Homo Oeconomicus

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.18 13 5 41 0 0.09 1997 0.21 28 9 40 0 1 0.04 0.08 1998 0.02 0.25 24 3 41 1 0 0.1 1999 0.02 0.32 44 5 52 1 0 0.15 2000 0.03 0.43 38 4 68 2 0 0.19 2001 0.02 0.41 27 32 82 2 0 0.17 2002 0.05 0.44 59 11 65 3 0 2 0.03 0.2 2003 0.08 0.47 25 4 86 7 0 0.22 2004 0.01 0.52 33 18 84 1 0 1 0.03 0.23 2005 0.05 0.56 23 1 58 3 0 0.25 2006 0.09 0.57 0 56 5 0 0.24 2007 0.48 0 23 0 0.22
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:18:y:2001:p:111-149 Imitation Equilibrium (2001).
Cited: 14 times.

(2) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:19:y:2002:p:345-371 Shareholder Voting Power and Ownership Control of Companies (2002).
Cited: 7 times.

(3) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:18:y:2001:p:303-318 How Paulus Becomes Saulus An Experimental Study of Equal Punishment Games (2001).
Cited: 5 times.

(4) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:14:y:1997:p:469-487 Steuerhinterziehung und ihre Kontrolle in unterschiedlichen politischen Systemen (1997).
Cited: 5 times.

(5) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:13:y:1996:p:127-166 Private-public partnership: Gemeinschaftsunternehmen zwischen Privaten und der öffentlichen Hand (1996).
Cited: 5 times.

(6) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:18:y:2001:p:211-228 Optimal Contracting With Boundedly Rational Agents (2001).
Cited: 4 times.

(7) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:21:y:2004:p:283-314 Economic Development and Democracy. Does Industrialization Lead to Universal Suffrage? (2004).
Cited: 4 times.

(8) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:21:y:2004:p:521-541 Bounded Rationality and Theory Absorption (2004).
Cited: 4 times.

(9) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:21:y:2004:p:396-429 The Dynamics of the Columbian Civil Conflict: A New Dataset (2004).
Cited: 3 times.

(10) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:15:y:1998:p:27-45 Tax Compliance Policy Reconsidered (1998).
Cited: 3 times.

(11) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:14:y:1997:p:357-369 The Concept of Open Network Provision in Large Technical Systems (1997).
Cited: 2 times.

(12) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:21:y:2004:p:251-282 Revolution or Reform? Socialism’s Dilemma as Rational Choice Problem (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(13) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:15:y:1999:p:561-579 Monopolistic Competition and Supply Behaviour under Fuzzy Price Information (1999).
Cited: 2 times.

(14) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:17:y:2001:p:391-425 The Election of Lincoln in 1860 (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(15) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:20:y:2003:p:161-194 An Indirect-Evolution Approad to Newcombs Problem (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(16) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:18:y:2001:p:241-262 Trust and Reciprocity in the Investment Game with Indirect Reward (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(17) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:18:y:2001:p:19-30 Direct versus Indirect Reciprocity: An Experiment (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(18) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:21:y:2004:p:171-196 The Rationale of Revolutions (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(19) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:19:y:2002:p:327-343 The Power of a Spatially Inferior Player (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(20) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:3:y:1984:p:7-42 Rationalmodell und analytische Handlungstheorie (1984).
Cited: 2 times.

(21) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:17:y:2000:p:67-84 Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games: The Case of EU Procedures (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(22) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:14:y:1997:p:391-410 The European Standardization System: How Much in Need of Reform Is It? (1997).
Cited: 1 times.

(23) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:21:y:2004:p:373-395 Secession as Revolution (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(24) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:16:y:2000:p:415-425 Notions of A Priori Voting Power: Critique of Holler and Widgrén (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

(25) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:19:y:2003:p:471-505 The founding of the American Agrarian Empire and the Conflict of Land and Capital (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

(26) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:12:y:1995:p:155-183 Ist die Normalform die normale Form? (1995).
Cited: 1 times.

(27) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:18:y:2001:p:177-197 Heuristics as Decision Rules - Part I: The Cobb Douglas Consumer (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(28) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:20:y:2004:p:423-427 Institutions Matter – the Role of Institutional Factors for Labour Disputes: a Comment (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(29) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:15:y:1999:p:295-300 Information (1999).
Cited: 1 times.

(30) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:19:y:2002:p:297-310 Models and Reality: the Curios Case of the Absent Abstention (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(31) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:22:y:2005:p:208-230 On the Evolutionary Stability of Profit Maximization (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(32) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:18:y:2001:p:337-351 Predating Predators: An experimental Study (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(33) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:17:y:2000:p:137-154 Set Games (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

(34) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:19:y:2003:p:507-517 The founding of the American Agrarian Empire and the Conflict of Land and Capital (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

(35) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:14:y:1997:p:371-390 Standardization in Transportation Markets: a European Perspective (1997).
Cited: 1 times.

(36) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:15:y:1999:p:581-586 Game Theory and the Evolution of Fairness: A Review Article (1999).
Cited: 1 times.

(37) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:19:y:2002:p:7-8 Introduction (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(38) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:15:y:1999:p:513-520 The Holler-Packel Axiomatization of the Public Good Index Completed (1999).
Cited: 1 times.

(39) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:20:y:2004:p:391-422 Labour Disputes in the Twentieth Century: an International Comparison and Evaluation of Theories (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(40) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:18:y:2001:p:91-110 How Ultimatum Offers Emerge: A Study in Bounded Rationality (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(41) RePEc:hom:homoec:v:19:y:2003:p:519-541 Ancestors of the Contemporary Homo Economicus (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004

Recent citations received in: 2007

Recent citations received in: 2006

Recent citations received in: 2005

Recent citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:hol:holodi:0410 The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict: A New Data Set (2004). Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London / Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics

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Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.