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 Updated January, 4 2010 234.510 documents processed, 5.249.629 references and 2.248.145 citations

 

 
 

Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.180000.09
19970.180000.09
19980.210000.13
19990.290000.17
20000.390000.2
20010.3712730050.420.18
20020.250.42134312333.320.150.2
20030.840.4363925219.50.21
20041.110.49159319219.550.330.24
20050.90.512232119020.170.29
20061.040.53157027283.6120.80.28
20070.590.44542716010.20.24
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0025 Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation (2006).
Cited: 56 times.

(2) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0020 The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government (2004).
Cited: 44 times.

(3) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0047 Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting (2004).
Cited: 24 times.

(4) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0003 Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium (2001).
Cited: 23 times.

(5) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0006 Implementation Theory (2001).
Cited: 22 times.

(6) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0046 Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia (2004).
Cited: 14 times.

(7) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0019 Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint (2002).
Cited: 13 times.

(8) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0049 A Model of Add-on Pricing (2004).
Cited: 12 times.

(9) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0033 The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules (2003).
Cited: 10 times.

(10) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0021 Fair Income Tax (2002).
Cited: 10 times.

(11) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0031 Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High-Bid Auctions (2003).
Cited: 9 times.

(12) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0007 Arms Races and Negotiations (2001).
Cited: 9 times.

(13) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0026 Credit Rationing, Wealth Inequality, and Allocation of Talent (2002).
Cited: 8 times.

(14) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0056 Secure Implementation (2005).
Cited: 8 times.

(15) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0030 Beauty is a Beast, Frog is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities (2003).
Cited: 8 times.

(16) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0032 Rejecting Small Gambles Under Expected Utility (2003).
Cited: 7 times.

(17) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0005 The Emergence and Persistence of the Anglo-Saxon and German Financial Systems (2001).
Cited: 6 times.

(18) RePEc:ads:wpaper:9602 Auctions and Efficiency (2001).
Cited: 6 times.

(19) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0088 Group Inequality (2009).
Cited: 5 times.

(20) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0008 On Indescribable Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts (2001).
Cited: 4 times.

(21) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0069 Willpower and the Optimal Control of Visceral Urges (2006).
Cited: 4 times.

(22) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0029 Mistakes in Cooperation: the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworths Recontracting (2003).
Cited: 4 times.

(23) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0053 Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships (2005).
Cited: 4 times.

(24) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0058 On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules (2006).
Cited: 4 times.

(25) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0054 The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession (2005).
Cited: 3 times.

(26) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0018 Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems (2001).
Cited: 3 times.

(27) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0068 The (Im)Possibility of a Paretian Rational (2005).
Cited: 3 times.

(28) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0042 Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare (2004).
Cited: 3 times.

(29) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0075 Public-private Partnerships and Government Spending Limits (2006).
Cited: 3 times.

(30) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0017 The Evolution of Focal Points (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(31) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0015 Social Orderings for the Assignment of Indivisible Objects (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(32) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0061 Distinguishing Social Preferences from Preferences for Altruism (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(33) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0022 On the Equivalence between Welfarism and Equality of Opportunity (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(34) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0077 Perishable Durable Goods (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(35) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0040 The Measurement of Intellectual Influence: the Views of a Sceptic (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(36) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0073 Demand Theory and General Equilibrium: From Explanation to Introspection, a Journey down the Wrong Road (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(37) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0027 Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(38) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0014 Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(39) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0078 Changing Identity: The Emergence of Social Groups (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(40) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0028 A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(41) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0035 Common Priors For Like-Minded Agents (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

(42) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0051 Endogenous Affirmative Action: Gender Bias Leads to Gender Quotas (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(43) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0013 Vertical Foreclosure and Specific Investments (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(44) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0059 Minorities and Storable Votes (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(45) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0045 Decentralization and Political Institutions (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(46) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0011 The Demand Bargaining Set: General Characterization and Application to Majority Games (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(47) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0016 Welfare Egalitarianism in Non-Rival Environments (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(48) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0034 Decision-Making in the Context of Imprecise Probabilistic Beliefs (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(49) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0060 A Simple Scheme to Improve the Efficiency of Referenda (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(50) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0012 Retrading in Market Games (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-007 Personal Identity in the Dictator Game (2007). Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek / Jena Economic Research Paper

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0067 Is it Possible to Define Subjective Probabilities in Purely Behavioral Terms? A Comment on Epstein-Zhang (2001) (2006). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers

(2) RePEc:cde:cdewps:142 Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights (2006). Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics / Working papers

(3) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1847 Should Courts always Enforce what Contracting Parties Write? (2006). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(4) RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0064 Patents vs Trade Secrets: Knowledge Licensing and Spillover (2006). Center for Economic and Financial Research / CEFIR Working Papers

(5) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000391 Self-Control through Second-Order Preferences (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(6) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5481 Patents, Imitation and Licensing in an Asymmetric Dynamic R&D Race (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(7) RePEc:fiu:wpaper:0602 Impact of Intellectual Property Rights Reforms on the Diffusion of Knowledge through FDI (2006). Florida International University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(8) RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00177614_v1 Patent Systems for Encouraging Innovation: Lessons from Economic Analysis (2006). HAL / Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Post-Print

(9) RePEc:isu:genres:12598 Patents, Research Exemption, and the Incentive for Sequential Innovation (2006). Iowa State University, Department of Economics / Staff General Research Papers

(10) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12615 Time Preference, Time Discounting, and Smoking Decisions (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(11) RePEc:pen:papers:06-024 Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (2006). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(12) RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2006/17 How Much Should Society Fuel the Greed of Innovators? On the Relations between Appropriability, Opportunities and Rates of Innovation (2006). Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy / LEM Papers Series

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:gra:wpaper:05/21 The role of personal involvement and responsibility in dictatorial allocations: a classroom investigation (2005). Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. / ThE Papers

(2) RePEc:rut:rutres:200512 Let Them Burn Money: Making Elections More Informative (2005). Rutgers University, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-02 The Measurement of Intellectual Influence: the Views of a Sceptic (2004). Brown University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(2) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1260 Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary (2004). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(3) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4272 Term Limits and Electoral Accountability (2004). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(4) RePEc:imf:imfwpa:04/163 Can Public Discussion Enhance Program Ownership? (2004). International Monetary Fund / IMF Working Papers

(5) RePEc:tuf:tuftec:0407 Policy Gambles (2004). Department of Economics, Tufts University / Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

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