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 Updated May, 1 2008 147.392 documents processed, 3.154.300 references and 1.403.701 citations

 

 
 

EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.230.162817409030.110.07
19970.10.1738774147560.160.09
19980.330.192572662236.450.20.12
19990.270.29227963175.930.140.19
20000.450.3913194721010.080.2
20010.260.342330359010.040.18
20020.170.39404236633.330.080.2
20030.240.416166631513.3140.230.21
20040.370.476959101378.1220.320.25
20050.20.4588651302626.9240.270.29
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
 
Impact Factor:
 
Immediacy Index:
 
Documents published:
 
Citations received:
 

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9703010 Efficient Mechanism Design (1998).
Cited: 33 times.

(2) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0303011 A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency (2003).
Cited: 27 times.

(3) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9409002 An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction (1994).
Cited: 22 times.

(4) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9901004 The Generalized War of Attrition (1999).
Cited: 22 times.

(5) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9906003 Professional Advice (1999).
Cited: 18 times.

(6) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9904003 Prices and the Winners Curse (1999).
Cited: 16 times.

(7) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9410003 Evolution and Endogenous Interactions (1994).
Cited: 13 times.

(8) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9501002 Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoners Dilemma (1995).
Cited: 11 times.

(9) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0203002 The Stability of Price Dispersion under Seller and Consumer Learning (2002).
Cited: 11 times.

(10) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9307001 The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision (1994).
Cited: 11 times.

(11) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9705005 Credit in a Random Matching Model With Private Information (1997).
Cited: 10 times.

(12) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9702001 Learning to Like What You Have - Explaining the Endowment Effect (1997).
Cited: 10 times.

(13) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0401004 Knowledge Creation as a Square Dance on the Hilbert Cube (2004).
Cited: 10 times.

(14) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9407002 How Noise Matters (1994).
Cited: 10 times.

(15) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0103003 Quantum Market Games (2001).
Cited: 9 times.

(16) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9903001 Preference Evolution and Reciprocity (1999).
Cited: 9 times.

(17) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9707002 Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games (1997).
Cited: 8 times.

(18) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0408001 Pairwise Kidney Exchange (2005).
Cited: 8 times.

(19) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9405003 Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms (1994).
Cited: 7 times.

(20) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9307003 Rational Expectations and Rational Learning (1993).
Cited: 7 times.

(21) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9805004 Gale-Shapley Matching in an Evolutionary Trade Network Game (1998).
Cited: 7 times.

(22) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0004010 Alternative Semantics for Unawareness (2000).
Cited: 7 times.

(23) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9503004 Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies (1995).
Cited: 7 times.

(24) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0508004 Expected utility without utility (2005).
Cited: 6 times.

(25) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9507001 The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations (1998).
Cited: 6 times.

(26) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9809004 Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring (1998).
Cited: 6 times.

(27) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0403004 Payoffs-dependent Balancedness and Cores (2004).
Cited: 6 times.

(28) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9707009 Learning in Cournot Oligopoly - An Experiment (1997).
Cited: 6 times.

(29) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9811004 Through Trial & Error to Collusion (1998).
Cited: 6 times.

(30) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0004002 Cooperation and Punishment (2000).
Cited: 5 times.

(31) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9707004 A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty. (1997).
Cited: 5 times.

(32) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9703006 A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (1997).
Cited: 5 times.

(33) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0201003 Aspirational Bargaining (2002).
Cited: 5 times.

(34) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9705003 Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field (1997).
Cited: 5 times.

(35) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9803001 A Model of Financial Fragility (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

(36) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0404002 A Theory of Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions (2004).
Cited: 5 times.

(37) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9410002 Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection (1994).
Cited: 5 times.

(38) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9902003 A Model of Expertise (1999).
Cited: 5 times.

(39) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0107001 Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes and `Coverups (2001).
Cited: 5 times.

(40) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9708002 Interdependent Preference Formation (1997).
Cited: 5 times.

(41) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0203004 A vague theory of choice over time (2002).
Cited: 4 times.

(42) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0309001 Correlated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with Quantum Signals (2003).
Cited: 4 times.

(43) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9810001 Market Experimentation in a Dynamic Differentiated-Goods Duopoly (1999).
Cited: 4 times.

(44) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0504007 Individual Preferences for Giving (2005).
Cited: 4 times.

(45) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9609002 Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs (1996).
Cited: 4 times.

(46) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0410001 The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games (2004).
Cited: 4 times.

(47) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0504002 Collusion as an Informed Principal Problem (2005).
Cited: 4 times.

(48) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0506002 Political renegotiation of regulatory contracts (2005).
Cited: 4 times.

(49) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0503005 Search in the Formation of Large Networks: How Random are Socially Generated Networks? (2005).
Cited: 4 times.

(50) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9407001 Loss Aversion in a Multi-Period Model (1997).
Cited: 4 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 | 2002

Latest citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:aub:autbar:652.05 The Making of International Environmental Agreements (2005). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(2) RePEc:bol:bodewp:543 Firms Network Formation Through the Transmission of Heterogeneous Knowledge (2005). Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna / Working Papers

(3) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000081 Pareto Damaging Behaviors (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(4) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000284 Distinguishing Social Preferences from Preferences for Altruism (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(5) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000534 Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(6) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5130 Democracy, Property Rights, Redistribution and Economic Growth (2005). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(7) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2005032 In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents (2005). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(8) RePEc:edn:esedps:132 Concessions of Infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led Renegotiation (2005). Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh / ESE Discussion Papers

(9) RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0645 Peer Effects and Social Networks in Education and Crime (2005). The Research Institute of Industrial Economics / IUI Working Paper Series

(10) RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2005_045 Choosing Opponents in Prisoners Dilemma: An Evolutionary Analysis (2005). Lund University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(11) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1754 In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents (2005). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(12) RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3749 Infrastructure concessions in Latin America : government-led renegotiations (2005). The World Bank / Policy Research Working Paper Series

(13) RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0505006 An interdisciplinary study of information systems: Christopher Alexander and IS failure. (2005). EconWPA / Development and Comp Systems

(14) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0506007 Coalition Formation with Local Public Goods and Network Effect (2005). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(15) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0509001 On the Shapley value of a minimum cost spanning tree problem (2005). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(16) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0509002 A language for the construction of preferences under uncertainty (2005). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(17) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0511006 A Focal-Point Solution for Bargaining Problems with Coalition Structure (2005). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(18) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0512002 Consistency and the Competitive Outcome Function (2005). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(19) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0512004 Altruism, Spite and Competition in Bargaining Games (2005). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(20) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0512005 Existence of Equilibrium in Discrete Market Games (2005). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(21) RePEc:wpa:wuwpif:0508004 Gains and losses. The same or different choices? (2005). EconWPA / International Finance

(22) RePEc:wpa:wuwpif:0509002 Gains and losses: the same or different choices? A “non-ideal” economics approach. (2005). EconWPA / International Finance

(23) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0502001 Benchmarking real-valued acts (2005). EconWPA / Microeconomics

(24) RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0511005 A Rational Irrational Man (2005). EconWPA / Public Economics

Latest citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0039 The Communication Requirements of of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets (2004). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers

(2) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1117 The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity: Evidence from US Cities (2004). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(3) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4233 The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity: Evidence from US Cities (2004). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(4) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200453 Obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree situations and their monotonicity properties (2004). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(5) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200470 Social network formation with consent (2004). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(6) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2004025 The Fuzzy Core and the (Π, β)- Balanced Core (2004). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(7) RePEc:ecm:feam04:629 Procurement Auctions for Differentiated Goods (2004). Econometric Society / Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings

(8) RePEc:ecm:nasm04:91 The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity: Evidence from US cities (2004). Econometric Society / Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings

(9) RePEc:ecm:nawm04:255 The performance of reverse auctions versus request for quotes when procuring goods with quality differences (2004). Econometric Society / Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings

(10) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.34 The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity: Evidence from US Cities (2004). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers

(11) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.92 Cities and Cultures (2004). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers

(12) RePEc:mse:wpsorb:b04093 Transfer rate rules and core selections in NTU games (2004). Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) / Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques

(13) RePEc:mse:wpsorb:b05023 Stable pricing in monopoly and equilibrium-core of cost games. (2004). Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) / Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques

(14) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10904 The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity: Evidence from US Cities (2004). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(15) RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp465 On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games (2004). Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia / FEUNL Working Paper Series

(16) RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp466 Nash Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players (2004). Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia / FEUNL Working Paper Series

(17) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0403001 Realizing efficient outcomes in cost spanning problems (2004). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(18) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0411001 Transfer Rate Rules and Core Selections in NTU Games (2004). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(19) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0412008 On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games (2004). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(20) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0412009 Nash Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players (2004). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(21) RePEc:wpa:wuwpur:0404006 Dynamic Urban Models: Agglomeration and Growth (2004). EconWPA / Urban/Regional

(22) RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:spii2004-19 Informational Cascades Elicit Private Information (2004). Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competitiveness and Industrial Change (CIC) / CIC Working Papers

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:cla:levarc:666156000000000319 Experiments with Network Formation (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(2) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3966 Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behaviour (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200353 The role of trust in costly network formation (2003). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(4) RePEc:esx:essedp:563 Learning in Networks: a survey (2003). University of Essex, Department of Economics / Economics Discussion Papers

(5) RePEc:grs:wpegrs:2003-08 Self-Organizing Innovation Networks: When do Small Worlds Emerge? (2003). Groupement de Recherches Economiques et Sociales / Working Papers of GRES - Cahiers du GRES

(6) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0112005 Calculus of Bargaining Solution on Boolean Tables (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(7) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0303008 A general model of best response adaptation (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(8) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0303009 Fictitious play in 2xn games (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(9) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0309001 Correlated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with Quantum Signals (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(10) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0310005 Agreeing to agree (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(11) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0311004 Nash and Limit Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(12) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0311006 Symmetric Approximate Equilibrium Distributions with Finite Support (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(13) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0312005 What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information? (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(14) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0308001 Speculation in First-Price Auctions with Resale (2003). EconWPA / Microeconomics

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:92:y:2002:i:5:p:1669-1686 Improving Efficiency of On-Campus Housing: An Experimental Study (2002). American Economic Review

(2) RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000003 Walrasian Bargaining (2002). UCLA Department of Economics / Theory workshop papers

(3) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0207002 some economic applications of scott domains (2002). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

©2008 Jose Manuel Barrueco | mail: barrueco@uv.es