International Review of Law and Economics

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.01 0.17 34 53 69 1 0 1 0.03 0.08 1997 0.06 0.2 41 83 64 4 0 1 0.02 0.08 1998 0.07 0.23 31 69 75 5 0 3 0.1 0.1 1999 0.18 0.31 33 65 72 13 0 0.15 2000 0.13 0.43 30 72 64 8 0 1 0.03 0.19 2001 0.08 0.4 18 29 63 5 0 2 0.11 0.17 2002 0.25 0.43 32 41 48 12 0 3 0.09 0.2 2003 0.18 0.48 28 42 50 9 0 4 0.14 0.22 2004 0.22 0.52 30 30 60 13 0 3 0.1 0.23 2005 0.16 0.59 37 23 58 9 0 3 0.08 0.27 2006 0.21 0.63 33 10 67 14 0 3 0.09 0.27
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:6:y:1986:i:1:p:45-58 The judgment proof problem (1986).
Cited: 38 times.

(2) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:1:p:75-106 Socioeconomic and demographic factors of crime in Germany: Evidence from panel data of the German states (2000).
Cited: 21 times.

(3) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:1:p:75-87 Casual police corruption and the economics of crime (1997).
Cited: 17 times.

(4) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:15:y:1995:i:1:p:109-126 The effects of criminality and conviction on the labor market status of young British offenders (1995).
Cited: 16 times.

(5) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:10:y:1990:i:3:p:233-239 Re-examining liability rules when injurers as well as victims suffer losses (1990).
Cited: 11 times.

(6) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:22:y:2002:i:2:p:193-216 Rent-seeking through litigation: adversarial and inquisitorial systems compared (2002).
Cited: 11 times.

(7) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:6:y:1986:i:1:p:101-105 Optimal subsidies and damages in the presence of judicial error (1986).
Cited: 11 times.

(8) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:13:y:1993:i:2:p:217-224 Optimal sanctions and differences in individuals likelihood of avoiding detection (1993).
Cited: 11 times.

(9) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:3:p:371-382 On the joint use of liability and safety regulation (2000).
Cited: 11 times.

(10) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:2:p:275-293 Using decoupling and deep pockets to mitigate judgment-proof problems1 (1999).
Cited: 10 times.

(11) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:1:p:21-34 Efficient standards of due care: Should courts find more parties negligent under comparative negligence? (1994).
Cited: 10 times.

(12) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:11:y:1991:i:1:p:3-10 Optimal criminal procedure: Fairness and deterrence (1991).
Cited: 10 times.

(13) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:3:p:273-281 Pretrial negotiations with asymmetric information on risk preferences (1994).
Cited: 9 times.

(14) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:8:y:1988:i:1:p:109-116 The deterrent effects of settlements and trials (1988).
Cited: 9 times.

(15) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:12:y:1992:i:2:p:263-279 A positive theory of statutory interpretation (1992).
Cited: 9 times.

(16) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:23:y:2003:i:3:p:253-259 A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders (2003).
Cited: 9 times.

(17) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:2:y:1982:i:1:p:3-27 The optimum enforcement of laws and the concept of justice: A positive analysis (1982).
Cited: 9 times.

(18) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:5:y:1985:i:1:p:3-13 A model in which suits are brought for their nuisance value (1985).
Cited: 9 times.

(19) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:4:p:393-409 The capture of wealth by monopolists and the protection of property rights (1994).
Cited: 9 times.

(20) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:4:p:509-520 Judicial detection skill and contractual compliance (1997).
Cited: 9 times.

(21) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:1:p:35-51 Casual police corruption and the economics of crime:: Further results (2000).
Cited: 9 times.

(22) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:16:y:1996:i:1:p:81-99 The political economy of immigration policies (1996).
Cited: 8 times.

(23) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:23:y:2003:i:1:p:1-29 Voting control in German corporations (2003).
Cited: 8 times.

(24) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:3:p:431-447 The burden of proof in civil litigation: A simple model of mechanism design (1997).
Cited: 8 times.

(25) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:18:y:1998:i:2:p:187-200 Capital structure, priority rules, and the settlement of civil claims (1998).
Cited: 8 times.

(26) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:4:p:467-477 A positive theory of legal change (1994).
Cited: 8 times.

(27) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:1:p:47-68 Do punitive damages promote deterrence?1 (1999).
Cited: 8 times.

(28) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:13:y:1993:i:3:p:239-257 Should employees be subject to fines and imprisonment given the existence of corporate liability? (1993).
Cited: 8 times.

(29) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:2:y:1982:i:1:p:47-65 Evaluating choice (1982).
Cited: 8 times.

(30) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:16:y:1996:i:2:p:259-276 Limited liability and the requirement to purchase insurance (1996).
Cited: 7 times.

(31) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:1:p:127-140 Punishing repeat offenders more severely (2000).
Cited: 7 times.

(32) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:10:y:1990:i:2:p:161-171 The influence of litigation costs on deterrence under strict liability and under negligence (1990).
Cited: 7 times.

(33) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:1:p:103-119 Does conviction have a persistent effect on income and employment? (1994).
Cited: 7 times.

(34) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:21:y:2001:i:3:p:287-307 Collective wage setting when wages are generally binding An antitrust perspective (2001).
Cited: 7 times.

(35) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:3:p:341-350 Deterrence effects of sequential punishment policies: Should repeat offenders be more severely punished? (1994).
Cited: 7 times.

(36) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:1:p:21-33 Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort (2000).
Cited: 7 times.

(37) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:18:y:1998:i:3:p:341-359 Dissolving the relationship between divorce laws and divorce rates (1998).
Cited: 7 times.

(38) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:10:y:1990:i:1:p:3-27 The effect of frivolous lawsuits on the settlement of litigation (1990).
Cited: 7 times.

(39) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:13:y:1993:i:2:p:163-177 Legal requirements that artists receive resale royalties (1993).
Cited: 7 times.

(40) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:18:y:1998:i:2:p:201-215 A simple model of efficient tort liability rules (1998).
Cited: 7 times.

(41) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:8:y:1988:i:2:p:127-143 Judicial decisionmaking and litigation expenditure (1988).
Cited: 7 times.

(42) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:1:p:31-61 Mandatory rotation of company auditors: A critical examination (1997).
Cited: 6 times.

(43) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:3:p:295-317 Contingent fees and litigation settlement1 (1999).
Cited: 6 times.

(44) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:12:y:1992:i:1:p:13-30 The motives of judges: Empirical evidence from antitrust sentencing (1992).
Cited: 6 times.

(45) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:2:p:215-231 Structural adjudication and the new law merchant: A model of decentralized law (1994).
Cited: 6 times.

(46) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:3:y:1983:i:1:p:3-26 Legal fees contracts and alternative cost rules: An economic analysis (1983).
Cited: 6 times.

(47) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:5:y:1985:i:1:p:91-106 Why did inheritance laws change? (1985).
Cited: 6 times.

(48) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:11:y:1991:i:2:p:223-232 The initiation problem in bankruptcy (1991).
Cited: 6 times.

(49) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:10:y:1990:i:3:p:255-270 Rationing trials by waiting: Welfare implications (1990).
Cited: 6 times.

(50) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:10:y:1990:i:3:p:219-231 Strict liability in a principal-agent model (1990).
Cited: 6 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2006 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp320 Legal capital: an outdated concept (2006). ESRC Centre for Business Research / ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers

(2) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060082 On the Importance of Default Breach Remedies (2006). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:yor:yorken:06/16 Valuation of the Firms Liabilities when Equity Holders are also Creditors (2006). Department of Economics, University of York / Discussion Papers

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000507 Asset Pricing Implications of Pareto Optimality with Private Information (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(2) RePEc:fiu:wpaper:0517 Cadaveric vs. Live-Donor Kidney Transplants: The Interaction of Institutions and InequalityA (2005). Florida International University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(3) RePEc:gla:glaewp:2005_25 CADAVERIC VS. LIVE-DONOR KIDNEY TRANSPLANTS: THE INTERACTION OF INSTITUTIONS AND INEQUALITY (2005). Department of Economics, University of Glasgow / Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:ide:wpaper:3349 Lutilisation du droit pénal en matière environnementale (2004). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(2) RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:18:y:2004:i:1:p:99-116 A Political Economy Perspective of Judicial Review in the European Union: Judicial Appointments Rule, Accessibility and Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (2004). European Journal of Law and Economics

(3) RePEc:use:tkiwps:0417 The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules (2004). Utrecht School of Economics / Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4131 Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200378 Do corporate control and product market competition lead to stronger productivity growth? : Evidence from market-oriented and blockholder-based governance regimes (2003). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(3) RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0315 Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders (2003). Universitat Bern, Volkswirtschaftliches Institut / Diskussionsschriften

(4) RePEc:use:tkiwps:0313 The Economics of Tort Law: A Précis (2003). Utrecht School of Economics / Working Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.