ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution / ELSE working papers

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.18 0 0 0 0.09 1997 0.18 0 0 0 0.09 1998 0.21 0 0 0 0.13 1999 0.29 0 0 0 0.17 2000 0.39 57 47 0 0 7 0.12 0.2 2001 0.05 0.37 0 57 3 0 0.18 2002 0.07 0.42 0 57 4 0 0.2 2003 0.43 0 0 0 0.21 2004 0.49 0 0 0 0.24 2005 0.5 0 0 0 0.29 2006 0.53 0 0 0 0.28 2007 0.44 0 0 0 0.24
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:els:esrcls:028 Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi- Armed Bandits (2000).
Cited: 17 times.

(2) RePEc:els:esrcls:002 Continuous Approximations of Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics (2000).
Cited: 6 times.

(3) RePEc:els:esrcls:024 CYCLES OF LEARNING IN THE CENTIPEDE GAME (2000).
Cited: 5 times.

(4) RePEc:els:esrcls:023 Learning with Hazy Beliefs (2000).
Cited: 4 times.

(5) RePEc:els:esrcls:033 Learning, Matching and Aggregation (2000).
Cited: 4 times.

(6) RePEc:els:esrcls:037 Naive Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspiration (2000).
Cited: 3 times.

(7) RePEc:els:esrcls:012 Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap Talk Coordination Games (2000).
Cited: 3 times.

(8) RePEc:els:esrcls:035 Monopoly Pricing with Social Learning (2000).
Cited: 3 times.

(9) RePEc:els:esrcls:011 Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(10) RePEc:els:esrcls:026 When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games? (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(11) RePEc:els:esrcls:049 EVOLUTIONARY DRIFT AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(12) RePEc:els:esrcls:034 Conventions and Social Mobility in Bargaining Situations (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

(13) RePEc:els:esrcls:045 How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

(14) RePEc:els:esrcls:009 Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004

Recent citations received in: 2007

Recent citations received in: 2006

Recent citations received in: 2005

Recent citations received in: 2004

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Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.