Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers
Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers. Create citation feed for this series
Raw data: |
|
IF |
AIF |
DOC |
CIT |
D2Y |
C2Y |
SC(%) |
CiY |
II |
AII |
1996 | | 0.18 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.08 |
1997 | | 0.19 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.09 |
1998 | | 0.2 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.12 |
1999 | | 0.29 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.19 |
2000 | | 0.41 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.21 |
2001 | | 0.37 | 12 | 60 | 0 | | 0 | 5 | 0.42 | 0.19 |
2002 | 0.25 | 0.42 | 13 | 41 | 12 | 3 | 33.3 | 2 | 0.15 | 0.2 |
2003 | 0.76 | 0.43 | 7 | 37 | 25 | 19 | 5.3 | | | 0.21 |
2004 | 0.95 | 0.49 | 15 | 74 | 20 | 19 | 10.5 | 7 | 0.47 | 0.26 |
2005 | 0.86 | 0.48 | 12 | 16 | 22 | 19 | 0 | 2 | 0.17 | 0.29 |
2006 | 0.89 | 0.54 | 15 | 53 | 27 | 24 | 4.2 | 13 | 0.87 | 0.28 |
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Impact Factor:
| Immediacy Index:
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Documents published:
| Citations received:
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  Most cited documents in this series: (1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0025 Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation (2006). Cited: 44 times. (2) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0020 The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government (2004). Cited: 33 times. (3) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0003 Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium (2001). Cited: 22 times. (4) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0047 Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting (2004). Cited: 20 times. (5) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0046 Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia (2004). Cited: 13 times. (6) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0006 Implementation Theory (2001). Cited: 12 times. (7) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0019 Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint (2002). Cited: 12 times. (8) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0021 Fair Income Tax (2002). Cited: 10 times. (9) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0033 The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules (2003). Cited: 10 times. (10) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0031 Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High-Bid Auctions (2003). Cited: 9 times. (11) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0026 Credit Rationing, Wealth Inequality, and Allocation of Talent (2002). Cited: 8 times. (12) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0049 A Model of Add-on Pricing (2004). Cited: 7 times. (13) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0032 Rejecting Small Gambles Under Expected Utility (2003). Cited: 7 times. (14) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0007 Arms Races and Negotiations (2001). Cited: 7 times. (15) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0030 Beauty is a Beast, Frog is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities (2003). Cited: 6 times. (16) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0005 The Emergence and Persistence of the Anglo-Saxon and German Financial Systems (2001). Cited: 6 times. (17) RePEc:ads:wpaper:9602 Auctions and Efficiency (2001). Cited: 6 times. (18) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0008 On Indescribable Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts (2001). Cited: 4 times. (19) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0029 Mistakes in Cooperation: the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworths Recontracting (2003). Cited: 4 times. (20) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0053 Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships (2005). Cited: 4 times. (21) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0018 Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems (2001). Cited: 3 times. (22) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0068 The (Im)Possibility of a Paretian Rational (2005). Cited: 3 times. (23) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0042 Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare (2004). Cited: 3 times. (24) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0054 The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession (2005). Cited: 3 times. (25) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0040 The Measurement of Intellectual Influence: the Views of a Sceptic (2004). Cited: 2 times. (26) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0073 Demand Theory and General Equilibrium: From Explanation to Introspection, a Journey down the Wrong Road (2006). Cited: 2 times. (27) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0027 Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading (2002). Cited: 2 times. (28) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0014 Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good (2002). Cited: 2 times. (29) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0058 On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules (2006). Cited: 2 times. (30) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0075 Public-private Partnerships and Government Spending Limits (2006). Cited: 2 times. (31) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0017 The Evolution of Focal Points (2002). Cited: 2 times. (32) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0069 Willpower and the Optimal Control of Visceral Urges (2006). Cited: 2 times. (33) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0015 Social Orderings for the Assignment of Indivisible Objects (2002). Cited: 2 times. (34) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0061 Distinguishing Social Preferences from Preferences for Altruism (2005). Cited: 2 times. (35) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0022 On the Equivalence between Welfarism and Equality of Opportunity (2002). Cited: 2 times. (36) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0012 Retrading in Market Games (2002). Cited: 1 times. (37) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0059 Minorities and Storable Votes (2005). Cited: 1 times. (38) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0045 Decentralization and Political Institutions (2004). Cited: 1 times. (39) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0077 Perishable Durable Goods (2007). Cited: 1 times. (40) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0056 Secure Implementation (2005). Cited: 1 times. (41) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0016 Welfare Egalitarianism in Non-Rival Environments (2002). Cited: 1 times. (42) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0034 Decision-Making in the Context of Imprecise Probabilistic Beliefs (2006). Cited: 1 times. (43) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0060 A Simple Scheme to Improve the Efficiency of Referenda (2005). Cited: 1 times. (44) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0078 Changing Identity: The Emergence of Social Groups (2007). Cited: 1 times. (45) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0011 The Demand Bargaining Set: General Characterization and Application to Majority Games (2001). Cited: 1 times. (46) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0028 A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation (2002). Cited: 1 times. (47) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0035 Common Priors For Like-Minded Agents (2003). Cited: 1 times. (48) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0051 Endogenous Affirmative Action: Gender Bias Leads to Gender Quotas (2005). Cited: 1 times. Recent citations received in: | 2006 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 Recent citations received in: 2006 (1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0067 Is it Possible to Define Subjective Probabilities in Purely Behavioral Terms?
A Comment on Epstein-Zhang (2001) (2006). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers (2) RePEc:cde:cdewps:142 Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights (2006). Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics / Working papers (3) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1847 Should Courts always Enforce what Contracting Parties Write? (2006). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series (4) RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0064 Patents vs Trade Secrets: Knowledge Licensing and Spillover (2006). Center for Economic and Financial Research / CEFIR Working Papers (5) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000391 Self-Control through Second-Order Preferences (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography (6) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5481 Patents, Imitation and Licensing in an Asymmetric Dynamic R&D Race (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers (7) RePEc:fiu:wpaper:0602 Impact of Intellectual Property Rights Reforms on the Diffusion of Knowledge through FDI (2006). Florida International University, Department of Economics / Working Papers (8) RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00177614_v1 Patent Systems for Encouraging Innovation: Lessons from Economic Analysis (2006). HAL / Post-Print (9) RePEc:isu:genres:12598 Patents, Research Exemption, and the Incentive for Sequential Innovation (2006). Iowa State University, Department of Economics / Staff General Research Papers (10) RePEc:mis:wpaper:20060502 On the Social Desirability of Patents for Sequential Innovations in a Vertically Differentiated Market (2006). Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Dipartimento di Statistica / Working Papers (11) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12615 Time Preference, Time Discounting, and Smoking Decisions (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (12) RePEc:pen:papers:06-024 Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (2006). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive (13) RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2006/17 How Much Should Society Fuel the Greed of Innovators? On the Relations between Appropriability, Opportunities and Rates of Innovation (2006). Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy / LEM Papers Series Recent citations received in: 2005 (1) RePEc:gra:wpaper:05/21 The role of personal involvement and
responsibility in dictatorial allocations: a classroom investigation (2005). Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. / ThE Papers (2) RePEc:rut:rutres:200512 Let Them Burn Money: Making Elections More Informative (2005). Rutgers University, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers Recent citations received in: 2004 (1) RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-02 The Measurement of Intellectual Influence: the Views of a Sceptic (2004). Brown University, Department of Economics / Working Papers (2) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1260 Making Judges Independent â Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary (2004). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series (3) RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0041 Ownership concentration in Russian industry (2004). Center for Economic and Financial Research / CEFIR Working Papers (4) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4272 Term Limits and Electoral Accountability (2004). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers (5) RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:1:y:2004:i:3:p:1-6 The Measurement of Intellectual Influence: the Views of a Sceptic (2004). Economics Bulletin (6) RePEc:imf:imfwpa:04/163 Can Public Discussion Enhance Program Ownership? (2004). International Monetary Fund / IMF Working Papers (7) RePEc:tuf:tuftec:0407 Policy Gambles (2004). Department of Economics, Tufts University / Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University Recent citations received in: 2003 Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results. Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.
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