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 Updated May, 1 2008 147.392 documents processed, 3.154.300 references and 1.403.701 citations

 

 
 

Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.060.1629576642520.070.07
19970.20.17344564137.710.030.09
19980.10.19387263616.710.030.12
19990.130.29333972966.720.060.19
20000.30.39303571211950.170.2
20010.210.342532631323.140.160.18
20020.270.39234955150120.520.2
20030.270.412219481315.450.230.21
20040.220.4714164510020.140.25
20050.080.451720363080.470.29
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
 
Impact Factor:
 
Immediacy Index:
 
Documents published:
 
Citations received:
 

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:451 Post-War U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical Investigation (1981).
Cited: 123 times.

(2) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:594 Job Search and Labor Market Analysis (1984).
Cited: 108 times.

(3) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:572 Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model (1982).
Cited: 85 times.

(4) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:570 Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders (1983).
Cited: 58 times.

(5) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:362 Optimal Auction Design (1978).
Cited: 49 times.

(6) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:618 Banking Panics (1984).
Cited: 42 times.

(7) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:225 A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences (1976).
Cited: 40 times.

(8) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:428r Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information (1981).
Cited: 39 times.

(9) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1014 Commitment and Observability in Games (1992).
Cited: 33 times.

(10) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:179 Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons (1977).
Cited: 29 times.

(11) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:144 Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the Free Rider Problem (1976).
Cited: 26 times.

(12) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:532 Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy Without Capital (1982).
Cited: 25 times.

(13) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:496 Multiple-Object Auctions (1981).
Cited: 25 times.

(14) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:384 The Matching Process as a Non-Cooperative/Bargaining Game (1979).
Cited: 25 times.

(15) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1098r A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks (1995).
Cited: 23 times.

(16) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:782 A Theory of Voting Equilibria (1988).
Cited: 23 times.

(17) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:848 Cheap Talk and Cooperation in the Society (1989).
Cited: 21 times.

(18) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1058 Intermediation in Search Markets (1993).
Cited: 21 times.

(19) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:964 A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods (1991).
Cited: 20 times.

(20) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1170 Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts (1996).
Cited: 20 times.

(21) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1096 A Technical Primer on Auction Theory I: Independent Private Values (1995).
Cited: 19 times.

(22) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:924 Updating Ambiguous Beliefs (1991).
Cited: 19 times.

(23) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1210 Decentralization and Collusion (1998).
Cited: 19 times.

(24) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:817 Collusion in Auctions (1989).
Cited: 17 times.

(25) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:802 The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition (1988).
Cited: 17 times.

(26) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:811 Equilibrium Wage Distrihutions: A Synthesis (1988).
Cited: 17 times.

(27) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:970 An Approach to Equilibrium Selection (1990).
Cited: 16 times.

(28) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1150 Reciprocal Trade Liberalization (1996).
Cited: 16 times.

(29) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:911 Occupational Choice and the Process of Development (1990).
Cited: 16 times.

(30) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1202 A Unique Subjective State Space for Unforeseen Contingencies (1997).
Cited: 16 times.

(31) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:29 Incentives and Public Inputs (1974).
Cited: 14 times.

(32) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:297 Labor Supply Under Uncertainty (1977).
Cited: 13 times.

(33) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1244 Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations (1998).
Cited: 12 times.

(34) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:602 On Weighted Shapley Values (1983).
Cited: 12 times.

(35) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1021 Strategy-Proof Exchange (1993).
Cited: 11 times.

(36) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1319 Stationary Equilibria in Asset-Pricing Models with Incomplete Markets and Collateral (2001).
Cited: 11 times.

(37) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1232 Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies (1998).
Cited: 11 times.

(38) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:515 Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games (1982).
Cited: 11 times.

(39) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:887 A Model of Random Matching (1990).
Cited: 10 times.

(40) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:488 A Theory of Wage Dynamics (1981).
Cited: 10 times.

(41) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1025 Case-Based Consumer Theory (1993).
Cited: 10 times.

(42) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1386 Vote Buying (2004).
Cited: 10 times.

(43) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:991r Efficient and Nearly Efficient Partnerships (1992).
Cited: 10 times.

(44) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1258 Stopping Games with Randomized Strategies (1999).
Cited: 10 times.

(45) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:215 Arbitration of Two-Party Disputes Under Ignorance (1976).
Cited: 10 times.

(46) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:892r Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria (1990).
Cited: 10 times.

(47) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1227 Quitting Games (1998).
Cited: 10 times.

(48) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1399 An Economic Analysis of Acting White (2005).
Cited: 10 times.

(49) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:234 Characterization of Domains Admitting Nondictatorial Social Welfare Functions and Nonmanipulable Voting Procedures (1977).
Cited: 9 times.

(50) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1359 Deliberation and Voting Rules (2002).
Cited: 9 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 | 2002

Latest citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000496 The Sunk Cost Bias and Managerial Pricing Practices (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(2) RePEc:kyo:wpaper:609 Heterogeneous Risk Attitudes in a Continuous-Time Model (2005). Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research / Working Papers

(3) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11334 An Empirical Analysis of Acting White (2005). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(4) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11577 Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood Effects (2005). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(5) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1404 On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting (2005). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(6) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1409 Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure (2005). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(7) RePEc:pri:indrel:879 Racial Segregation and the Black-White Test Score Gap (2005). Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section. / Working Papers

(8) RePEc:trf:wpaper:68 The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance (2005). SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, University of Mannheim / Discussion Papers

Latest citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:pen:papers:04-014 Do Citizens Vote Sincerely (If They Vote at All)? Theory and Evidence from U. S. National Elections (2004). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(2) RePEc:pen:papers:04-038 A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers: Supplementary Materiel (2004). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1000 Fractionalization and the Size of Government (2003). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(2) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4115 Good Jobs, Bad Jobs and Redistribution (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:hhs:osloec:2003_021 Fractionalization and the size of government (2003). Oslo University, Department of Economics / Memorandum

(4) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1374 Excludability and Bounded Computational Capacity Strategies (2003). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(5) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1380 Entry Patterns over the Product Life Cycle (2003). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:cep:stitep:439 The Wrong Kind of Transparency (2002). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE / STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series

(2) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3208 Spatial Agglomeration Dynamics (2002). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:ebg:heccah:0756 Approximating a sequence of observations by a simple process (2002). Groupe HEC / Les Cahiers de Recherche

(4) RePEc:ebg:heccah:0757 Perturbed Markov Chains (2002). Groupe HEC / Les Cahiers de Recherche

(5) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp295 Stochastic games: Existence of the MinMax (2002). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(6) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1341 Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring (2002). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(7) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1342 Perturbed Markov Chains (2002). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(8) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1354 Stopping Games in Continuous Time (2002). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(9) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1355 Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games (2002). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(10) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1356 Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations (2002). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(11) RePEc:tky:fseres:2002cf178 Honesty-Proof Implementation (2002). CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo / CIRJE F-Series

(12) RePEc:tky:fseres:2002cf186 Financial Market Globalization, Symmetry-Breaking, and Endogenous Inequality of Nations (2002). CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo / CIRJE F-Series

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

©2008 Jose Manuel Barrueco | mail: barrueco@uv.es