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 Updated January, 2 2009 180.482 documents processed, 3.979.807 references and 1.716.086 citations

 

 
 

UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.180000.08
19970.190000.09
19980.20000.12
19990.290000.19
20000.41433000.21
200110.37204400.19
20021.170.4271367020.290.2
20030.220.43122610920810.660.21
20041.140.49965171291474.8540.560.26
20051.290.481404802182819.3750.540.29
20061.030.5416427423624411.9720.440.28
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000515 Bargaining and Markets (2005).
Cited: 167 times.

(2) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000413 Why Do Americans Work So Much More Than Europeans? (2004).
Cited: 109 times.

(3) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000384 Optimal Interest-Rate Rules: I. General Theory (2003).
Cited: 86 times.

(4) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000130 The Social Multiplier (2003).
Cited: 56 times.

(5) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000394 Optimal Interest-Rate Rules: II. Applications (2003).
Cited: 48 times.

(6) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000217 Designing Optimal Disability Insurance (2003).
Cited: 36 times.

(7) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000289 Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities (2004).
Cited: 32 times.

(8) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000092 Public and Private Information in Monetary Policy Models (2003).
Cited: 31 times.

(9) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000367 Average Debt and Equity Returns: Puzzling? (2003).
Cited: 31 times.

(10) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000518 A Critique of Structural VARs Using Real Business Cycle Theory (2004).
Cited: 29 times.

(11) RePEc:cla:levrem:7616 Risk, Ambiguity, and the Separation of Utility and Beliefs (2000).
Cited: 28 times.

(12) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000880 Sudden Stops and Output Drops (2005).
Cited: 26 times.

(13) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000560 Business Cycle Accounting (2004).
Cited: 26 times.

(14) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000484 Neuroeconomics: How neuroscience can inform economics. (2003).
Cited: 25 times.

(15) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000143 COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR IN TWO-PERSON GUESSING GAMES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY (2004).
Cited: 23 times.

(16) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000136 Inefficient Foreign Borrowing: A Dual-and Common-Agency Perspective (2003).
Cited: 22 times.

(17) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000465 Why is fiscal policy often procyclical? (2005).
Cited: 22 times.

(18) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000311 Persistence in Law-of-One-Price Deviations: Evidence from Micro-data (2006).
Cited: 21 times.

(19) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000652 Time-Consistent Public Expenditures (2004).
Cited: 21 times.

(20) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000098 Knife-Edge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip? (2003).
Cited: 20 times.

(21) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000488 Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions (2005).
Cited: 19 times.

(22) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000336 Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study (2006).
Cited: 18 times.

(23) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000415 Hot Money (2003).
Cited: 18 times.

(24) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000300 A Unified Theory of the Evolution of International Income Levels (2004).
Cited: 17 times.

(25) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000116 Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces (2005).
Cited: 17 times.

(26) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001139 Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details (2006).
Cited: 16 times.

(27) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000108 Cooperative Behavior and the Frequency of Social Interaction (2004).
Cited: 15 times.

(28) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000300 Societal Benefits of Illiquid Bonds (2003).
Cited: 14 times.

(29) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000252 Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations (2006).
Cited: 14 times.

(30) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000439 Clean Evidence on Peer Effects (2004).
Cited: 14 times.

(31) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000715 Taxes, Regulations, and the Value of U.S. and U.K. Corporations (2004).
Cited: 14 times.

(32) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000259 Structural Transformation and Cross-Country Income Differences (2003).
Cited: 13 times.

(33) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000092 Competing Auctions (2003).
Cited: 13 times.

(34) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000236 Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal Form Games (2004).
Cited: 13 times.

(35) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000018 Market Culture: How Norms Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance (2004).
Cited: 13 times.

(36) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000997 Principal Components and the Long Run (2005).
Cited: 13 times.

(37) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001304 Democratic capital: The nexus of political and economic change (2006).
Cited: 13 times.

(38) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000035 Robust Mechanism Design (2003).
Cited: 12 times.

(39) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000138 Efficient Allocations, with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending (2004).
Cited: 12 times.

(40) RePEc:cla:levrem:172782000000000096 A,B,Cs (and Ds)s for Understanding VARS (2005).
Cited: 11 times.

(41) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000506 Fertility and Social Security (2005).
Cited: 11 times.

(42) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000224 A Qualitative Approach to Markovian Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Capital (2004).
Cited: 11 times.

(43) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001030 The Informal Sector (2006).
Cited: 10 times.

(44) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000124 Executive Compensation and Short-termist Behavior in Speculative Markets (2003).
Cited: 10 times.

(45) RePEc:cla:levrem:234936000000000089 A General Theory of Time Preferences (2003).
Cited: 10 times.

(46) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000886 Political Economy of Mechanisms (2007).
Cited: 10 times.

(47) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000294 Coordination and Policy Traps (2004).
Cited: 10 times.

(48) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001045 Empirical Models of Auctions (2006).
Cited: 9 times.

(49) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000587 U.S. Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations and Relative Price Fluctuations (2004).
Cited: 9 times.

(50) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000514 The Limits of Ex Post Implementation Revisited (2004).
Cited: 9 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2006 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:2:p:87-91 When Do More Patents Reduce R&D? (2006). American Economic Review

(2) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse11_2006 Moral Norms in a Partly Compliant Society (2006). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2006-025 Temptation, Welfare and Revealed Preference (2006). Department of Economics, Boston University / Boston University Working Papers Series

(4) RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0063 Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse (2006). Center for Economic and Financial Research / CEFIR Working Papers

(5) RePEc:cir:cirpro:2006rp-02 Open Government Architecture: The evolution of De Jure Standards, Consortium Standards, and Open Source Software (2006). CIRANO / CIRANO Project Reports

(6) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001129 Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(7) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001183 Methods of Social Comparison in Games of Status (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(8) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001211 Metastable Equilibria (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(9) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000166 Giving Gifts to Groups: How Congestible is Altruism? (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(10) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000170 Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(11) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000193 Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(12) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000211 Self-Correcting Information Cascades (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(13) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000364 Information Processing and Learning: Testing the Analogy-based Expectation Approach (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(14) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000374 Optimal Ties in Contests (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(15) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000391 Self-Control through Second-Order Preferences (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(16) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000462 Look-ups as the Windows of the Strategic Soul: Studying Cognition via Information Search in Game Experiments (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(17) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000507 Temptation, Certainty Effect, and Diminishing Self-Control (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(18) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000517 Look-ups as the Windows of the Strategic Soul: Studying Cognition via Information Search in Game Experiments (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(19) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000541 Information Processing, Learning and Analogy-based Expectation: an Experiment (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(20) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000547 Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(21) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000608 Vertical Orientation and Color Contrast and Choices by Bumblebees (Bombus terrestris L.) (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(22) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000629 Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(23) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000272 An Experimental Test of Advice and Social Learning (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(24) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000621 Which Inequality? The Inequality of Resources Versus the Inequality of Rewards (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(25) RePEc:clt:sswopa:1259 The compromise game: Two-sided adverse selection in the laboratory (2006). California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences / Working Papers

(26) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5543 The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(27) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5647 Optimal Taxation of Entrepreneurial Capital with Private Information (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(28) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5733 Control Rights in Public-Private Partnerships (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(29) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5748 Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives and the Resource Curse (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(30) RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0650 Why and where do headquarters move? (2006). IESE Business School / IESE Research Papers

(31) RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2006:i:24:p:1-5 A note on the suboptimality of right-of-first-refusal clauses (2006). Economics Bulletin

(32) RePEc:edb:cedidp:06-10 Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse (2006). Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University / CEDI Discussion Paper Series

(33) RePEc:esx:essedp:612 Control Rights in Public-Private Partnership (2006). University of Essex, Department of Economics / Economics Discussion Papers

(34) RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2006/40 Pricing to Habits and the Law of One Price (2006). European University Institute / Economics Working Papers

(35) RePEc:fip:fedfwp:2006-50 Global price dispersion: are prices converging or diverging? (2006). Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco / Working Paper Series

(36) RePEc:fip:fedmsr:383 Private monitoring with infinite histories (2006). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis / Staff Report

(37) RePEc:gla:glaewp:2006_9 US Trade and Exchange Rate Volatility: A Real Sectoral Bilateral Analysis (2006). Department of Economics, University of Glasgow / Working Papers

(38) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0634 Organizational Structure as the Channeling of Boundedly Rational Pre-play Communication (2006). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

(39) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp430 Optimal Ties in Contests (2006). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(40) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp439 Vertical Orientation and Color Contrast and Choices by Bumblebees (Bombus terrestris L.) (2006). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(41) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2143 Control Rights in Public-Private Partnerships (2006). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(42) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2341 Two-Stage Boundedly Rational Choice Procedures: Theory and Experimental Evidence (2006). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(43) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2499 The Age of Mass Migration: Economic and Institutional Determinants (2006). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(44) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:9:y:2006:i:1:p:53-66 Internet cautions: Experimental games with internet partners (2006). Experimental Economics

(45) RePEc:kob:dpaper:199 Immediately Reactive Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs (2006). Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University / Discussion Paper Series

(46) RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0622 Competition Fosters Trust (2006). University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics (formerly Institute of Economics) / Discussion Papers

(47) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12108 Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(48) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12419 Optimal Taxation of Entrepreneurial Capital with Private Information (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(49) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12507 An Experimental Test of Criminal Behavior Among Juveniles and Young Adults (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(50) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12562 Valuing New Goods in a Model with Complementarities: Online Newspapers (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(51) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12648 Learning and Disagreement in an Uncertain World (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(52) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12702 Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(53) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12720 Coarse Thinking and Persuasion (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(54) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12731 Pricing to Habits and the Law of One Price (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(55) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12767 Information Cascades: Evidence from An Experiment with Financial Market Professionals (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(56) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12778 Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(57) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1423 Temptation–Driven Preferences (2006). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(58) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1438 Voting in small networks with cross-pressure (2006). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(59) RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2006-11 An Experimental Test of Criminal Behavior Among Juveniles and Young Adults (2006). University of Oregon Economics Department / University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers

(60) RePEc:pen:papers:06-018 Smooth Monotone Contribution Games (2006). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(61) RePEc:pit:wpaper:236 Information Use and Transference (2006). University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(62) RePEc:por:fepwps:206 Rational Expectations Equilibrium in Economies with Uncertain Delivery (2006). Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto / FEP Working Papers

(63) RePEc:pra:mprapa:1018 Political Bad Reputation (2006). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(64) RePEc:pra:mprapa:1440 Endogenous Network Formation In the Laboratory (2006). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(65) RePEc:pra:mprapa:2071 Taxation without Commitment (2006). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(66) RePEc:red:ecodyn:v:8:y:2006:i:1:agenda The Research Agenda: Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde and Juan F. Rubio-Ramirez on Estimating DSGE Models (2006). EconomicDynamics Newsletter

(67) RePEc:red:issued:05-139 Credibility and endogenous societal discounting (2006). Review of Economic Dynamics

(68) RePEc:roc:rocher:525 Cognitive Dissonance and Choice (2006). University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) / RCER Working Papers

(69) RePEc:roc:wallis:wp43 Robust Rational Turnout (2006). University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy / Wallis Working Papers

(70) RePEc:roc:wallis:wp44 Robust Rational Turnout (2006). University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy / Wallis Working Papers

(71) RePEc:scp:wpaper:06-60 The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory (2006). Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR) / IEPR Working Papers

(72) RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4078 Informality trends and cycles (2006). The World Bank / Policy Research Working Paper Series

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0056 Secure Implementation (2005). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers

(2) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0061 Distinguishing Social Preferences from Preferences for Altruism (2005). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers

(3) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:2:p:381-387 Sudden Stops and Output Drops (2005). American Economic Review

(4) RePEc:aub:autbar:643.05 Its What You Say Not What You Pay (2005). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(5) RePEc:bbk:bbkefp:0510 The Management of Digital Rights in Pay TV (2005). Birkbeck, School of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics / Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance

(6) RePEc:bep:bjafio:v:3:y:2005:i:2:p:1121-1121 Private Label Products as Experience Goods (2005). Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization

(7) RePEc:bep:eapcon:v:4:y:2005:i:1:p:1458-1458 Fatalistic Tendencies: An Explanation of Why People Dont Save (2005). Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy

(8) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1472 Contract Adjustment under Uncertainty (2005). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(9) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1494 Sustaining Social Security (2005). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(10) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1521 Pension, Fertility, and Education (2005). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(11) RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000925 Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of Surplus from Creation (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(12) RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000988 Dont Ask Why Things Went Wrong: Nested Reputation and Scapegoating Inefficiency (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(13) RePEc:cla:levarc:666156000000000520 On Information Revelation in Private Value Auctions (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(14) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000340 Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(15) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000785 Ascending Proxy Auctions (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(16) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000861 Asset Float and Speculative Bubbles (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(17) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000909 Monetary and Fiscal Policy: An Overview (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(18) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000941 Money Pumps in the Market (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(19) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000966 Reducing the Complexity Costs of 401(k) Participation Through Quick Enrollment(TM) (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(20) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000983 From Busts to Booms, in Babies and Goodies (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(21) RePEc:cla:levrem:172782000000000090 Public Education and Capital Accumulation (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(22) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000116 Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(23) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000232 Restructured Electricity Markets: A Risk Management Approach (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(24) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000238 Restructured Electricity Markets: Reevaluation of Vertical Integration and Unbundling (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(25) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000284 Distinguishing Social Preferences from Preferences for Altruism (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(26) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000379 From Busts to Booms in Babies and Goodies (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(27) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000539 Discussion of BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(28) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000604 Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winners Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(29) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000634 The Market for Quacks (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(30) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000649 $100 Bills on the Sidewalk: Suboptimal Saving in 401(k) Plans (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(31) RePEc:cla:uclaol:365 Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite) (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / UCLA Economics Online Papers

(32) RePEc:cla:uclaol:366 Folk Theorem with Communication (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / UCLA Economics Online Papers

(33) RePEc:cla:uclawp:838 Posterior Implementation Versus Ex-Post Implementation (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / UCLA Economics Working Papers

(34) RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp2005_0503 ON INFORMATION AND COMPETITION IN PRIVATE VALUE AUCTIONS (2005). CEMFI / Working Papers

(35) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5434 A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade (2005). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(36) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1479r Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2005). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(37) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1519 Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces (2005). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(38) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20050063 Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining (2005). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(39) RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:070 On Myopic Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Endogenous Discounting (2005). Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department / DNB Working Papers

(40) RePEc:esi:discus:2005-24 On Inequity Aversion (2005). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(41) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.38 Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games (2005). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers

(42) RePEc:fip:fedbcp:y:2005:x:1 Debit or credit? (2005). Conference Series ; [Proceedings]

(43) RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0501 Bargaining and the value of money (2005). Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland / Working Paper

(44) RePEc:fip:feddcl:0105 Financial crises and total factor productivity (2005). Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas / Center for Latin America Working Papers

(45) RePEc:fip:fedmsr:353 Sudden stops and output drops (2005). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis / Staff Report

(46) RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:2005:i:sum:p:19-50:n:v.91no.3 Unemployment and vacancy fluctuations in the matching model: inspecting the mechanism (2005). Economic Quarterly

(47) RePEc:fip:fedrwp:05-13 Optimal wealth taxes with risky human capital (2005). Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond / Working Paper

(48) RePEc:fiu:wpaper:0517 Cadaveric vs. Live-Donor Kidney Transplants: The Interaction of Institutions and InequalityA (2005). Florida International University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(49) RePEc:gla:glaewp:2005_25 CADAVERIC VS. LIVE-DONOR KIDNEY TRANSPLANTS: THE INTERACTION OF INSTITUTIONS AND INEQUALITY (2005). Department of Economics, University of Glasgow / Working Papers

(50) RePEc:gla:glaewp:2005_5 Strategic Effects and Incentives in Multi-issue Bargaining Games (2005). Department of Economics, University of Glasgow / Working Papers

(51) RePEc:gra:wpaper:05/21 The role of personal involvement and responsibility in dictatorial allocations: a classroom investigation (2005). Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. / ThE Papers

(52) RePEc:iek:wpaper:0505 Diversity Is, Uh ..., Homogeneity: The Case of Horizontal Innovation (2005). Institute of Economic Research, Korea University / Working Papers

(53) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1890 Affect as a Source of Motivation in the Workplace: A New Model of Labor Supply, and New Field Evidence on Income Targeting and the Goal Gradient (2005). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(54) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:8:y:2005:i:4:p:347-367 Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium (2005). Experimental Economics

(55) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11133 Sudden Stops and Output Drops (2005). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(56) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11211 Attention, Demographics, and the Stock Market (2005). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(57) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11367 Asset Float and Speculative Bubbles (2005). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(58) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11680 Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families: Evidence from a Field Experiment with H&R Block (2005). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(59) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11765 Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords (2005). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(60) RePEc:nus:nusewp:wp0509 A Fictitious-Play Model of Bargaining To Implement the Nash Solution (2005). National University of Singapore, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers

(61) RePEc:nya:albaec:05-02 Directed Search without Wage Commitment and the Role of Labor Market Institutions (2005). University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics / Discussion Papers

(62) RePEc:nzb:nzbdps:2005/02 Mind your Ps and Qs! Improving ARMA forecasts with RBC priors (2005). Reserve Bank of New Zealand / Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discussion Paper Series

(63) RePEc:osk:wpaper:0403r Dominant Strategy Implementation in Pure Exchange Economies (2005). Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) / Discussion Papers in Economics and Business

(64) RePEc:pen:papers:05-014 Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2005). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(65) RePEc:pse:psecon:2005-28 Towards a theory of deception. (2005). PSE (Ecole normale supérieure) / PSE Working Papers

(66) RePEc:red:ecodyn:v:6:y:2005:i:2:interview EconomicDynamics Interviews Ellen McGrattan on Business Cycle Accounting and Stock Market Valuation (2005). EconomicDynamics Newsletter

(67) RePEc:siu:wpaper:19-2005 Trade, Growth and Increasing Returns to Infrastructure: The Role of the Sophisticated Monopolist (2005). Singapore Management University, School of Economics / Working Papers

(68) RePEc:wiw:wiwrsa:ersa05p133 INCORPORATING AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES IN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF TRANSPORT PROJECTS (2005). European Regional Science Association / ERSA conference papers

(69) RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0511007 Trust and Reciprocity in Incentive Contracting (2005). EconWPA / Experimental

(70) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0501004 Reinterpreting the meaning of breakdown (2005). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(71) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0503001 A Game Theoretical Model of Land Contract Choice (2005). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(72) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0510002 The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information (2005). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(73) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0508008 Impact of Valuation Ranking Information on Bidding in First-Price (2005). EconWPA / Microeconomics

(74) RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:06-02 Is Online Trading Gambling with Peanuts? (2005). Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim / Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications

(75) RePEc:yca:wpaper:2003_4 High-Order Consumption Moments and Asset Pricing (2005). York University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:bep:maccon:v:4:y:2004:i:1:p:1180-1180 What Does It Take to Explain Procyclical Productivity? (2004). Contributions to Macroeconomics

(2) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse15_2004 Herding with and without Payoff Externalities - An Internet Experiment (2004). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:2004-12 Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete and Sophistication in Experimental Hide and Seek Games (2004). Department of Economics, UC San Diego / University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series

(4) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1200 A Leading Indicator for the Dutch Economy – Methodological and Empirical Revision of the CPB System (2004). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(5) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1353 Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination (2004). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(6) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000050 On the Recursive Saddle Point Method (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(7) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000113 Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(8) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000143 COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR IN TWO-PERSON GUESSING GAMES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(9) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000300 A Unified Theory of the Evolution of International Income Levels (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(10) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000345 Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(11) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000426 On Dynamic Principal-Agent Problems in Continuous Time (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(12) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000466 Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(13) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000514 The Limits of Ex Post Implementation Revisited (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(14) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000678 An Axiomatization of an Exponential Similarity Function (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(15) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000684 Empirical Similarity (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(16) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000696 Probabilities as Similarity-Weighted Frequencies (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(17) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000710 Productivity and the Post-1990 U.S. Economy (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(18) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000750 Incentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(19) RePEc:cla:uclaol:299 The Market Price of Aggregate Risk and the Wealth Distribution (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / UCLA Economics Online Papers

(20) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4179 Speed and Quality of Collective Decision-Making, I: Imperfect Information Processing (2004). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(21) RePEc:cte:werepe:we044517 CAN FINANCIAL FRICTIONS HELP EXPLAIN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE US FED? (2004). Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía / Economics Working Papers

(22) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1421r Robust Mechanism Design (2004). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(23) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1479 Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2004). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(24) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1485 Axiomatization of an Exponential Similarity Function (2004). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(25) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1486 Empirical Similarity (2004). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(26) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2004047 Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types (2004). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(27) RePEc:ecm:latm04:47 The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions (2004). Econometric Society / Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings

(28) RePEc:ecm:nasm04:516 Bargaining with History Dependent Preferences (2004). Econometric Society / Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings

(29) RePEc:esi:discus:2004-31 Individual or team decision-making - Causes and consequences of self-selection (2004). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(30) RePEc:esi:discus:2004-38 Approximate Truth in Economic Modelling (2004). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(31) RePEc:fip:fedmsr:333 A unified theory of the evolution of international income levels (2004). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis / Staff Report

(32) RePEc:fip:fedmsr:351 Latin America in the rearview mirror (2004). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis / Staff Report

(33) RePEc:imf:imfwpa:04/193 Work Absence in Europe (2004). International Monetary Fund / IMF Working Papers

(34) RePEc:kls:series:0005 Trust among Internet Traders: A Behavioral Economics Approach (2004). University of Cologne, Seminar of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics

(35) RePEc:mlb:wpaper:897 STOCHASTIC GROWTH WITH NONCONVEXITIES:THE OPTIMAL CASE (2004). The University of Melbourne / Department of Economics - Working Papers Series

(36) RePEc:mlb:wpaper:902 Some Stability Results for Markovian Economic Semigroups (2004). The University of Melbourne / Department of Economics - Working Papers Series

(37) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10260 Are Americans Saving Optimally for Retirement? (2004). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(38) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10636 Technology Shocks and Aggregate Fluctuations: How Well Does the RBS Model Fit Postwar U.S. Data? (2004). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(39) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10734 Emerging Market Business Cycles: The Cycle is the Trend (2004). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(40) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10792 Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing (2004). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(41) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11000 Dynamic Scoring: A Back-of-the-Envelope Guide (2004). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(42) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11008 Latin America in the Rearview Mirror (2004). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(43) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11009 Externalities and Growth (2004). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(44) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1392 Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types (2004). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(45) RePEc:pen:papers:04-033 Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2004). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(46) RePEc:red:issued:v:7:y:2004:i:3:p:541-554 Figuring out the Impact of Hidden Savings on Optimal Unemployment Insurance (2004). Review of Economic Dynamics

(47) RePEc:sce:scecf4:10 Markovian Optimal Taxation (2004). Society for Computational Economics / Computing in Economics and Finance 2004

(48) RePEc:ste:nystbu:04-18 Information Markets and the Comovement of Asset Prices (2004). New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(49) RePEc:ucy:cypeua:2-2004 Endogenous Public Policy and Long-Run Growth (2004). University of Cyprus Department of Economics / University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics

(50) RePEc:upf:upfgen:783 Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (2004). Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Economics Working Papers

(51) RePEc:upf:upfgen:788 Global Nash Convergence of Foster and Youngs Regret Testing (2004). Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Economics Working Papers

(52) RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0404001 The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An Experimental and Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market (2004). EconWPA / Experimental

(53) RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0410016 Optimal stopping made easy (2004). EconWPA / Finance

(54) RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0408013 A Positive Theory of Government Debt (2004). EconWPA / Macroeconomics

Recent citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:2:p:192-195 Models of Thinking, Learning, and Teaching in Games (2003). American Economic Review

(2) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:2:p:196-201 Decision Making with Naive Advice (2003). American Economic Review

(3) RePEc:bep:mactop:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1082-1082 The Politics of Endogenous Growth (2003). Topics in Macroeconomics

(4) RePEc:cea:doctra:e2003_11 Computational Errors in Guessing Games1 (2003). Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces / Economic Working Papers at centrA

(5) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1060 Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interactions: Empirical Evidence and Optimal Policy Using a Structural New Keynesian Model (2003). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(6) RePEc:cfs:cfswop:wp200312 Optimal Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge (2003). Center for Financial Studies / CFS Working Paper Series

(7) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000092 Competing Auctions (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(8) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000098 Knife-Edge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip? (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(9) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000350 Attainability of Boundary Points under Reinforcement Learning (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(10) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000495 A cognitive hierarchy theory of one-shot games: Some preliminary results (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(11) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000514 Functional EWA: A one-parameter theory of learning in games (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(12) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000264 Accuracy of Simulations for Stochastic Dynamic Models (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(13) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000284 Calculating and Using Second Order Accurate Solutions of Discrete Time (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(14) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000426 Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(15) RePEc:clt:sswopa:1161 A survey of models of network formation: Stability and efficiency (2003). California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences / Working Papers

(16) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3723 The Law of Primogeniture and the Transition from Landed Aristocracy to Industrial Democracy (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(17) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3899 Taylor Rules in Practice: How Central Banks can Intercept Sunspot Expectations (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(18) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3928 Backward-Looking Interest Rate Rules, Interest Rate Smoothing and Macroeconomic Instability (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(19) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3966 Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behaviour (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(20) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4006 Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(21) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4028 The Spatial Aspects of Crime (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(22) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4030 Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow in Foreign Currency? (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(23) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4135 The Learning Cost of Interest Rate Reversals (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(24) RePEc:cte:werepe:we034615 ACCURACY OF SIMULATIONS FOR STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC MODELS (2003). Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía / Economics Working Papers

(25) RePEc:cte:werepe:we034716 SIMULATION-BASED ESTIMATION OF DYNAMIC MODELS WITH CONTINUOUS EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTIONS (2003). Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía / Economics Working Papers

(26) RePEc:ctl:louvir:2003010 Diverging patterns of education premium and school attendance in France and the US : a Walrasian view (2003). Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) / Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Eco

(27) RePEc:cvs:starer:03-05 Medium Term Business Cycles (2003). C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University / Working Papers

(28) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1423 Multidimensional Private Value Auctions (2003). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(29) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1432 On the Empirical Content of Quantal Response Equilibrium (2003). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(30) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200353 The role of trust in costly network formation (2003). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(31) RePEc:dnb:wormem:729 Central Bank Communication and Interest Rate Rules (2003). Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department / WO Research Memoranda (discontinued)

(32) RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20030257 Macroeconomic modelling of monetary policy. (2003). European Central Bank / Working Paper Series

(33) RePEc:esx:essedp:563 Learning in Networks: a survey (2003). University of Essex, Department of Economics / Economics Discussion Papers

(34) RePEc:fip:fedawp:2003-21 Inflation scares and forecast-based monetary policy (2003). Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta / Working Paper

(35) RePEc:fip:fedfap:2003-11 Inflation scares and forecast-based monetary policy (2003). Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco / Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory

(36) RePEc:fip:fedfer:y:2003:p:1-12 Simple rules for monetary policy (2003). Economic Review

(37) RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2003-41 Inflation scares and forecast-based monetary policy (2003). Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) / Finance and Economics Discussion Series

(38) RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2003-61 Calculating and using second order accurate solutions of discrete time dynamic equilibrium models (2003). Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) / Finance and Economics Discussion Series

(39) RePEc:fip:fedkpr:y:2003:p:349-360 Implications of a changing economic structure for the strategy of monetary policy : commentary (2003). Proceedings

(40) RePEc:fip:fedmbp:4-03 Alternative nominal anchors: a welfare comparison (2003). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis / Banking and Policy Studies

(41) RePEc:fip:fedmsr:316 Financial crises as herds: overturning the critiques (2003). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis / Staff Report

(42) RePEc:fip:fedmwp:628 Designing optimal disability insurance (2003). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis / Working Papers

(43) RePEc:fip:fedpwp:03-4 Backward-looking interest-rate rules, interest-rate smoothing, and macroeconomic instability (2003). Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia / Working Papers

(44) RePEc:gla:glaewp:2003_9 Assessing Money Supply Rules (2003). Department of Economics, University of Glasgow / Working Papers

(45) RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0100 Do You Enjoy Having More Than Others? Survey Evidence of Positional Goods (2003). Göteborg University, Department of Economics / Working Papers in Economics

(46) RePEc:hhs:rbnkwp:0157 Indicator Accuracy and Monetary Policy: Is Ignorance Bliss? (2003). Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden) / Working Paper Series

(47) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp319 Markets Versus Negotiations: An Experimental Investigation (2003). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(48) RePEc:ide:wpaper:589 Efficient Patent Pools (2003). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(49) RePEc:ide:wpaper:654 Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets (2003). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(50) RePEc:iie:wpaper:wp03-10 The Difficulty of Discerning Whats Too Tight: Taylor Rules and Japanese Monetary Policy (2003). Peterson Institute for International Economics / Peterson Institute Working Paper Series

(51) RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2003-36 THE CURSE AND BLESSING OF FIXED SPECIFIC FACTORS IN SMALL-OPEN ECONOMIES (2003). Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) / Working Papers. Serie AD

(52) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp846 Diverging Patterns of Education Premium and School Attendance in France and the US: A Walrasian View (2003). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(53) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:6:y:2003:i:1:p:53-73 Coordination and Information in Critical Mass Games: An Experimental Study (2003). Experimental Economics

(54) RePEc:kud:epruwp:03-10 The Equity Risk Premium and the Required Share Returns in a Tobin’s q Model. (2003). Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics (formerly Institute of Economics) / EPRU Working Paper Series

(55) RePEc:kud:kuieca:2004_10 Optimal Unemployment Insurance in an Estimated Job Search Model with Savings (2003). University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics / CAM Working Papers

(56) RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2003-06 Nash Networks with Heterogeneous Agents (2003). Department of Economics, Louisiana State University / Departmental Working Papers

(57) RePEc:max:cprwps:51 Social Interactions in Labor Supply (revised October 2005) (2003). Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University / Center for Policy Research Working Papers

(58) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10003 Medium Term Business Cycles (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(59) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10119 Pareto Efficient Income Taxation with Stochastic Abilities (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(60) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10125 International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMFs Catalytic Finance (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(61) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9421 What is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(62) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9658 Financial Crises as Herds: Overturning the Critiques (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(63) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9767 Coordination and Policy Traps (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(64) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9852 The Value of a Statistical Life and the Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(65) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9900 Does Exchange Rate Risk Matter for Welfare? (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(66) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9931 Micro-Foundations of Urban Agglomeration Economies (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(67) RePEc:net:wpaper:0311 Adoption Delay in a Standards War (2003). NET Institute / Working Papers

(68) RePEc:net:wpaper:0312 Differentiation Across Standards and Adoption Failure in 56K Modems (2003). NET Institute / Working Papers

(69) RePEc:nus:nusewp:wp0311 Competing Payment Schemes (2003). National University of Singapore, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers

(70) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1372 Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms (2003). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(71) RePEc:pen:papers:03-005 Backward-Looking Interest-Rate Rules, Interest-Rate Smoothing, and Macroeconomic Instability (2003). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(72) RePEc:red:ecodyn:v:4:y:2003:i:2:interview EconomicDynamics Interviews Narayana Kocherlakota (2003). EconomicDynamics Newsletter

(73) RePEc:rne:rneart:v:2:y:2003:i:2:p:50-68 Theory of Credit Card Networks: A Survey of the Literature (2003). Review of Network Economics

(74) RePEc:rne:rneart:v:2:y:2003:i:2:p:97-124 The Theory of Interchange Fees: A Synthesis of Recent Contributions (2003). Review of Network Economics

(75) RePEc:roc:rocher:490 Does Stockholding Provide Perfect Risk Sharing? (2003). University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) / RCER Working Papers

(76) RePEc:rut:rutres:200304 Backward-Looking Interest-Rate Rules, Interest-Rate Smoothing, and Macroeconomic Instability (2003). Rutgers University, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers

(77) RePEc:sce:scecf3:263 Optimal Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge (2003). Society for Computational Economics / Computing in Economics and Finance 2003

(78) RePEc:sce:scecf3:38 Public and Private Information in Monetary Policy Models (2003). Society for Computational Economics / Computing in Economics and Finance 2003

(79) RePEc:sce:scecf3:61 Does Exchange Rate Risk Matter for Welfare? (2003). Society for Computational Economics / Computing in Economics and Finance 2003

(80) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0303011 A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(81) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0308001 Speculation in First-Price Auctions with Resale (2003). EconWPA / Microeconomics

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