Games and Economic Behavior

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.21 0.18 97 796 110 23 0 9 0.09 0.09 1997 0.28 0.21 63 497 146 41 0 17 0.27 0.08 1998 0.28 0.25 61 365 160 44 0 8 0.13 0.1 1999 0.26 0.32 63 410 124 32 0 13 0.21 0.15 2000 0.48 0.43 67 462 124 60 0 24 0.36 0.19 2001 0.4 0.41 75 365 130 52 0 21 0.28 0.17 2002 0.48 0.44 68 391 142 68 0 28 0.41 0.2 2003 0.52 0.47 87 481 143 75 0 25 0.29 0.22 2004 0.71 0.52 88 514 155 110 0 44 0.5 0.23 2005 0.95 0.56 80 356 175 167 0 50 0.63 0.25 2006 1.02 0.57 83 496 168 171 0 73 0.88 0.24 2007 1.01 0.48 81 212 163 164 0 49 0.6 0.22
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:122-142 Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History (1995).
Cited: 356 times.

(2) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:2:p:293-315 A theory of reciprocity (2006).
Cited: 182 times.

(3) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:47:y:2004:i:2:p:268-298 A theory of sequential reciprocity (2004).
Cited: 157 times.

(4) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:3:p:346-380 Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games (1994).
Cited: 135 times.

(5) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:6-38 Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games (1995).
Cited: 120 times.

(6) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:124-143 Potential Games (1996).
Cited: 116 times.

(7) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:387-424 The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction (1993).
Cited: 111 times.

(8) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:2:y:1990:i:1:p:29-46 Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria (1990).
Cited: 103 times.

(9) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:60-79 Psychological games and sequential rationality (1989).
Cited: 96 times.

(10) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:4:p:327-360 Renegotiation in repeated games (1989).
Cited: 95 times.

(11) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:3:p:347-369 Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments (1994).
Cited: 93 times.

(12) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:26:y:1999:i:2:p:286-336 A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures (1999).
Cited: 74 times.

(13) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:218-254 On Players Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence (1995).
Cited: 69 times.

(14) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:2:p:260-281 How to identify trust and reciprocity (2004).
Cited: 66 times.

(15) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:90-123 Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division (1996).
Cited: 65 times.

(16) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:16:y:1996:i:2:p:181-191 Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games (1996).
Cited: 63 times.

(17) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:38:y:2002:i:2:p:201-230 The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures (2002).
Cited: 63 times.

(18) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:2:p:170-190 Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs (1989).
Cited: 61 times.

(19) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:30:y:2000:i:2:p:163-182 Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game (2000).
Cited: 61 times.

(20) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:95-121 Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining (1995).
Cited: 58 times.

(21) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:20:y:1997:i:2:p:201-237 Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities (1997).
Cited: 56 times.

(22) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:320-367 Learning Mixed Equilibria (1993).
Cited: 51 times.

(23) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:15:y:1996:i:2:p:132-148 Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games (1996).
Cited: 50 times.

(24) repec:eee:gamebe:v:44:y:2003:i:2:p:217-226 ().
Cited: 50 times.

(25) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:4:p:295-326 Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games (1989).
Cited: 48 times.

(26) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:59:y:2007:i:1:p:17-45 A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness (2007).
Cited: 47 times.

(27) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:1:p:82-100 Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games (1991).
Cited: 45 times.

(28) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:13:y:1996:i:1:p:100-110 Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs (1996).
Cited: 44 times.

(29) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:19:y:1997:i:1:p:46-76 Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results (1997).
Cited: 43 times.

(30) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:3:p:445-468 A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects (1994).
Cited: 42 times.

(31) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:13-24 The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations (1999).
Cited: 41 times.

(32) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:79-109 Social Norms and Random Matching Games (1995).
Cited: 40 times.

(33) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:4:p:514-531 Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games (1993).
Cited: 40 times.

(34) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:2:y:1990:i:4:p:378-394 Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility (1990).
Cited: 40 times.

(35) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:1:p:1-24 Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism (2006).
Cited: 39 times.

(36) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:1:p:62-91 Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game (1994).
Cited: 39 times.

(37) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:12:y:1996:i:2:p:187-218 Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoners Dilemma Games (1996).
Cited: 38 times.

(38) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:34:y:2001:i:2:p:331-341 A Dynamic Model of Network Formation (2001).
Cited: 38 times.

(39) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:425-454 An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction (1993).
Cited: 38 times.

(40) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:62:y:2008:i:1:p:287-303 Testing theories of fairness--Intentions matter (2008).
Cited: 36 times.

(41) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:43:y:2003:i:1:p:57-85 Networks of collaboration in oligopoly (2003).
Cited: 33 times.

(42) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:37:y:2001:i:1:p:161-169 The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games (2001).
Cited: 33 times.

(43) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:21:y:1997:i:1-2:p:40-55 Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium (1997).
Cited: 33 times.

(44) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:41:y:2002:i:2:p:265-291 On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games (2002).
Cited: 33 times.

(45) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:4:p:467-486 Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders (1991).
Cited: 32 times.

(46) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:1:p:118-132 Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis (1993).
Cited: 32 times.

(47) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:20:y:1997:i:1:p:3-24 On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall (1997).
Cited: 32 times.

(48) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:2:p:295-300 The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice (1994).
Cited: 31 times.

(49) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:52:y:2005:i:2:p:460-492 Modeling internal commitment mechanisms and self-control: A neuroeconomics approach to consumption-saving decisions (2005).
Cited: 31 times.

(50) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:55:y:2006:i:2:p:297-320 Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction (2006).
Cited: 30 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:ags:uersrr:6391 Could Behavioral Economics Help Improve Diet Quality for Nutrition Assistance Program Participants? (2007). United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service / Economic Research Report

(2) RePEc:arx:papers:0706.4432 The minority game: An economics perspective (2007). arXiv.org / Quantitative Finance Papers

(3) RePEc:aub:autbar:677.07 Inequity Version and Team Incentives (2007). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(4) RePEc:aub:autbar:682.07 Organisational structure, communication and group ethics (2007). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(5) RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-7 The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence (2007). Brown University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(6) RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:14-07 A Route Choice Experiment With an Efficient Toll (2007). Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara / University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series

(7) RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:15-07 The Relevance of Heterogeneity in a Congested Route Network with Tolls: An Analysis of Two Experiments Using Actual Waiting Times and Monetized Time Costs (2007). Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara / University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series

(8) RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2007-05 Network Architecture and Traffic Flows: Experiments on the Pigou-Knight-Downs and Braess Paradoxes (2007). The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham / Discussion Papers

(9) RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2007-11 The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia (2007). The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham / Discussion Papers

(10) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000850 Social Memory and Evidence from the Past (2007). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(11) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000926 A `Super Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games (2007). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(12) RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000374 What to Put on the Table (2007). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(13) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6257 Unbundling Ownership and Control (2007). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(14) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6476 Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices (2007). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(15) RePEc:cte:werepe:we072010 An experiment on markets and contracts : do social preferences determine corporate culture? (2007). Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía / Economics Working Papers

(16) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1601 Social Memory and Evidence from the Past (2007). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(17) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200753 The Minority Game: An Economics Perspective (2007). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(18) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200757 A General Framework for Cooperation under Uncertainty (2007). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(19) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2007003 First-Price Equilibrium and Revenue Equivalence in a Sequential Procurement Auction Model (2007). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(20) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2007017 Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (2007). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(21) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2007020 Combinatorial Scoring Auctions (2007). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(22) RePEc:edj:ceauch:237 What to put in the table (2007). Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile / Documentos de Trabajo

(23) RePEc:ema:worpap:2007-05 Road Traffic Congestion and Public Information: An Experimental Investigation (2007). THEMA / Working papers

(24) RePEc:exc:wpaper:2007-11 Trust in Private and Common Property Experiments (2007). Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University / Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series

(25) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.87 Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter (2007). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers

(26) RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~07-07-01 Social Memory and Evidence from the Past (2007). Georgetown University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(27) RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243060_v1 Tax avoidance and the political appeal of progressivity (2007). HAL / Working Papers

(28) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0674 Reciprocity in young children (2007). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

(29) RePEc:ide:wpaper:5969 Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group (2007). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(30) RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2007-21 DOWNSTREAM MERGERS AND ENTRY (2007). Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) / Working Papers. Serie AD

(31) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3200 Deception and Incentives: How Dishonesty Undermines Effort Provision (2007). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(32) RePEc:lau:crdeep:07.05 Fair ultimatum: an experimental study of the Myerson value (2007). Université de Lausanne, Ecole des HEC, DEEP / Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP)

(33) RePEc:lec:leecon:06/8 Auctions in which Losers Set the Price (2007). Department of Economics, University of Leicester / Discussion Papers in Economics

(34) RePEc:man:sespap:0702 Existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in electoral competition games: The hybrid case (2007). School of Economics, The University of Manchester / The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series

(35) RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:0708 What Norms Trigger Punishment (2007). Middlebury College, Department of Economics / Middlebury College Working Paper Series

(36) RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2006_25 Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoners Dilemma Games (2007). Max Planck Institute for Reserach on Collective Goods / Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Reserach on Collective Goods

(37) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1448 Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (2007). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(38) RePEc:oxf:wpaper:304 The Possible and the Impossible in Multi-Agent Learning (2007). University of Oxford, Department of Economics / Economics Series Working Papers

(39) RePEc:pit:wpaper:326 Campaign Rhetoric and the Hide-and-Seek Game (2007). University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(40) RePEc:pra:mprapa:2202 Perfect Competition (2007). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(41) RePEc:pra:mprapa:4051 Conformism and Cooperation in a Local Interaction Model (2007). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(42) RePEc:pra:mprapa:4321 Equilibrium Vengeance (2007). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(43) RePEc:pra:mprapa:5258 Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks (2007). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(44) RePEc:pra:mprapa:9143 Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities (2007). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(45) RePEc:pur:prukra:1201 Cooperation among strangers: an experiment with indefinite interaction (2007). Purdue University, Department of Economics / Purdue University Economics Working Papers

(46) RePEc:roc:wallis:wp50 Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in electoral competition games: The hybrid case (2007). University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy / Wallis Working Papers

(47) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2007:i:1:p:119-135 Imitation, coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium (2007). International Journal of Game Theory

(48) RePEc:van:wpaper:0703 Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling (2007). Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University / Working Papers

(49) RePEc:wsu:wpaper:tgsmith-2 Why the Poor Get Fat: Weight Gain and Economic Insecurity (2007). School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University / Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:3:p:602-629 An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous (2006). American Economic Review

(2) RePEc:ags:aaea06:21276 Estimating Heterogeneous Primal Capacity and Capacity Utilization Measures in a Multi-Species Fishery (2006). American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) / 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Be

(3) RePEc:aub:autbar:664.06 (When) Would I Lie To You? Comment on ?Deception: The Role of Consequences? (2006). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(4) RePEc:aub:autbar:668.06 Weighted Approval Voting (2006). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(5) RePEc:bbk:bbkefp:0614 Links and Architecture in Village Networks (2006). Birkbeck, School of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics / Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance

(6) RePEc:bol:bodewp:559 A Rationale for Searching (Imprecise) Health Information (2006). Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna / Working Papers

(7) RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2006-11 Demand Bargaining and Proportional Payoffs in Legislatures (2006). The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham / Discussion Papers

(8) RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2006-14 An Experiment on Spatial Price Competition (2006). The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham / Discussion Papers

(9) RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2006-21 Private-Collective Innovation and the Fragility of Knowledge Sharing (2006). The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham / Discussion Papers

(10) RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2006-22 Counterintuitive Number Effects in Experimental Oligopolies (2006). The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham / Discussion Papers

(11) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1782 The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions (2006). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(12) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1794 Institution Formation in Public Goods Games (2006). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(13) RePEc:cir:cirwor:2006s-12 Who Gets the Last Word? An Experimental Study of the Effect of a Peer Review Process on the Expression of Social Norms (2006). CIRANO / CIRANO Working Papers

(14) RePEc:cir:cirwor:2006s-30 A Simple Test of Learning Theory (2006). CIRANO / CIRANO Working Papers

(15) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000042 Pinocchios Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth-telling and Deception in Games (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(16) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000092 Moral Norms in a Partly Compliant Society (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(17) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000256 Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winners Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(18) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000457 The Canonical Type Space for Interdependent Preferences (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(19) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000547 Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(20) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000724 A Simple Test of Learning Theory (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(21) RePEc:clt:sswopa:1259 The compromise game: Two-sided adverse selection in the laboratory (2006). California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences / Working Papers

(22) RePEc:cor:louvco:2006004 Contests with heterogeneous agents (2006). Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) / Discussion Papers

(23) RePEc:cor:louvco:2006062 On the adjudication of conflicting claims: an experimental study (2006). Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) / Discussion Papers

(24) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5532 Competition and Well-Being (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(25) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5538 On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(26) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5789 Homo Reciprocans: Survey Evidence on Prevalence, Behaviour and Success (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(27) RePEc:cra:wpaper:2006-16 Rewarding Honest Taxpayers? Evidence on the Impact of Rewards from Field Experiments (2006). Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) / CREMA Working Paper Series

(28) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1554 Caller Number Five: Timing Games that Morph from One Form to Another (2006). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(29) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006003 Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof or Maskin Monotonic Choice Rules (2006). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(30) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006029 Institution Formation in Public Goods Games (2006). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(31) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006038 Weighted Approval Voting (2006). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(32) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060037 Gift Exchange and the Separation of Ownership and Control (2006). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(33) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060104 Does Stake Size matter for Cooperation and Punishment? (2006). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(34) RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp06-022 Core and Periphery in Endogenous Networks (2006). Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government / Working Paper Series

(35) RePEc:edn:esedps:153 A Simple Test of Learning Theory? (2006). Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh / ESE Discussion Papers

(36) RePEc:esi:discus:2006-01 Are preferences complete? An experimental measurement of indecisiveness under risk (2006). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(37) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.80 Inequity Aversion May Increase Inequity (2006). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers

(38) RePEc:gat:wpaper:0604 Punishment, Inequality and Emotions (2006). Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure / W

(39) RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00142866_v1 Punishment, Inequality and Emotions (2006). HAL / Post-Print

(40) RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00175045_v1 Punishment, Inequality and Emotions (2006). HAL / Post-Print

(41) RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0219 Bridging the Great Divide in South Africa: Inequality and Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods (2006). Göteborg University, Department of Economics / Working Papers in Economics

(42) RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0221 A Note on the Risk Behavior and Death of Homo Economicus (2006). Göteborg University, Department of Economics / Working Papers in Economics

(43) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0629 Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium (2006). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

(44) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0634 Organizational Structure as the Channeling of Boundedly Rational Pre-play Communication (2006). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

(45) RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0109 Reciprocity and Payment Schemes: When Equality Is Unfair (2006). The Ratio Institute / Ratio Working Papers

(46) RePEc:hit:hituec:a473 Axiomatic bargaining theory on opportunity assignments (2006). Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University / Discussion Paper Series

(47) RePEc:inu:caeprp:2006005 The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods (2006). Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington / Caepr Working Papers

(48) RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2006-24 AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF CONDITIONAL COOPERATION (2006). Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) / Working Papers. Serie AD

(49) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2119 Punishment, Inequality and Emotions (2006). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(50) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2205 Homo Reciprocans: Survey Evidence on Prevalence, Behavior and Success (2006). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(51) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2288 Institution Formation in Public Goods Games (2006). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(52) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2500 Reciprocity and Payment Schemes: When Equality Is Unfair (2006). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(53) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:9:y:2006:i:3:p:193-208 Decomposing trust and trustworthiness (2006). Experimental Economics

(54) RePEc:kap:theord:v:61:y:2006:i:3:p:191-204 Formation of a Communication Network Under Perfect Foresight (2006). Theory and Decision

(55) RePEc:lam:wpaper:06-10 An empirical study of determinants in decision-making process (2006). LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier / Working Papers

(56) RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2006-05 Existence of Nash Networks in One-Way Flow Models (2006). Department of Economics, Louisiana State University / Departmental Working Papers

(57) RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2006-18 Heterogeneity in Nash Networks (2006). Department of Economics, Louisiana State University / Departmental Working Papers

(58) RePEc:max:cprwps:86 Estimating Heterogeneous Capacity and Capacity Utilization in a Multi-Species Fishery (2006). Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University / Center for Policy Research Working Papers

(59) RePEc:mcl:mclwop:2006-11 WHO GETS THE LAST WORD? AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF A PEER REVIEW PROCESS ON THE EXPRESSION OF SOCIAL NORMS (2006). McGill University, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers

(60) RePEc:mse:wpsorb:bla06063 Group and individual risk preferences : a lottery-choice experiment. (2006). Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) / Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques

(61) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12588 Optimal Inequality/Optimal Incentives: Evidence from a Tournament (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(62) RePEc:noj:journl:v:32:y:2006:p:93-112 Unaffected Strangers Affect Contributions (2006). Nordic Journal of Political Economy

(63) RePEc:pse:psecon:2006-38 The strategy structure of some coalition formation games (2006). PSE (Ecole normale supérieure) / PSE Working Papers

(64) RePEc:pur:prukra:1181 A Trackable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness. (2006). Purdue University, Department of Economics / Purdue University Economics Working Papers

(65) RePEc:pur:prukra:1188 Peer Punishment in Teams: Emotional or Strategic Choice? (2006). Purdue University, Department of Economics / Purdue University Economics Working Papers

(66) RePEc:scp:wpaper:06-60 The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory (2006). Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR) / IEPR Working Papers

(67) RePEc:sef:csefwp:169 Are Disadvantaged Bidders Doomed in Ascending Auctions? (2006). Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy / CSEF Working Papers

(68) RePEc:siu:wpaper:10-2006 Expectations, Animal Spirits, and Evolutionary Dynamics (2006). Singapore Management University, School of Economics / Working Papers

(69) RePEc:spr:jeicoo:v:1:y:2006:i:2:p:147-169 Can boundedly rational sellers learn to play Nash? (2006). Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination

(70) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:35:y:2006:i:1:p:129-150 Naive audience and communication bias (2006). International Journal of Game Theory

(71) RePEc:use:tkiwps:0611 Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations (2006). Utrecht School of Economics / Working Papers

(72) RePEc:yca:wpaper:2006_7 Auctions with Almost Homogeneous Bidders (2006). York University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(73) RePEc:zur:iewwpx:288 Environmental Morale and Motivation (2006). Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW / IEW - Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0050 Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games (2005). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers

(2) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0059 Minorities and Storable Votes (2005). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers

(3) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0060 A Simple Scheme to Improve the Efficiency of Referenda (2005). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers

(4) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:2:p:340-345 The Neuroeconomics of Mind Reading and Empathy (2005). American Economic Review

(5) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse33_2005 Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2x2 Games (2005). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers

(6) RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-01 Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games (2005). Brown University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(7) RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-02 An Axiomatization of the Inner Core Using Appropriate Reduced Games (2005). Brown University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(8) RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2005-08 Enlargement and the Balance of Power: an Experimental Study (2005). The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham / Discussion Papers

(9) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1583 Minorities and Storable Votes (2005). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(10) RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000876 A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(11) RePEc:cla:levarc:784828000000000034 Willpower and the Optimal Control of Visceral Urges (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(12) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000914 The Swing Voters Curse in the Laboratory (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(13) RePEc:cla:levrem:172782000000000073 The Brain as a Hierarchical Organization (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(14) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000116 Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(15) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000205 The Brain as a Hierarchical Organization (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(16) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000476 Modeling the Psychology of Consumer and Firm Behavior with Behavioral Economics (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(17) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000539 Discussion of BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(18) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000609 Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(19) RePEc:clu:wpaper:0506-02 Minorities and storable votes (2005). Columbia University, Department of Economics / Discussion Papers

(20) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5278 Minorities and Storable Votes (2005). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(21) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5291 Efficiency, Equity and Timing in Voting Mechanisms (2005). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(22) RePEc:cte:werepe:we055726 INFORMATION TRANSMISSION IN COALITIONAL VOTING GAMES (2005). Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía / Economics Working Papers

(23) RePEc:ctl:louvec:2005036 Networks of Manufacturers and Retailers (2005). Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques / Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Workin

(24) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1479r Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2005). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(25) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1503 Aggregation of Expert Opinions (2005). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(26) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1519 Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces (2005). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(27) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2005117 Learning to be prepared (2005). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(28) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200553 An axiomatization of minimal curb sets (2005). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(29) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200584 Stable networks and convex payoffs (2005). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(30) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200594 The cutting power of preparation (2005). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(31) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2005018 The Coordinate-Wise Core for Multiple-Type Housing Markets is Second-Best Incentive Compatible (2005). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(32) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2005053 A Reason for Sophisticated Investors not to seize Arbitrage Opportunities in Markets without Frictions (2005). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(33) RePEc:ecl:prirpe:03-13-2006 The Swing Voters Curse in the Laboratory (2005). Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy / Papers

(34) RePEc:edn:esedps:135 Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria (2005). Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh / ESE Discussion Papers

(35) RePEc:emo:wp2003:0507 Temptation and Self-Control: Some Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (2005). Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta) / Emory Economics

(36) RePEc:gue:guelph:2005-7 Competitive Burnout: Theory and Experimental Evidence. (2005). University of Guelph, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(37) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0583 The cutting power of preparation (2005). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

(38) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0589 An axiomatization of minimal curb sets (2005). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

(39) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0590 Learning to be prepared (2005). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

(40) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1890 Affect as a Source of Motivation in the Workplace: A New Model of Labor Supply, and New Field Evidence on Income Targeting and the Goal Gradient (2005). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(41) RePEc:kap:mktlet:v:16:y:2005:i:3:p:375-386 Decision Neuroscience (2005). Marketing Letters

(42) RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2005-13 Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs (2005). Department of Economics, Louisiana State University / Departmental Working Papers

(43) RePEc:pen:papers:05-014 Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2005). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(44) RePEc:pen:papers:05-016 Aggregation of Expert Opinions (2005). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(45) RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0507001 Enlargement and the Balance of Power: An Experimental Study (2005). EconWPA / Experimental

(46) RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0511006 Auctions with Anticipated Regret (2005). EconWPA / Experimental

(47) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0503010 Dynamic Behavior in Minimum Effort Coordination Games - Some Theory of Group Size and Inter-Group Competition as Coordination Devices (2005). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(48) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0407005 Rationalizing Boundedly Rational Choice: Sequential Rationalizability and Rational Shortlist Methods. (2005). EconWPA / Microeconomics

(49) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0510014 Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations over a Single Good (2005). EconWPA / Microeconomics

(50) RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:05-02 A Network Experiment in Continuous Time: (2005). Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim / Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications

Recent citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:94:y:2004:i:3:p:484-498 Distinguishing Informational Cascades from Herd Behavior in the Laboratory (2004). American Economic Review

(2) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:94:y:2004:i:4:p:857-869 Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments (2004). American Economic Review

(3) RePEc:aub:autbar:634.04 An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments (Revised Version) (2004). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(4) RePEc:boc:bocoec:620 Pairwise Kidney Exchange (2004). Boston College Department of Economics / Boston College Working Papers in Economics

(5) RePEc:bri:cmpowp:04/108 Efficient Contracts for Digital Content (2004). Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK / The Centre for Market and Public Organisation

(6) RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:07-04 Expressed Preferences and Behavior in Experimental Games (2004). Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara / University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series

(7) RePEc:cej:primer:v:2:y:2004:i:1:p:189-212 Gradual Nash bargaining with endogenous agenda. A path-dependent model (2004). Colombian Economic Journal

(8) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000153 Self-Correcting Information Cascades (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(9) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000236 Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal Form Games (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(10) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000350 Pairwise Kidney Exchange (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(11) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000750 Incentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(12) RePEc:cla:uclatw:121473000000000021 Multidimensional Private Value Auctions (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Theory workshop papers

(13) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2004111 Enemies and friends in hedonic games : individual deviations, stability and manipulation (2004). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(14) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2004114 Symmetric convex games and stable structures (2004). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(15) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:20045 Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games (2004). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(16) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200453 Obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree situations and their monotonicity properties (2004). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(17) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200457 On representative social capital (2004). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(18) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2004018 The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2004). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(19) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20040100 Gift Exchange in a Multi-worker Firm (2004). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(20) RePEc:ecm:feam04:472 A Unified Approach to Information, Knowledge, and Stability (2004). Econometric Society / Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings

(21) RePEc:ecm:nasm04:135 Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games (2004). Econometric Society / Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings

(22) RePEc:esa:iesawp:0407 How do subjects assess the Social Trade-off invilved in the Prisoners Dilemma? (2004). Institute for Social Syudies of Andalusia - Higher Council for Scientific Research / IESA Working Papers Series

(23) RePEc:esi:discus:2004-01 Age and the development of trust and reciprocity (2004). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(24) RePEc:esi:discus:2004-36 Express Yourself: The Price of Fairness in a Simple Distribution Game (2004). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(25) RePEc:feb:artefa:0039 The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives - Trust and Trustworthiness among CEOs (2004). The Field Experiments Website / Artefactual Field Experiments

(26) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.51 Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games (2004). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers

(27) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.97 Defining Rules in Cost Spanning Tree Problems Through the Canonical Form (2004). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers

(28) RePEc:has:discpr:0421 The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension (2004). Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences / IEHAS Discussion Papers

(29) RePEc:hhs:aareco:2004_016 Can Information Backfire? - Experimental Evidence from the Ultimatum Game (2004). Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(30) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1145 On Representative Social Capital (2004). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(31) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1203 Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control (2004). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(32) RePEc:kyo:wpaper:582 Trade with Heterogeneous Multiple Priors (2004). Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research / Working Papers

(33) RePEc:lau:crdeep:04.15 Verified Trust: Reciprocity, Altruism, and Noise in Trust Games (2004). Université de Lausanne, Ecole des HEC, DEEP / Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP)

(34) RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:0412 Who is Post-Walrasian Man? (2004). Middlebury College, Department of Economics / Middlebury College Working Paper Series

(35) RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2004_14 Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision and Public-Sector Pricing: A Contribution to the Foundations of Public Economics (2004). Max Planck Institute for Reserach on Collective Goods / Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Reserach on Collective Goods

(36) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10698 Pairwise Kidney Exchange (2004). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(37) RePEc:trf:wpaper:11 Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights (2004). SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, University of Mannheim / Discussion Papers

(38) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:robson-04-02-12-12-44-46 Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Bayesian Views (2004). Microeconomics.ca Website / Micro Theory Working Papers

(39) RePEc:upf:upfgen:788 Global Nash Convergence of Foster and Youngs Regret Testing (2004). Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Economics Working Papers

(40) RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0406001 A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness (2004). EconWPA / Experimental

(41) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0402004 Defining rules in cost spanning tree problems through the canonical form (2004). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(42) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0403001 Realizing efficient outcomes in cost spanning problems (2004). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(43) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0405001 Additivity in cost spanning tree problems (2004). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(44) RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:04-42 Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision (2004). Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim / Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications

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Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.