Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE / STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Create citation feed for this series

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.2 0.18 17 47 10 2 0 2 0.12 0.09 1997 0.23 0.18 8 13 22 5 0 1 0.13 0.09 1998 0.16 0.21 9 23 25 4 50 0.13 1999 0.24 0.29 5 25 17 4 0 3 0.6 0.17 2000 0.36 0.39 5 12 14 5 0 1 0.2 0.2 2001 0.4 0.37 6 14 10 4 50 0.18 2002 0.09 0.42 5 23 11 1 0 0.2 2003 1.55 0.43 8 17 11 17 5.9 4 0.5 0.21 2004 0.62 0.49 5 8 13 8 12.5 2 0.4 0.24 2005 0.31 0.5 3 1 13 4 0 1 0.33 0.29 2006 0.38 0.53 1 2 8 3 0 2 2 0.28 2007 0.44 1 1 4 0 0.24
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:cep:stitep:292 The Governance of Exchanges: Members Co-operatives Versus Outside Ownership (1996).
Cited: 16 times.

(2) RePEc:cep:stitep:346 Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership (1998).
Cited: 13 times.

(3) RePEc:cep:stitep:198 Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games (1989).
Cited: 13 times.

(4) RePEc:cep:stitep:367 Dynamic Voting in Clubs (1999).
Cited: 13 times.

(5) RePEc:cep:stitep:447 Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies (2003).
Cited: 12 times.

(6) RePEc:cep:stitep:289 Reputation and Allocation of Ownership (1995).
Cited: 12 times.

(7) RePEc:cep:stitep:375 On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization (1999).
Cited: 10 times.

(8) RePEc:cep:stitep:414 Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? (2001).
Cited: 10 times.

(9) RePEc:cep:stitep:442 Law Enforcement under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence from Financial Market Regulation (2002).
Cited: 9 times.

(10) RePEc:cep:stitep:217 A Theory of Corporate Financial Structure Based on the Seniority of Claims (1990).
Cited: 9 times.

(11) RePEc:cep:stitep:303 Preventing Collusion Through Discretion (1996).
Cited: 9 times.

(12) RePEc:cep:stitep:441 Credit Rationing, Wealth Inequality, and Allocation of Talent (2002).
Cited: 8 times.

(13) RePEc:cep:stitep:260 A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly (1993).
Cited: 8 times.

(14) RePEc:cep:stitep:233 A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital (1991).
Cited: 8 times.

(15) RePEc:cep:stitep:301 Efficiency Rents of Storage Plants in Peak-Load Pricing, I: Pumped Storage (1996).
Cited: 7 times.

(16) RePEc:cep:stitep:333 Optimal Experimentation in a Changing Environment (1997).
Cited: 7 times.

(17) RePEc:cep:stitep:305 Building Trust (1996).
Cited: 7 times.

(18) RePEc:cep:stitep:190 Convergence to Equilibrium in a Sequence for Games with Learning (1989).
Cited: 7 times.

(19) RePEc:cep:stitep:313 Costly Contingent Contracts (1996).
Cited: 6 times.

(20) RePEc:cep:stitep:286 Roads to Equality: Wealth Distribution Dynamics with Public-Private Capital Complementarity (1995).
Cited: 6 times.

(21) RePEc:cep:stitep:300 Uninterruptible Consumption, Concentrated Charges, and Equilibrium in the Commodity Space of Continuous Functions (1996).
Cited: 5 times.

(22) RePEc:cep:stitep:/2004/478 Knowledge Disclosure, Patents and Optimal Organization of Research and Development (2004).
Cited: 5 times.

(23) RePEc:cep:stitep:321 Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt (1997).
Cited: 5 times.

(24) RePEc:cep:stitep:106 Risk Aversion Without Diminishing Marginal Utility (1984).
Cited: 5 times.

(25) RePEc:cep:stitep:255 Imperfect Capital Markets and Persistence of Initial Wealth Inequalities (1992).
Cited: 4 times.

(26) RePEc:cep:stitep:405 Efficiency Rents of Pumped-Storage Plants and their Uses for Operation and Investment Decisions (2000).
Cited: 4 times.

(27) RePEc:cep:stitep:431 Unforeseen Contingencies (2002).
Cited: 4 times.

(28) RePEc:cep:stitep:356 A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs (1998).
Cited: 4 times.

(29) RePEc:cep:stitep:417 Continuity of the Equilibrium Price Density and its Uses in Peak-Load Pricing (2001).
Cited: 3 times.

(30) RePEc:cep:stitep:/2004/472 AGREEING NOW TO AGREE LATER: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In (2004).
Cited: 3 times.

(31) RePEc:cep:stitep:362 Costly Coasian Contracts (1998).
Cited: 3 times.

(32) RePEc:cep:stitep:401 Collective Bargaining under Complete Information (2000).
Cited: 3 times.

(33) RePEc:cep:stitep:100 A General-Equilibrium Model of the Transactions Demand for Money (1984).
Cited: 3 times.

(34) RePEc:cep:stitep:404 Strategic Consultation in the Presence of Career Concerns (2000).
Cited: 3 times.

(35) RePEc:cep:stitep:201 Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions With Incomplete Information (1989).
Cited: 3 times.

(36) RePEc:cep:stitep:280 A Matching Model with Wage Announcement (1995).
Cited: 2 times.

(37) RePEc:cep:stitep:37 Price Competition Among Differentiated Products: A Detailed Study of a Nash Equilibrium (1981).
Cited: 2 times.

(38) RePEc:cep:stitep:299 The Wong-Viner Envelope Theorem or Nonsmooth Joint Costs, Rental Valuation and the Short-Run Approach to Long-Run Equilibrium (1996).
Cited: 2 times.

(39) RePEc:cep:stitep:445 Strategic Liquidity Supply and Security Design (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(40) RePEc:cep:stitep:209 The Theory of Union Behaviour: Labour Hoarding and Endogenous Hysteresis. (1989).
Cited: 2 times.

(41) RePEc:cep:stitep:355 Read My Lips: The Political Economy of Information Transmission (1998).
Cited: 2 times.

(42) RePEc:cep:stitep:200 Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Model (1989).
Cited: 2 times.

(43) RePEc:cep:stitep:/2006/511 Active Courts and Menu Contracts* (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(44) RePEc:cep:stitep:369 Market Experimentation in a Dynamic Differentiated-Goods Duopoly (1999).
Cited: 2 times.

(45) RePEc:cep:stitep:440 Modelling the Economic Interaction of Agents with Diverse Abilities to Recognise Equilibrium Patterns (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(46) RePEc:cep:stitep:393 The Short-Run Approach to LRMC Pricing for Multiple Outputs with Nondifferentiable Costs (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(47) RePEc:cep:stitep:/2007/514 The Political Economy of Housing Supply:Homeowners, Workers, and Voters (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(48) RePEc:cep:stitep:/2005/489 The Wong-Viner Envelope Theorem for subdifferentiable functions (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(49) RePEc:cep:stitep:409 Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(50) RePEc:cep:stitep:162 Similarity and Decision-Making Under Risk (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, 46 (1988), pp.145-153.) (1987).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004

Recent citations received in: 2007

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1847 Should Courts always Enforce what Contracting Parties Write? (2006). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(2) RePEc:pen:papers:06-024 Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (2006). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:cep:stitep:/2005/488 A Practical Short-run Approach to Market Equilibrium (2005). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE / STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series

Recent citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:cep:stitep:/2004/478 Knowledge Disclosure, Patents and Optimal Organization of Research and Development (2004). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE / STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series

(2) RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000000194 Curb Your Innovation: Corporate Conservatism in the Presence of Imperfect Intellectual Property Rights (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.