Oscar Volij / Economic theory and game theory
Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.
  Most cited documents in this series: (1) RePEc:nid:ovolij:006 Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information (1999). Cited: 6 times. (2) RePEc:nid:ovolij:005 The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach (1997). Cited: 6 times. (3) RePEc:nid:ovolij:010 On Risk Aversion and Bargaining Outcomes (1999). Cited: 4 times. (4) RePEc:nid:ovolij:015 The Measurement of Intellectual Influence (2002). Cited: 2 times. (5) RePEc:nid:ovolij:012 The Evolution of Exchange (2000). Cited: 2 times. (6) RePEc:nid:ovolij:016 A Remark on Bargaining and Non-Expected Utility (2002). Cited: 1 times. (7) RePEc:nid:ovolij:001 Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium (2000). Cited: 1 times. (8) RePEc:nid:ovolij:014 The Time-Preference Nash Solution (2001). Cited: 1 times. (9) RePEc:nid:ovolij:004 Will You Marry Me? A Perspective on the Gender Gap (1997). Cited: 1 times. (10) RePEc:nid:ovolij:009 Utility Equivalence in Sealed Bid Auctions and the Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk (1999). Cited: 1 times. Latest citations received in: | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 Latest citations received in: 2005 Latest citations received in: 2004 Latest citations received in: 2003 Latest citations received in: 2002 Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results. Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.
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