Journal of Law, Economics and Organization

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Create citation feed for this series

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.23 0.17 20 134 40 9 0 0.08 1997 0.34 0.2 18 196 41 14 0 7 0.39 0.08 1998 0.37 0.23 19 87 38 14 0 1 0.05 0.1 1999 0.49 0.31 34 595 37 18 0 9 0.26 0.15 2000 0.81 0.43 20 180 53 43 0 1 0.05 0.19 2001 0.81 0.4 19 70 54 44 0 0.17 2002 0.87 0.43 20 110 39 34 0 13 0.65 0.2 2003 0.56 0.48 20 121 39 22 0 4 0.2 0.22 2004 0.8 0.52 22 43 40 32 0 5 0.23 0.23 2005 0.88 0.59 22 51 42 37 0 6 0.27 0.27 2006 0.75 0.63 21 34 44 33 0 8 0.38 0.27
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:222-79 The Quality of Government. (1999).
Cited: 382 times.

(2) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:0:p:24-52 Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. (1991).
Cited: 201 times.

(3) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:2:p:181-214 Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations. (1986).
Cited: 89 times.

(4) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:8:y:1992:i:3:p:523-46 The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform. (1992).
Cited: 80 times.

(5) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:13:y:1997:i:1:p:1-25 The (1997).
Cited: 61 times.

(6) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:3:y:1987:i:2:p:243-77 Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control. (1987).
Cited: 56 times.

(7) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:2:p:201-46 The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation. (1994).
Cited: 53 times.

(8) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:18:y:2002:i:1:p:221-277 Courts and Relational Contracts (2002).
Cited: 51 times.

(9) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:74-102 The Firm as a Subeconomy. (1999).
Cited: 50 times.

(10) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:2:p:335-61 Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment. (1995).
Cited: 45 times.

(11) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:141-61 The Theory of the Firm Revisited. (1988).
Cited: 41 times.

(12) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:13:y:1997:i:2:p:387-409 Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach. (1997).
Cited: 41 times.

(13) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:1:p:1-24 The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach. (1996).
Cited: 40 times.

(14) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:0:p:84-105 Privatization and Incentives. (1991).
Cited: 36 times.

(15) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:181-98 A Legal Basis for the Firm. (1988).
Cited: 33 times.

(16) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:2:p:407-26 The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy. (1994).
Cited: 32 times.

(17) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:6:y:1990:i:2:p:381-409 Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency. (1990).
Cited: 32 times.

(18) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:56-73 Informal Authority in Organizations. (1999).
Cited: 31 times.

(19) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:2:p:279-303 Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards. (1986).
Cited: 31 times.

(20) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:1:p:1-25 The Costs of Organization. (1991).
Cited: 31 times.

(21) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:1:y:1985:i:1:p:101-24 Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition. (1985).
Cited: 29 times.

(22) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:19:y:2003:i:1:p:119-140 Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments (2003).
Cited: 29 times.

(23) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:8:y:1992:i:2:p:321-45 Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective. (1992).
Cited: 28 times.

(24) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:1:p:1-31 The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development. (1995).
Cited: 28 times.

(25) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:19:y:2003:i:2:p:281-306 The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina (2003).
Cited: 27 times.

(26) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:230-55 Judicial Modification of Contracts between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach. (1993).
Cited: 26 times.

(27) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:9:y:1993:i:1:p:1-29 Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy. (1993).
Cited: 26 times.

(28) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:205-29 Monopolization by Sequential Acquisition. (1993).
Cited: 25 times.

(29) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:2:p:334-64 The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment. (2000).
Cited: 25 times.

(30) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:1:p:205-26 Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History. (1995).
Cited: 25 times.

(31) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:1:p:1-49 A Theory of Legal Presumptions. (2000).
Cited: 25 times.

(32) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:5:y:1989:i:1:p:109-26 Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry. (1989).
Cited: 25 times.

(33) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:199-213 Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited. (1988).
Cited: 24 times.

(34) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:1:p:1-32 The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement. (1986).
Cited: 24 times.

(35) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:2:p:365-94 On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias. (2000).
Cited: 24 times.

(36) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:1:p:155-65 Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests. (2000).
Cited: 23 times.

(37) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:1:p:142-59 Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany. (1994).
Cited: 23 times.

(38) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:119-39 Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm. (1988).
Cited: 22 times.

(39) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:14:y:1998:i:2:p:205-31 Why Dont More Households File for Bankruptcy? (1998).
Cited: 22 times.

(40) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:659-84 Optimal Soft or Tough Bankruptcy Procedures. (1999).
Cited: 21 times.

(41) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:95-117 Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence. (1988).
Cited: 21 times.

(42) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:1:y:1985:i:2:p:225-83 Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle. (1985).
Cited: 21 times.

(43) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:637-58 Dispute Prevention without Courts in Vietnam. (1999).
Cited: 20 times.

(44) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:2:p:201-28 Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form. (1991).
Cited: 19 times.

(45) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:704-36 The Role of Risk in Contract Choice. (1999).
Cited: 19 times.

(46) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:1:p:25-61 The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier. (1996).
Cited: 18 times.

(47) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:13:y:1997:i:1:p:232-58 The Search for Deep Pockets: Is Extended Liability Expensive Liability? (1997).
Cited: 18 times.

(48) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:615-36 Endogenous Business Networks. (1999).
Cited: 18 times.

(49) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:2:p:362-78 Start-ups, Spin-offs, and Internal Projects. (1995).
Cited: 18 times.

(50) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:1:p:214-33 The Formation of Cooperative Relationships. (1996).
Cited: 18 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2006 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1673 Evaluation of Researchers: A Life Cycle Analysis of German Academic Economists (2006). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(2) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1847 Should Courts always Enforce what Contracting Parties Write? (2006). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(3) RePEc:knz:hetero:0608 Evaluation of researchers : a life cycle analysis of German academic economists (2006). Research Group Heterogeneous Labor, University of Konstanz/ZEW Mannheim / Working Papers of the Research Group Heterogenous Labor

(4) RePEc:mis:wpaper:20060506 Missing Contracts: On the Rationality of not Signing a Prenuptial Agreement (2006). Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Dipartimento di Statistica / Working Papers

(5) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12209 Buy, Lobby or Sue: Interest Groups Participation in Policy Making - A Selective Survey (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(6) RePEc:pen:papers:06-024 Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (2006). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(7) RePEc:pra:mprapa:1550 The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence (2006). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(8) RePEc:qed:wpaper:1107 Work-Related Perks, Agency Problems, and Optimal Incentive Contracts (2006). Queen's University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1605 Policy-induced Internal Migration: An Empirical Investigation of the Canadian Case (2005). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(2) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20050102 The Political Economy of Corporate Control (2005). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:ecl:stabus:1846r Co-worker Complementarity and the Stability of Top Management Teams (2005). Stanford University, Graduate School of Business / Research Papers

(4) RePEc:trn:utwpde:0517 From Planning to Mature: on the Determinants of Open Source Take Off (2005). Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia / Department of Economics Working Papers

(5) RePEc:use:tkiwps:0532 Bargaining in Mergers: The Role of Outside Options and Termination Provisions (2005). Utrecht School of Economics / Working Papers

(6) RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0507006 From Planning to Mature: on the Determinants of Open Source Take-Off (2005). EconWPA / Industrial Organization

Recent citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:94:y:2004:i:5:p:1635-1653 International Protection of Intellectual Property (2004). American Economic Review

(2) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.141 Bidding for Incompete Contracts (2004). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers

(3) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10587 The Costs of Entrenched Boards (2004). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(4) RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0407 The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees (2004). Universitat Bern, Volkswirtschaftliches Institut / Diskussionsschriften

(5) RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0409 Conditional versus Contingent Fees (2004). Universitat Bern, Volkswirtschaftliches Institut / Diskussionsschriften

Recent citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200381 The trade-off between risk and control in corporate ownership (2003). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(2) RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200317 Corporate control concentration measurement and firm performance (2003). Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center / Discussion Paper

(3) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9470 Investor Sentiment in Japanese and U.S. Daily Mutual Fund Flows (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(4) RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:5:y:2003:i:8:p:117-146 Instituciones, costos de transacción y políticas públicas: un panorama (2003). Revista de Economía Institucional

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.