Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.06 0.18 29 93 66 4 25 2 0.07 0.08 1997 0.22 0.19 34 50 64 14 14.3 1 0.03 0.09 1998 0.1 0.2 38 97 63 6 16.7 1 0.03 0.12 1999 0.13 0.29 33 46 72 9 66.7 2 0.06 0.19 2000 0.31 0.41 30 40 71 22 22.7 5 0.17 0.21 2001 0.25 0.37 25 35 63 16 18.8 4 0.16 0.19 2002 0.27 0.42 23 62 55 15 0 12 0.52 0.2 2003 0.31 0.43 22 25 48 15 13.3 6 0.27 0.21 2004 0.27 0.49 14 22 45 12 0 2 0.14 0.26 2005 0.08 0.48 17 23 36 3 0 10 0.59 0.29 2006 0.35 0.54 23 14 31 11 18.2 2 0.09 0.28
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:451 Post-War U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical Investigation (1981).
Cited: 134 times.

(2) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:594 Job Search and Labor Market Analysis (1984).
Cited: 106 times.

(3) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:572 Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model (1982).
Cited: 90 times.

(4) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:362 Optimal Auction Design (1978).
Cited: 75 times.

(5) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:570 Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders (1983).
Cited: 58 times.

(6) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:225 A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences (1976).
Cited: 55 times.

(7) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:144 Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the Free Rider Problem (1976).
Cited: 49 times.

(8) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1170 Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts (1996).
Cited: 48 times.

(9) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:618 Banking Panics (1984).
Cited: 48 times.

(10) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:428r Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information (1981).
Cited: 46 times.

(11) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:179 Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons (1977).
Cited: 34 times.

(12) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1014 Commitment and Observability in Games (1992).
Cited: 33 times.

(13) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:246 Graphs and Cooperation in Games (1976).
Cited: 31 times.

(14) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:911 Occupational Choice and the Process of Development (1990).
Cited: 30 times.

(15) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:782 A Theory of Voting Equilibria (1988).
Cited: 28 times.

(16) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:991r Efficient and Nearly Efficient Partnerships (1992).
Cited: 27 times.

(17) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:496 Multiple-Object Auctions (1981).
Cited: 25 times.

(18) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1210 Decentralization and Collusion (1998).
Cited: 24 times.

(19) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:384 The Matching Process as a Non-Cooperative/Bargaining Game (1979).
Cited: 24 times.

(20) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:532 Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy Without Capital (1982).
Cited: 23 times.

(21) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:848 Cheap Talk and Cooperation in the Society (1989).
Cited: 23 times.

(22) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:602 On Weighted Shapley Values (1983).
Cited: 22 times.

(23) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1058 Intermediation in Search Markets (1993).
Cited: 22 times.

(24) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:964 A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods (1991).
Cited: 20 times.

(25) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1096 A Technical Primer on Auction Theory I: Independent Private Values (1995).
Cited: 20 times.

(26) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:802 The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition (1988).
Cited: 19 times.

(27) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:924 Updating Ambiguous Beliefs (1991).
Cited: 19 times.

(28) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:817 Collusion in Auctions (1989).
Cited: 18 times.

(29) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1202 A Unique Subjective State Space for Unforeseen Contingencies (1997).
Cited: 18 times.

(30) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1227 Quitting Games (1998).
Cited: 18 times.

(31) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:811 Equilibrium Wage Distrihutions: A Synthesis (1988).
Cited: 17 times.

(32) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1098r A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks (1995).
Cited: 17 times.

(33) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1244 Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations (1998).
Cited: 17 times.

(34) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:394 The Dynamics of Supply: Retrospect and Prospect (1979).
Cited: 16 times.

(35) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:515 Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games (1982).
Cited: 16 times.

(36) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1150 Reciprocal Trade Liberalization (1996).
Cited: 16 times.

(37) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:970 An Approach to Equilibrium Selection (1990).
Cited: 15 times.

(38) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:29 Incentives and Public Inputs (1974).
Cited: 14 times.

(39) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1386 Vote Buying (2004).
Cited: 14 times.

(40) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1339 Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design (2002).
Cited: 14 times.

(41) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:297 Labor Supply Under Uncertainty (1977).
Cited: 13 times.

(42) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:887 A Model of Random Matching (1990).
Cited: 13 times.

(43) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1117 Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information (1994).
Cited: 13 times.

(44) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:295 Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept (1977).
Cited: 13 times.

(45) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:363 Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules (1978).
Cited: 13 times.

(46) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1064 The Swing Voters Curse (1995).
Cited: 13 times.

(47) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1258 Stopping Games with Randomized Strategies (1999).
Cited: 12 times.

(48) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1319 Stationary Equilibria in Asset-Pricing Models with Incomplete Markets and Collateral (2001).
Cited: 12 times.

(49) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:425 Generalized Network Problems Yielding Totally Balanced Games (1980).
Cited: 12 times.

(50) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1083 Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition (1994).
Cited: 11 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2006 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5975 Redistributive Politics with Distortionary Taxation (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1434 Vote Bying I: General Elections (2006). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000496 The Sunk Cost Bias and Managerial Pricing Practices (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(2) RePEc:kyo:wpaper:609 Heterogeneous Risk Attitudes in a Continuous-Time Model (2005). Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research / Working Papers

(3) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11334 An Empirical Analysis of Acting White (2005). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(4) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11577 Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood Effects (2005). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(5) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1404 On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting (2005). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(6) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1409 Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure (2005). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(7) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1411 Analysis of Do-Not-Spam Registry (2005). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(8) RePEc:pri:indrel:879 Racial Segregation and the Black-White Test Score Gap (2005). Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section. / Working Papers

(9) RePEc:trf:wpaper:68 The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance (2005). SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, University of Mannheim / Discussion Papers

(10) RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0511004 Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination (2005). EconWPA / Industrial Organization

Recent citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:pen:papers:04-014 Do Citizens Vote Sincerely (If They Vote at All)? Theory and Evidence from U. S. National Elections (2004). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(2) RePEc:pen:papers:04-038 A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers: Supplementary Materiel (2004). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

Recent citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1000 Fractionalization and the Size of Government (2003). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(2) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4115 Good Jobs, Bad Jobs and Redistribution (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:hhs:osloec:2003_021 Fractionalization and the size of government (2003). Oslo University, Department of Economics / Memorandum

(4) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1374 Excludability and Bounded Computational Capacity Strategies (2003). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(5) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1378 Real Options with Unknown-Date Events (2003). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(6) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1380 Entry Patterns over the Product Life Cycle (2003). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

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Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.