CitEc
home      Information for:  researchers | archive maintainers        warning | faq
 Updated January, 2 2009 180.482 documents processed, 3.979.807 references and 1.716.086 citations

 

 
 

Purdue University, Department of Economics / Purdue University Economics Working Papers

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Create citation feed for this series

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.080.185313100.08
19970.170.192012200.09
19980.211197020.180.12
19990.150.296213200.19
20000.240.4112417400.21
20010.110.37147518200.19
20020.080.4284262010.130.2
20030.410.4367229010.170.21
20040.140.4974142010.140.26
20050.150.4891913200.29
20060.690.54156161136.420.130.28
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:pur:prukra:1141 Monetary and Non-monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism. (2001).
Cited: 72 times.

(2) RePEc:pur:prukra:956 OPTIMAL CONTRACTS UNDER COSTLY STATE FALSIFICATION. (1989).
Cited: 26 times.

(3) RePEc:pur:prukra:1062 Capacity Precommitment as a Barrier to Entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth Approach. (1994).
Cited: 10 times.

(4) RePEc:pur:prukra:1039 The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when r>2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates. (1993).
Cited: 9 times.

(5) RePEc:pur:prukra:1177 Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-Of-War. (2005).
Cited: 9 times.

(6) RePEc:pur:prukra:1120 Non-Speculative Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality Vs. Actual Irrationality. (1998).
Cited: 7 times.

(7) RePEc:pur:prukra:1056 Capacity Constrained Price Competition when Unit Costs Differ. (1994).
Cited: 7 times.

(8) RePEc:pur:prukra:1078 Experimental Comparisons of Auctions Under Single and Multi Unit Demand. (1995).
Cited: 6 times.

(9) RePEc:pur:prukra:1063 The Allocation of Shared Resource within an Organization. (1994).
Cited: 5 times.

(10) RePEc:pur:prukra:1111 An Analysis of Productive Efficiency of University Commercialization Activities. (1998).
Cited: 4 times.

(11) RePEc:pur:prukra:1110 An Experimental Study of Decisions in Dynamic Optimization Problems. (1998).
Cited: 4 times.

(12) RePEc:pur:prukra:1032 How to Sell a Pickup Truck; Beat-or-Pay Advertisements as Facilitating Devices. (1992).
Cited: 4 times.

(13) RePEc:pur:prukra:1164 Endogenous Rationing, Price Dispersion, and Collusion in Capacity Constrained Supergames. (2003).
Cited: 3 times.

(14) RePEc:pur:prukra:1092 Output Targeting and an Argument for Stabilization Policies. (1996).
Cited: 3 times.

(15) RePEc:pur:prukra:1176 Group Cooperation Under Alternative Peer Punishment Technologies: An Experiment. (2005).
Cited: 3 times.

(16) RePEc:pur:prukra:992 PRICE LEADERSHIP IN A DUOPOLY WITH CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION. (1990).
Cited: 3 times.

(17) RePEc:pur:prukra:1114 Does Insider Trading Really Move Stock Prices? (1998).
Cited: 3 times.

(18) RePEc:pur:prukra:1080 Dynamic Capacity Choice in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Framework. (1995).
Cited: 3 times.

(19) RePEc:pur:prukra:958 CAPACITY-CONSTRAINED PRICE COMPETITION WHEN UNIT COSTS DIFFER. (1989).
Cited: 3 times.

(20) RePEc:pur:prukra:1178 Electoral Poaching and Party Identification. (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(21) RePEc:pur:prukra:1192 Multi-Stage Contests with Stochastic Ability (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(22) RePEc:pur:prukra:1004 Optimal Polocies with Strategic Distortions (1991).
Cited: 2 times.

(23) RePEc:pur:prukra:1173 Price Dispersion with Directed Search. (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(24) RePEc:pur:prukra:1187 Multi-battle contests. (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(25) RePEc:pur:prukra:1166 Trade Mechanism Selection in Markets with Frictions. (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(26) RePEc:pur:prukra:1179 Anonymous Markets and Monetary Trading. (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(27) RePEc:pur:prukra:1162 A Comment on “David and Goliath: An Analysis on Asymmetric Mixed-Strategy Games and Experimental Evidence”. (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(28) RePEc:pur:prukra:1204 Individual Rationality and Market Efficiency (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(29) RePEc:pur:prukra:1135 Rate-of-Return Dominance and Efficiency in an Experimental Economy. (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(30) RePEc:pur:prukra:1154 Decimal Trading and Market Impact. (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(31) RePEc:pur:prukra:1005 Smuggling, Camouflaging, and Market Structure (1991).
Cited: 2 times.

(32) RePEc:pur:prukra:1124 Dirty Money. (1999).
Cited: 2 times.

(33) RePEc:pur:prukra:1174 Tacit Collusion and Capacity Withholding in Repeated Uniform Price Auctions. (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(34) RePEc:pur:prukra:1188 Peer Punishment in Teams: Emotional or Strategic Choice? (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(35) RePEc:pur:prukra:1168 A Random Matching Theory. (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(36) RePEc:pur:prukra:1184 Around-the-Clock Media Coverage and the Timing of Earnings Announcements. (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(37) RePEc:pur:prukra:1207 Coalitional Colonel Blotto Games with Application to the Economics of Alliances (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(38) RePEc:pur:prukra:1137 Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: an Auction-Theoretic Approach. (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

(39) RePEc:pur:prukra:1156 An Examination of Own Account Trading by Dual Traders in Future Markets. (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(40) RePEc:pur:prukra:1202 The Marginal Product of Capital, Capital Flows and Convergence (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(41) RePEc:pur:prukra:1006 Quotas and Tariffs with Endogenous Conduct (1991).
Cited: 1 times.

(42) RePEc:pur:prukra:1132 Bidding Behavior in the Price is Right Game: an Experimental Study. (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

(43) RePEc:pur:prukra:1153 Relationships and Rationing in Consumer Loans: Evidence from the Nineties. (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(44) RePEc:pur:prukra:1145 Productive Education or a Marketable Degree? (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(45) RePEc:pur:prukra:1139 Genetically Modified Organisms in the Food Supply: Public Opinion vs. Consumer Behavior. (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(46) RePEc:pur:prukra:1200 How enforcement institutions affect markets (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(47) RePEc:pur:prukra:1072 The Pattern of Exit from Declining Industries. (1995).
Cited: 1 times.

(48) RePEc:pur:prukra:1149 Do Bid-Ask Spreads or Bid and Ask Depths Convey New Information First? (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(49) RePEc:pur:prukra:1117 The Free Cash Flow Hypothesis for Sales Growth and Firm Performance. (1998).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2006 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5844 Multi-Stage Contests with Stochastic Ability (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:pur:prukra:1192 Multi-Stage Contests with Stochastic Ability (2006). Purdue University, Department of Economics / Purdue University Economics Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2005

Recent citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:pur:prukra:1171 Efficient Monetary Allocations and the Illiquidity of Bonds. (2004). Purdue University, Department of Economics / Purdue University Economics Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:pur:prukra:1161 Caps on Bidding in All-Pay Auctions: Comments on the Experiments of A. Rapoport and W. Amaldoss. (2003). Purdue University, Department of Economics / Purdue University Economics Working Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

©2009 Jose Manuel Barrueco | mail: barrueco@uv.es