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 Updated January, 4 2010 234.510 documents processed, 5.249.629 references and 2.248.145 citations

 

 
 

Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics / Working Papers

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.180000.09
19970.180000.09
19980.210000.13
19990.29650020.330.17
20000.3931600.2
20010.110.378109110010.130.18
20020.270.421125113080.730.2
20030.260.432019500.21
20040.150.4910213200.24
20050.080.516712110020.130.29
20060.150.53912642510.110.28
20070.44992500.24
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:bie:wpaper:345 Power measurement as sensitivity analysis : a unified approach (2002).
Cited: 11 times.

(2) RePEc:bie:wpaper:332 Convex fuzzy games and participation monotonic allocation schemes (2002).
Cited: 5 times.

(3) RePEc:bie:wpaper:330 Moral property rights in bargaining (2002).
Cited: 5 times.

(4) RePEc:bie:wpaper:395 Network formation with closeness incentives (2007).
Cited: 4 times.

(5) RePEc:bie:wpaper:308 Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions (1999).
Cited: 4 times.

(6) RePEc:bie:wpaper:328 The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering : a defense (2001).
Cited: 4 times.

(7) RePEc:bie:wpaper:392 Do social preferences matter in competitive markets? (2007).
Cited: 4 times.

(8) RePEc:bie:wpaper:310 A universal meta bargaining realization of the Nash solution (1999).
Cited: 3 times.

(9) RePEc:bie:wpaper:321 Game theory (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(10) RePEc:bie:wpaper:417 Indivisible commodities and an equivalence theorem on the strong core (2009).
Cited: 2 times.

(11) RePEc:bie:wpaper:367 Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(12) RePEc:bie:wpaper:322 Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory? (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(13) RePEc:bie:wpaper:375 Government versus opposition: Who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag? (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(14) RePEc:bie:wpaper:373 A taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(15) RePEc:bie:wpaper:393 On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(16) RePEc:bie:wpaper:306 On the Nash program for the Nash bargaining solution (1999).
Cited: 1 times.

(17) RePEc:bie:wpaper:360 Cephoids : Minkowski sums of prisms (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(18) RePEc:bie:wpaper:326 The positive core of a cooperative game (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(19) RePEc:bie:wpaper:385 An axiomatic approach to composite solutions (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(20) repec:bie:wpaper:340 ().
Cited: 1 times.

(21) RePEc:bie:wpaper:374 On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(22) RePEc:bie:wpaper:335 Centralized common pool management and local community participation (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(23) RePEc:bie:wpaper:418 Strong core equivalence theorem in an atomless economy with indivisible commodities (2009).
Cited: 1 times.

(24) RePEc:bie:wpaper:319 Formation of cartels in glove markets and the modiclus (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

(25) RePEc:bie:wpaper:372 Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(26) RePEc:bie:wpaper:331 Hypercubes and compromise values for cooperative fuzzy games (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(27) RePEc:bie:wpaper:361 A superadditive solution (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(28) RePEc:bie:wpaper:323 A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(29) RePEc:bie:wpaper:339 How to cope with division problems under interval uncertainty of claims? (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(30) RePEc:bie:wpaper:419 Core allocations may not be Walras allocations in any large finite economy with indivisible commodities (2009).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004

Recent citations received in: 2007

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:bie:wpaper:378 Coalition formation in simple games: The semistrict core (2006). Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics / Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:bie:wpaper:375 Government versus opposition: Who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag? (2005). Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics / Working Papers

(2) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2005027 Bundling in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods (2005). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

Recent citations received in: 2004

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Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

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