Decomposing trust and trustworthiness (2006).
Cited: 10 times.

(19) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:2:y:2000:i:3:p:239-259 Step Returns in Threshold Public Goods: A Meta- and Experimental Analysis (2000).
Cited: 10 times.

(20) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:3:y:2000:i:1:p:81-100 Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History: A Re-examination (2000).
Cited: 10 times.

(21) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:3:y:2000:i:3:p:261-280 Dominant Strategy Adoption and Bidders Experience with Pricing Rules (2000).
Cited: 10 times.

(22) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:6:y:2003:i:2:p:141-158 Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with Responder Competition (2003).
Cited: 9 times.

(23) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:1:y:1998:i:3:p:191-206 Nash as an Organizing Principle in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence (1998).
Cited: 9 times.

(24) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:7:y:2004:i:2:p:123-140 Experimental Methods and Elicitation of Values (2004).
Cited: 9 times.

(25) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:6:y:2003:i:3:p:273-297 Nonparametric Tests of Differences in Medians: Comparison of the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney and Robust Rank-Order Tests (2003).
Cited: 8 times.

(26) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:8:y:2005:i:1:p:5-20 Learning Direction Theory and the Winner’s Curse (2005).
Cited: 8 times.

(27) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:5:y:2002:i:1:p:29-38 Price Competition Between Teams (2002).
Cited: 8 times.

(28) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:3:y:2000:i:3:p:215-240 Control Without Deception: Individual Behaviour in Free-Riding Experiments Revisited (2000).
Cited: 7 times.

(29) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:7:y:2004:i:2:p:189-205 How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange? (2004).
Cited: 7 times.

(30) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:6:y:2003:i:2:p:181-207 Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games (2003).
Cited: 7 times.

(31) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:3:y:2000:i:3:p:241-260 The False Consensus Effect Disappears if Representative Information and Monetary Incentives Are Given (2000).
Cited: 7 times.

(32) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:1:y:1998:i:1:p:43-61 Axiomatic Characterization of the Quadratic Scoring Rule (1998).
Cited: 7 times.

(33) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:1:y:1998:i:1:p:87-100 A Monte Carlo Analysis of the Fisher Randomization Technique: Reviving Randomization for Experimental Economists (1998).
Cited: 7 times.

(34) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:3:y:2000:i:1:p:5-9 The Impact of Exchange Context on the Activation of Equity in Ultimatum Games (2000).
Cited: 7 times.

(35) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:9:y:2006:i:3:p:265-279 Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment? (2006).
Cited: 6 times.

(36) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:6:y:2003:i:1:p:5-25 Order of Play, Forward Induction, and Presentation Effects in Two-Person Games (2003).
Cited: 6 times.

(37) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:7:y:2004:i:2:p:153-169 An Application of the English Clock Market Mechanism to Public Goods Games (2004).
Cited: 6 times.

(38) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:8:y:2005:i:1:p:35-54 Heterogeneous Agents in Public Goods Experiments (2005).
Cited: 6 times.

(39) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:1:y:1998:i:2:p:163-183 Bounded Rationality in Individual Decision Making (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

(40) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:3:y:2000:i:1:p:11-29 Learning to Accept in Ultimatum Games: Evidence from an Experimental Design that Generates Low Offers (2000).
Cited: 5 times.

(41) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:2:y:1999:i:1:p:41-57 Continuous-Time Strategy Selection in Linear Population Games (1999).
Cited: 5 times.

(42) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:3:y:2000:i:1:p:31-53 Robustness of the Incentive Compatible Combinatorial Auction (2000).
Cited: 5 times.

(43) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:4:y:2001:i:3:p:221-228 Testing for the Presence of a Tremble in Economic Experiments (2001).
Cited: 5 times.

(44) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:6:y:2003:i:2:p:123-140 Explaining Overbidding in First Price Auctions Using Controlled Lotteries (2003).
Cited: 5 times.

(45) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:7:y:2004:i:3:p:235-247 Rewards and Sanctions and the Provision of Public Goods in One-Shot Settings (2004).
Cited: 5 times.

(46) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:2:y:1999:i:1:p:59-75 Collusion Without Conspiracy: An Experimental Study of One-Sided Auctions (1999).
Cited: 4 times.

(47) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:9:y:2006:i:3:p:223-235 Induced heterogeneity in trust experiments (2006).
Cited: 4 times.

(48) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:7:y:2004:i:1:p:93-114 A Study of Consumer Behavior Using Laboratory Data (2004).
Cited: 4 times.

(49) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:5:y:2002:i:2:p:133-153 Voluntary Participation and Spite in Public Good Provision Experiments: An International Comparison (2002).
Cited: 4 times.

(50) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:9:y:2006:i:4:p:383-405 Elicitation using multiple price list formats (2006).
Cited: 4 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 | 2002

Latest citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:5:p:1731-1737 Bubbles and Experience: An Experiment (2005). American Economic Review

(2) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000602 The Origin of the Winner’s Curse: A Laboratory Study (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(3) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0605 Strategic equivalence and bounded rationality in extensive form games (2005). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

(4) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:8:y:2005:i:4:p:301-323 Modelling the Stochastic Component of Behaviour in Experiments: Some Issues for the Interpretation of Data (2005). Experimental Economics

(5) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:8:y:2005:i:4:p:347-367 Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium (2005). Experimental Economics

(6) RePEc:zur:iewwpx:261 Heterogeneous social preferences and the dynamics of free riding in public goods (2005). Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW / IEW - Working Papers

Latest citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20040100 Gift Exchange in a Multi-worker Firm (2004). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:esi:discus:2004-29 Leadership and cooperation in public goods experiments (2004). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(3) RePEc:lau:crdeep:04.15 Verified Trust: Reciprocity, Altruism, and Noise in Trust Games (2004). Université de Lausanne, Ecole des HEC, DEEP / Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP)

(4) RePEc:vcu:wpaper:0401 Rebates, Matches, and Consumer Behavior (2004). VCU School of Business, Department of Economics / Working Papers

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:aub:autbar:586.03 Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation (2003). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(2) RePEc:cir:cirwor:2003s-69 Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students (2003). CIRANO / CIRANO Working Papers

(3) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000253 Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(4) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:6:y:2003:i:1:p:53-73 Coordination and Information in Critical Mass Games: An Experimental Study (2003). Experimental Economics

(5) RePEc:mcm:mceelp:2003-04 Advance Production Duopolies and Posted Prices or Market-Clearing Prices (2003). McMaster University / McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications

(6) RePEc:upf:upfgen:703 Forward Induction and the Excess Capacity Puzzle: An Experimental Investigation (2003). Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Economics Working Papers

(7) RePEc:usi:wpaper:405 Drift effect and timing without observability: experimental evidence (2003). Department of Economics, University of Siena / Experimental Economics

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20020106 Experimental Public Choice (2002). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp303 Repeated Price Competition Between Individuals and Between Teams (2002). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(3) RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2002-10 Trust in Children (2002). University of Oregon Economics Department / University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.