Mathematical Social Sciences
Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers. Create citation feed for this series
Raw data: |
|
IF |
AIF |
DOC |
CIT |
D2Y |
C2Y |
SC(%) |
CiY |
II |
AII |
1996 | 0.06 | 0.18 | 55 | 40 | 105 | 6 | 0 | | | 0.09 |
1997 | 0.05 | 0.21 | 31 | 30 | 120 | 6 | 0 | | | 0.08 |
1998 | 0.07 | 0.25 | 35 | 96 | 86 | 6 | 0 | 4 | 0.11 | 0.1 |
1999 | 0.08 | 0.32 | 42 | 71 | 66 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0.02 | 0.15 |
2000 | 0.1 | 0.43 | 39 | 83 | 77 | 8 | 0 | 3 | 0.08 | 0.19 |
2001 | 0.16 | 0.41 | 37 | 100 | 81 | 13 | 0 | 4 | 0.11 | 0.17 |
2002 | 0.17 | 0.44 | 49 | 79 | 76 | 13 | 0 | 1 | 0.02 | 0.2 |
2003 | 0.22 | 0.47 | 41 | 99 | 86 | 19 | 0 | 6 | 0.15 | 0.22 |
2004 | 0.31 | 0.52 | 51 | 69 | 90 | 28 | 0 | 7 | 0.14 | 0.23 |
2005 | 0.28 | 0.56 | 45 | 54 | 92 | 26 | 0 | 9 | 0.2 | 0.25 |
2006 | 0.2 | 0.57 | 48 | 28 | 96 | 19 | 0 | 8 | 0.17 | 0.24 |
2007 | 0.18 | 0.48 | 47 | 19 | 93 | 17 | 0 | 4 | 0.09 | 0.22 |
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Impact Factor:
| Immediacy Index:
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Documents published:
| Citations received:
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  Most cited documents in this series: (1) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:1:y:1981:i:4:p:409-430 Generalized gini inequality indices (1981). Cited: 58 times. (2) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:2:y:1982:i:4:p:345-371 A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud (1982). Cited: 55 times. (3) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:45:y:2003:i:3:p:249-297 Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey (2003). Cited: 35 times. (4) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:19:y:1990:i:2:p:117-134 Intermediate inequality: concepts, indices, and welfare implications (1990). Cited: 31 times. (5) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:42:y:2001:i:3:p:307-328 The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems (2001). Cited: 29 times. (6) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:19:y:1990:i:3:p:235-251 Silicon Valley locational clusters: when do increasing returns imply monopoly? (1990). Cited: 27 times. (7) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:6:y:1983:i:3:p:307-313 A new index of poverty (1983). Cited: 24 times. (8) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:3:y:1982:i:4:p:313-327 Cores of partitioning games (1982). Cited: 23 times. (9) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:7:y:1984:i:1:p:83-102 Dominance solvability and cournot stability (1984). Cited: 22 times. (10) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:12:y:1986:i:2:p:105-137 The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results (1986). Cited: 22 times. (11) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:29:y:1995:i:1:p:1-17 Redistribution mechanisms based on individual characteristics (1995). Cited: 21 times. (12) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:26:y:1993:i:3:p:273-286 Rational equal-loss solutions for bargaining problems (1993). Cited: 21 times. (13) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:42:y:2001:i:1:p:13-29 Numerical measures of segregation: desirable properties and their implications (2001). Cited: 18 times. (14) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:18:y:1989:i:1:p:33-55 A Tiebout theorem (1989). Cited: 18 times. (15) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:21:y:1991:i:2:p:153-167 Properties of a measure of predictive success (1991). Cited: 17 times. (16) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:5:y:1983:i:3:p:269-363 Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games (1983). Cited: 16 times. (17) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:15:y:1988:i:3:p:231-246 The proportional solution for rights problems (1988). Cited: 15 times. (18) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:30:y:1995:i:1:p:98-99 On Additive Methods to Share Joint Costs. (1995). Cited: 14 times. (19) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:45:y:2003:i:1:p:27-52 Coalition formation games with separable preferences (2003). Cited: 13 times. (20) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:35:y:1998:i:3:p:273-289 Ranking opportunity profiles on the basis of the common opportunities (1998). Cited: 13 times. (21) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:50:y:2005:i:2:p:181-201 Nash networks with heterogeneous links (2005). Cited: 13 times. (22) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:40:y:2000:i:2:p:123-130 On diversity and freedom of choice (2000). Cited: 12 times. (23) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:32:y:1996:i:1:p:71-93 Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The No Envy approach to compensation (1996). Cited: 12 times. (24) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:26:y:1993:i:3:p:287-297 The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach (1993). Cited: 12 times. (25) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:37:y:1999:i:1:p:59-77 Individual rights and collective responsibility: the rights-egalitarian solution (1999). Cited: 12 times. (26) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:28:y:1994:i:3:p:151-165 Comparative statics for aggregative games the strong concavity case (1994). Cited: 12 times. (27) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:24:y:1992:i:1:p:19-33 Bargaining problems with claims (1992). Cited: 12 times. (28) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:39:y:2000:i:1:p:55-70 Potential maximizers and network formation (2000). Cited: 11 times. (29) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:35:y:1998:i:1:p:37-55 Intertemporal objective functions: Strong pareto versus anonymity (1998). Cited: 11 times. (30) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:30:y:1995:i:3:p:324-324 On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall. (1995). Cited: 10 times. (31) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:3:y:1982:i:4:p:389-396 Single-peaked orders on a tree (1982). Cited: 10 times. (32) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:44:y:2002:i:1:p:45-64 Opportunity egalitarianism and income inequality (2002). Cited: 10 times. (33) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:36:y:1998:i:3:p:229-242 Serial cost sharing methods for multi-commodity situations (1998). Cited: 10 times. (34) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:17:y:1989:i:3:p:245-261 A noncooperative justification for egalitarian surplus sharing (1989). Cited: 10 times. (35) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:15:y:1988:i:1:p:11-27 Monotonicity properties of bargaining solutions when applied to economics (1988). Cited: 9 times. (36) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:48:y:2004:i:1:p:37-53 A group bargaining solution (2004). Cited: 9 times. (37) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:47:y:2004:i:1:p:37-49 L.S. Penroses limit theorem: proof of some special cases (2004). Cited: 9 times. (38) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:30:y:1995:i:3:p:319-320 The Geographic Foundations of Industrial Performance. (1995). Cited: 9 times. (39) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:47:y:2004:i:2:p:245-257 The Talmud rule and the securement of agents awards (2004). Cited: 8 times. (40) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:6:y:1983:i:2:p:153-169 Paternalism, buyers and sellers market (1983). Cited: 8 times. (41) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:14:y:1987:i:2:p:185-191 Redistributive properties of progressive taxation (1987). Cited: 8 times. (42) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:36:y:1998:i:1:p:31-56 Belief revision in games: forward and backward induction1 (1998). Cited: 8 times. (43) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:45:y:2003:i:2:p:185-203 On coalition formation: durable coalition structures (2003). Cited: 8 times. (44) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:43:y:2002:i:2:p:267-287 Nash consistent representation of constitutions: a reaction to the Gibbard paradox (2002). Cited: 8 times. (45) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:1:y:1981:i:3:p:235-267 The median procedure in cluster analysis and social choice theory (1981). Cited: 8 times. (46) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:35:y:1998:i:2:p:203-218 Shared irrigation costs: An empirical and axiomatic analysis (1998). Cited: 8 times. (47) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:36:y:1998:i:2:p:105-125 Growth and the relativity of satisfaction (1998). Cited: 7 times. (48) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:53:y:2007:i:2:p:185-195 A generalized index of employment segregation (2007). Cited: 7 times. (49) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:45:y:2003:i:2:p:131-142 Efficient and non-deteriorating choice (2003). Cited: 7 times. (50) RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:48:y:2004:i:2:p:151-182 Responsibility sensitive egalitarianism and optimal linear income taxation (2004). Cited: 7 times. Recent citations received in: | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004 Recent citations received in: 2007 (1) RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00294466_v1 Conceptions of freedom and ranking opportunity sets. A typology (2007). HAL / Post-Print (2) RePEc:icr:wpicer:33-2007 Modelling Politics (2007). ICER - International Centre for Economic Research / ICER Working Papers (3) RePEc:icr:wpicer:34-2007 Electoral Oscillations in Argentina.. (2007). ICER - International Centre for Economic Research / ICER Working Papers (4) RePEc:inq:inqwps:ecineq2007-82 An alternative proposal for measuring occupational segregation (2007). Recent citations received in: 2006 (1) RePEc:aub:autbar:669.06 Stability and Manipulation in Representative Democracies (2006). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers (2) RePEc:bie:wpaper:385 An axiomatic approach to composite solutions (2006). Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics / Working Papers (3) RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:17:y:2006:i:2:p:1-10 A note on an equilibrium in the great fish war game (2006). Economics Bulletin (4) RePEc:ecl:corcae:06-14 Flexibility of Choice versus Reduction of Ambiguity (2006). Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics / Working Papers (5) RePEc:pra:mprapa:1849 Sharpening Intertemporal Prospect Theory (2006). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper (6) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:35:y:2006:i:1:p:111-128 A simple ââ¬Åmarket valueââ¬Â bargaining model for weighted voting games: characterization and limit theorems (2006). International Journal of Game Theory (7) RePEc:ssb:dispap:481 Labor Supply as a Choice among Latent Job Opportunities. A Practical
Empirical Approach (2006). Research Department of Statistics Norway / Discussion Papers (8) RePEc:vnm:wpaper:139 A copula-based approach to aggregation functions (2006). Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Venice / Working Papers Recent citations received in: 2005 (1) RePEc:awi:wpaper:0424 Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case (2005). University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics / Working Papers (2) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse12_2005 Stability of the Replicator Equation for a
Single-Species with a Multi-Dimensional Continuous Trait Space (2005). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers (3) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse38_2005 Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case (2005). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers (4) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2005018 The Coordinate-Wise Core for Multiple-Type Housing Markets is Second-Best Incentive Compatible (2005). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda (5) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2005032 In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents (2005). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda (6) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1754 In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents (2005). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers (7) RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2005-14 (Non-)Existence and Scope of Nash Networks (2005). Department of Economics, Louisiana State University / Departmental Working Papers (8) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0512003 Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case (2005). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information (9) RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:05-34 Interaction on Hypergraphs (2005). Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim / Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications Recent citations received in: 2004 (1) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1291 Non-Welfarist Optimal Taxation and Behavioral Public Economics (2004). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series (2) RePEc:ecl:riceco:2004-01 Bargaining among Groups: An Axiomatic Viewpoint (2004). Rice University, Department of Economics / Working Papers (3) RePEc:roc:rocher:511 A New Solution to the Problem of Adjudicating Conflicting Claims (2004). University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) / RCER Working Papers (4) RePEc:siu:wpaper:26-2004 LS Penroseâs limit theorem: Tests by simulation (2004). Singapore Management University, School of Economics / Working Papers (5) RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:12:y:2004:i:2:p:399-408 Various characterizations of convex fuzzy games (2004). TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research (6) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0405001 Additivity in cost spanning tree problems (2004). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information (7) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0409003 Negotiating the membership (2004). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results. Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.
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