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Social Choice and Welfare Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.
Most cited documents in this series: (1) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:1:p:135-153 Core in a simple coalition formation game (2001). (2) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:4:p:655-708 A crash course in implementation theory (2001). (3) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:4:p:639-653 Characterizations of Lorenz curves and income distributions (2000). (4) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:3:p:431-464 The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting (2001). (5) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:4:p:557-567 Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods (1999). (6) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1997:i:4:p:513-525 Non-cooperative implementation of the core (1997). (7) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:2:p:263-287 The measurement of opportunity inequality: a cardinality-based approach (1998). (8) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:2:p:187-199 Opting out of publicly provided services: A majority voting result (1998). (9) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:1:p:69-93 Multidimensional poverty indices (2002). (10) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:2:p:183-196 Intersecting generalized Lorenz curves and the Gini index (1999). (11) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:3:p:343-355 Redistribution and compensation (*) (1996). (12) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:3:p:445-454 Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions (1998). (13) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:3:p:349-371 On the power of poverty orderings (1999). (14) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:2:p:231-257 An axiomatic approach to sustainable development (1996). (15) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:21:y:2003:i:1:p:39-61 Farsighted stability in hedonic games (2003). (16) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:2:p:349-367 Envy, malice and Pareto efficiency: An experimental examination (2002). (17) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1997:i:3:p:427-438 A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation (1997). (18) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:97-112 Opportunity sets and individual well-being (1996). (19) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:2:p:455-471 Equality of opportunity: A progress report (2002). (20) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:4:p:619-653 An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions (2001). (21) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1997:i:1:p:67-80 Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights (1997). (22) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:3:p:533-558 Negatively interdependent preferences (2000). (23) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:4:p:567-582 Axiomatizations of the normalized Banzhaf value and the Shapley value (1998). (24) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:3:p:371-382 Ranking opportunity sets on the basis of their freedom of choice and their ability to satisfy preferences: A difficulty (1998). (25) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:24:y:2005:i:2:p:253-267 Multi-profile welfarism: A generalization (2005). (26) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:4:p:481-488 When is Condorcets Jury Theorem valid? (1998). (27) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:25:y:2005:i:2:p:457-474 Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting (2005). (28) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:1:p:17-40 Consequences, opportunities, and procedures (1998). (29) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:289-301 Characterizing uncertainty aversion through preference for mixtures (2001). (30) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:3:p:373-394 Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: A survey and open questions (1999). (31) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:4:p:513-532 Comparison functions and choice correspondences (1999). (32) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:57-64 Equitable opportunities in economic environments (1996). (33) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:129-145 Utilities, preferences, and substantive goods (1996). (34) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:3:p:569-580 Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules (2002). (35) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:24:y:2005:i:1:p:171-197 Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations (2005). (36) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:26:y:2006:i:3:p:447-453 Reduced prizes and increased effort in contests (2006). (37) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:20:y:2003:i:3:p:457-465 How to cut a pizza fairly: Fair division with decreasing marginal evaluations (2003). (38) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:2:p:233-258 Using equivalent income of equivalent adults to rank income distributions (1999). (39) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:4:p:569-583 Cooperative production with unequal skills: The solidarity approach to compensation (1999). (40) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:20:y:2003:i:2:p:307-350 From preference to happiness: Towards a more complete welfare economics (2003). (41) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:2:p:231-249 The TAL-Family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems (2006). (42) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:3:p:527-541 Locating libraries on a street (2001). (43) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:24:y:2005:i:1:p:155-169 Yardstick competition and political agency problems (2005). (44) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:25:y:2005:i:2:p:381-418 The news of the death of welfare economics is greatly exaggerated (2005). (45) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:2:p:297-311 Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments (1998). (46) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:269-288 A cognitive model of individual well-being (2001). (47) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:2:p:369-379 Existence and Nash implementation of efficient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology (2002). (48) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:21:y:2003:i:2:p:347-384 On the informational basis of social choice (2003). (49) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:4:p:601-627 Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation (2000). (50) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:3:p:321-332 An informationally parsimonious impartial observer theorem (1998). Recent citations received in: | 2006 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 Recent citations received in: 2006 (1) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5478 The European Commission - Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers (2) RePEc:mtl:montde:2006-03 Consistent Relations (2006). Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques / Cahiers de recherche (3) RePEc:mtl:montde:2006-13 Non-Deteriorating Choice without Full Transitivity (2006). Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques / Cahiers de recherche (4) RePEc:mtl:montde:2006-15 Population Ethics (2006). Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques / Cahiers de recherche (5) RePEc:rif:dpaper:999 The European Commission - Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations (2006). The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy / Discussion Papers (6) RePEc:rut:rutres:200629 Decentralizing Aid with Interested Parties (2006). Rutgers University, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers (7) RePEc:rut:rutres:200630 Migrants, Ethnicity and Strategic Assimilation (2006). Rutgers University, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers (8) RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:19:y:2006:i:4:p:703-723 The struggle over migration policy (2006). Journal of Population Economics (9) RePEc:spr:specre:v:8:y:2006:i:3:p:227-237 Composition, Securement, and Concede-and-divide (2006). Spanish Economic Review (10) RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp6 The European Commission Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations (2006). Aboa Centre for Economics / Discussion Papers (11) RePEc:upf:upfgen:900 Voting with Preferences over Margins of Victory (2006). Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Economics Working Papers Recent citations received in: 2005 (1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0068 The (Im)Possibility of a Paretian Rational (2005). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers (2) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1531 Making Statements and Approval Voting (2005). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers (3) RePEc:iep:wpidep:0405 Do Irrelevant Commodities Matter? (2005). Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France / IDEP Working Papers 2004 (4) RePEc:ifr:wpaper:2006-02 Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare (2005). University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations / Working Papers (5) RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2005-24 BARGAINING IN COMMITTEES OF REPRESENTATIVES: THE OPTIMAL VOTING RULE (2005). Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) / Working Papers. Serie AD (6) RePEc:mtl:montde:2005-06 Intertemporal Social Evaluation (2005). Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques / Cahiers de recherche Recent citations received in: 2004 (1) RePEc:aub:autbar:623.04 Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint (2004). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anà lisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anà lisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers (2) RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2004:i:11:p:1-7 Good and bad objects: the symmetric difference rule (2004). Economics Bulletin (3) RePEc:esi:discus:2004-03 Senss Capability Approach to Welfare Economics (2004). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction (4) RePEc:kap:jecinq:v:2:y:2004:i:1:p:11-30 Ranking Income Distributions According to Equality of Opportunity (2004). Journal of Economic Inequality (5) RePEc:rug:rugwps:04/240 Equality of opportunity versus equality of opportunity sets (2004). Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration / Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent Univers (6) RePEc:tky:fseres:2004cf304 Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems (2004). CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo / CIRJE F-Series (7) RePEc:usi:wpaper:429 Freedom, Time Constraints and Progressive Taxation (2004). Department of Economics, University of Siena / Experimental Economics Recent citations received in: 2003 (1) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1421 Robust Mechanism Design (2003). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers (2) RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2003:i:26:p:1-5 Intergenerational preferences and sensitivity to the present (2003). Economics Bulletin (3) RePEc:icr:wpmath:01-2003 The convexity-cone approach to comparative risk and downside risk. (2003). ICER - International Centre for Economic Research / ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series (4) RePEc:icr:wpmath:10-2003 A folk theorem for minority games. (2003). ICER - International Centre for Economic Research / ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series (5) RePEc:icr:wpmath:15-2003 Unequal uncertainties and uncertain inequalities: an axiomatic approach. (2003). ICER - International Centre for Economic Research / ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series (6) RePEc:icr:wpmath:18-2003 Decision Making with Imprecise Probabilistic Information. (2003). ICER - International Centre for Economic Research / ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series (7) RePEc:iep:wpidep:0312 Social Welfare, Priority to the Worst-Off And the Dimensions of Individual Well-Being (2003). Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France / IDEP Working Papers 2004 (8) RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:41 On the Generic Strategic Stability of Nash Equilibria if Voting is Costly (2003). Tor Vergata University, CEIS / Research Paper Series (9) RePEc:van:wpaper:0206 Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains (2003). Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University / Working Papers Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results. Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series. |
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