Theory and Decision

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.18 0 0 0 0.09 1997 0.21 0 0 0 0.08 1998 0.25 0 0 0 0.1 1999 0.32 0 0 0 0.15 2000 0.43 0 0 0 0.19 2001 0.41 37 33 0 0 3 0.08 0.17 2002 0.03 0.44 37 36 37 1 0 1 0.03 0.2 2003 0.08 0.47 33 22 74 6 0 0.22 2004 0.04 0.52 60 19 70 3 0 1 0.02 0.23 2005 0.06 0.56 29 26 93 6 0 1 0.03 0.25 2006 0.1 0.57 36 14 89 9 0 0.24 2007 0.14 0.48 30 40 65 9 0 11 0.37 0.22
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:kap:theord:v:59:y:2005:i:1:p:51-95 On Decomposing Net Final Values: Eva, Sva and Shadow Project (2005).
Cited: 13 times.

(2) RePEc:kap:theord:v:62:y:2007:i:2:p:161-193 The Experimetrics of Public Goods: Inferring Motivations from Contributions (2007).
Cited: 11 times.

(3) RePEc:kap:theord:v:53:y:2002:i:4:p:327-342 Digraph Competitions and Cooperative Games (2002).
Cited: 9 times.

(4) RePEc:kap:theord:v:53:y:2002:i:2:p:137-152 A Rule For Updating Ambiguous Beliefs (2002).
Cited: 9 times.

(5) RePEc:kap:theord:v:56:y:2004:i:1:p:47-61 The P-value for cost sharing in minimum (2004).
Cited: 7 times.

(6) RePEc:kap:theord:v:56:y:2004:i:3:p:291-324 Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation Games with Positive Spillovers (2004).
Cited: 6 times.

(7) RePEc:kap:theord:v:63:y:2007:i:4:p:349-388 The Self-Fulfilling Property of Trust: An Experimental Study (2007).
Cited: 6 times.

(8) RePEc:kap:theord:v:51:y:2001:i:2:p:367-386 Conditioning Capacities and Choquet Integrals: The Role of Comonotony (2001).
Cited: 5 times.

(9) RePEc:kap:theord:v:50:y:2001:i:2:p:119-148 Rationalizing Focal Points (2001).
Cited: 5 times.

(10) RePEc:kap:theord:v:55:y:2003:i:2:p:147-180 FAIR DIVISION OF INDIVISIBLE ITEMS (2003).
Cited: 5 times.

(11) RePEc:kap:theord:v:64:y:2008:i:2:p:333-362 Granny Versus Game Theorist: Ambiguity in Experimental Games (2008).
Cited: 5 times.

(12) RePEc:kap:theord:v:60:y:2006:i:4:p:371-394 Reciprocity, Altruism, Solidarity: A Dynamic Model (2006).
Cited: 4 times.

(13) RePEc:kap:theord:v:64:y:2008:i:2:p:249-300 Dynamic Choice, Independence and Emotions (2008).
Cited: 4 times.

(14) RePEc:kap:theord:v:50:y:2001:i:3:p:249-262 A Process Approach to the Utility for Gambling (2001).
Cited: 4 times.

(15) RePEc:kap:theord:v:62:y:2007:i:2:p:119-134 Rationality and Order-Dependent Sequential Rationality (2007).
Cited: 4 times.

(16) RePEc:kap:theord:v:63:y:2007:i:4:p:389-418 On the Robustness of the Winner’s Curse Phenomenon (2007).
Cited: 4 times.

(17) RePEc:kap:theord:v:63:y:2007:i:3:p:283-314 An Experimental Evaluation of the Serial Cost Sharing Rule (2007).
Cited: 4 times.

(18) RePEc:kap:theord:v:53:y:2002:i:4:p:313-325 Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games (2002).
Cited: 4 times.

(19) RePEc:kap:theord:v:55:y:2003:i:2:p:87-146 INCREASING INCREMENT GENERALIZATIONS OF RANK-DEPENDENT THEORIES (2003).
Cited: 3 times.

(20) RePEc:kap:theord:v:62:y:2007:i:3:p:241-279 On Robust Constitution Design (2007).
Cited: 3 times.

(21) RePEc:kap:theord:v:52:y:2002:i:1:p:29-71 Fast, frugal, and fit: Simple heuristics for paired comparison (2002).
Cited: 3 times.

(22) RePEc:kap:theord:v:51:y:2001:i:2:p:329-349 The Domain and Interpretation of Utility Functions: An Exploration (2001).
Cited: 3 times.

(23) RePEc:kap:theord:v:62:y:2007:i:4:p:311-333 Stochastic Evolution of Rules for Playing Finite Normal Form Games (2007).
Cited: 3 times.

(24) RePEc:kap:theord:v:52:y:2002:i:4:p:303-312 Semicontinuous Representability of Homothetic Interval Orders by Means of Two Homogeneous Functionals (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(25) RePEc:kap:theord:v:61:y:2006:i:4:p:329-344 Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(26) RePEc:kap:theord:v:65:y:2008:i:3:p:205-226 How Risk Disciplines Pre-Commitment (2008).
Cited: 2 times.

(27) RePEc:kap:theord:v:63:y:2007:i:3:p:265-282 An Evolutionary Analysis of Buyer Insurance and Seller Reputation in Online Markets (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(28) RePEc:kap:theord:v:54:y:2003:i:4:p:357-374 Bargaining and Strategic Demand Commitment (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(29) RePEc:kap:theord:v:59:y:2005:i:2:p:127-174 Resolving the Trust Predicament: A Quantum Game-theoretic Approach (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(30) RePEc:kap:theord:v:54:y:2003:i:2:p:125-149 Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(31) RePEc:kap:theord:v:50:y:2001:i:3:p:213-238 Constraints and the Measurement of Freedom of Choice (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(32) RePEc:kap:theord:v:55:y:2003:i:3:p:181-207 Super Majoritarianism and the Endowment Effect (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(33) RePEc:kap:theord:v:62:y:2007:i:1:p:1-29 Socially Structured Games (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(34) RePEc:kap:theord:v:52:y:2002:i:3:p:201-232 Loss Aversion and Bargaining (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(35) RePEc:kap:theord:v:61:y:2006:i:4:p:305-318 Achievable Hierarchies In Voting Games (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(36) RePEc:kap:theord:v:50:y:2001:i:1:p:35-58 Lottery Dependent Utility: a Reexamination (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(37) RePEc:kap:theord:v:51:y:2001:i:1:p:13-29 Target Rules for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(38) RePEc:kap:theord:v:51:y:2001:i:2:p:89-124 De Finetti was Right: Probability Does Not Exist (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(39) RePEc:kap:theord:v:54:y:2003:i:3:p:231-248 The Favorite-Longshot Bias in Sequential Parimutuel Betting with Non-Expected Utility Players (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(40) RePEc:kap:theord:v:53:y:2002:i:1:p:29-59 Spatial Dispersion as a Dynamic Coordination Problem (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(41) RePEc:kap:theord:v:55:y:2003:i:4:p:359-389 Bargaining Solutions as Social Compromises (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(42) RePEc:kap:theord:v:59:y:2005:i:1:p:43-50 Willingness to Pay for Risk Reduction and Risk Aversion without the Expected Utility Assumption (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(43) RePEc:kap:theord:v:54:y:2003:i:1:p:73-83 A Note on Optimal Insurance in the presence of a Nonpecuniary Background Risk (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(44) RePEc:kap:theord:v:50:y:2001:i:2:p:169-196 What to Make of the Liberal Paradox? (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(45) RePEc:kap:theord:v:58:y:2005:i:4:p:325-350 Maximal-Element Rationalizability (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(46) RePEc:kap:theord:v:51:y:2001:i:2:p:217-246 Multiple-Stage Decision-Making: The Effect of Planning Horizon Length on Dynamic Consistency (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(47) RePEc:kap:theord:v:56:y:2004:i:2_2:p:35-46 A comparison of non-transferable utility values (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(48) RePEc:kap:theord:v:59:y:2005:i:4:p:255-294 Games of Competition in a Stochastic Environment (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(49) RePEc:kap:theord:v:50:y:2001:i:2:p:101-118 The Ecology of Cooperation (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(50) RePEc:kap:theord:v:52:y:2002:i:2:p:139-147 Why the Infinite Decision Puzzle is Puzzling (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:ant:wpaper:2007026 Sequential Reciprocity in Two-Player, Two-Stage Games: An Experimental Analysis (2007). University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics / Working Papers

(2) RePEc:aub:autbar:678.07 Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (revised version) (2007). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(3) RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:17-07c The Origin of the Winners Curse: A Laboratory Study (2007). Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara / University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series

(4) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6417 On the Optimal Number of Representatives (2007). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(5) RePEc:esi:discus:2006-36 Social Learning of Efficiency Enhancing Trade With(out) Market Entry Costs - An experimental study (2007). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(6) RePEc:gat:wpaper:0707 Endogenous Leadership Selection and Influence (2007). Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure / W

(7) RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00142461_v1 Endogenous Leadership Selection and Influence (2007). HAL / Post-Print

(8) RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:34:y:2007:i:3:p:241-257 Preferences and decision errors in the winner’s curse (2007). Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

(9) RePEc:kls:series:0033 The Limits of Trust in Economic Transactions - Investigations of Perfect Reputation Systems (2007). University of Cologne, Seminar of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics

(10) RePEc:slp:islawp:islawp27 Towards a Behavioral Public Choice: Guilt-Aversion and Accountability in the Lab. (2007). ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy / ISLA Working Papers

(11) RePEc:spr:joecth:v:33:y:2007:i:1:p:1-10 An introduction to the symposium on behavioral game theory (2007). Economic Theory

Recent citations received in: 2006

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:mtl:montde:2005-21 Domain Closedness Conditions and Rational Choice (2005). Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques / Cahiers de recherche

Recent citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0402004 Defining rules in cost spanning tree problems through the canonical form (2004). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

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Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.