Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.18 0 0 0 0.09 1997 0.21 55 49 0 0 2 0.04 0.08 1998 0.05 0.25 55 68 55 3 0 4 0.07 0.1 1999 0.07 0.32 44 137 110 8 0 2 0.05 0.15 2000 0.22 0.43 38 51 99 22 0 2 0.05 0.19 2001 0.3 0.41 43 36 82 25 0 2 0.05 0.17 2002 0.04 0.44 38 61 81 3 0 7 0.18 0.2 2003 0.14 0.47 44 53 81 11 0 9 0.2 0.22 2004 0.23 0.52 43 49 82 19 0 6 0.14 0.23 2005 0.18 0.56 39 51 87 16 0 2 0.05 0.25 2006 0.38 0.57 54 24 82 31 0 3 0.06 0.24 2007 0.2 0.48 51 22 93 19 0 4 0.08 0.22
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199903)155:1_51:odobbt_2.0.tx_2-x Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Transition Economies (1999).
Cited: 32 times.

(2) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199912)155:4_755:mpbsw_2.0.tx_2-6 Measuring Preferences by Subjective Well-Being (1999).
Cited: 30 times.

(3) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199803)154:1_144:fsacga_2.0.tx_2-r Financial Systems and Corporate Governance: A Review of the International Evidence (1998).
Cited: 19 times.

(4) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199912)155:4_643:efatef_2.0.tx_2-t Economic Freedom and the Environment for Economic Growth (1999).
Cited: 17 times.

(5) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199912)155:4_664:sciag_2.0.tx_2-e Social Comparisons, Inequality, and Growth (1999).
Cited: 15 times.

(6) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200203)158:1_168:iaiefc_2.0.tx_2-a Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: From Communal to Individual Responsibility (2002).
Cited: 13 times.

(7) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200803)164:1_163:mtcia_2.0.tx_2-y Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions (2008).
Cited: 13 times.

(8) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200306)159:2_362:tdmina_2.0.tx_2-7 The Dutch Miracle: Institutions, Networks, and Trust (2003).
Cited: 13 times.

(9) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200409)160:3_377:ipunow_2.0.tx_2-x Introducing Procedural Utility: Not Only What, but Also How Matters (2004).
Cited: 12 times.

(10) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199812)154:4_622:mssitr_2.0.tx_2-t Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem (1998).
Cited: 12 times.

(11) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199909)155:3_458:tuokif_2.0.tx_2-6 The Use of Knowledge in Firms (1999).
Cited: 12 times.

(12) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199903)155:1_22:otrobc_2.0.tx_2-2 On the Role of Bank Competition for Corporate Finance and Corporate Control in Transition Economies (1999).
Cited: 11 times.

(13) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200203)158:1_66:htdap_2.0.tx_2-3 How to Dissolve a Partnership (2002).
Cited: 10 times.

(14) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200003)156:1_245:sbctai_2.0.tx_2-v Soft Budget Constraints, Transition, and Industrial Change (2000).
Cited: 10 times.

(15) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200103)157:1_57:niatlo_2.0.tx_2-v Nonmajoritarian Institutions and the Limits of Democratic Governance: A Political Transaction-Cost Approach (2001).
Cited: 10 times.

(16) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199709)153:3_510:lcaasf_2.0.tx_2-e Location Choice as a Signal for Product Quality: The Economics of Made in Germany (1997).
Cited: 9 times.

(17) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200512)161:4_636:iitwep_2.0.tx_2-x Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection (2005).
Cited: 9 times.

(18) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200306)159:2_259:tmfc_2.0.tx_2-i Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts (2003).
Cited: 9 times.

(19) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199712)153:4_607:tiforc_2.0.tx_2-n The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment in the UK: The Case of Telecommunications (1997).
Cited: 7 times.

(20) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199703)153:1_4:tcaiec_2.0.tx_2-h Transaction Costs and Islam: Explaining Conversion in Africa (1997).
Cited: 7 times.

(21) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200209)158:3_393:peai_2.0.tx_2-o Predation, Efficiency, and Inequality (2002).
Cited: 7 times.

(22) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200412)160:4_627:lgbapr_2.0.tx_2-x Local Government Behavior and Property Right Formation in Rural China (2004).
Cited: 7 times.

(23) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200306)159:2_302:prtatq_2.0.tx_2-o Physician Reimbursement, Time-Consistency and the Quality of Care (2003).
Cited: 7 times.

(24) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200503)161:1_38:jpufdp_2.0.tx_2-e Judgment Proofness under Four Different Precaution Technologies (2005).
Cited: 7 times.

(25) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199709)153:3_441:ugaata_2.0.tx_2-z University Governance and Academic Tenure: A Property Rights Explanation (1997).
Cited: 7 times.

(26) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200506)161:2_193:dvjeac_2.0.tx_2-n Deterrence versus Judicial Error: A Comparative View of Standards of Proof (2005).
Cited: 6 times.

(27) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199803)154:1_177:lacadt_2.0.tx_2-d Liquidity and Control: A Dynamic Theory of Corporate Ownership Structure (1998).
Cited: 6 times.

(28) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199703)153:1_41:iauaop_2.0.tx_2-m Islam and Underdevelopment: An Old Puzzle Revisited (1997).
Cited: 6 times.

(29) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199803)154:1_61:otoocb_2.0.tx_2-2 On the Obsolescence of Commercial Banking (1998).
Cited: 6 times.

(30) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200512)161:4_735:akwas_2.0.tx_2-0 A Knight without a Sword?. The Effects of Audit Courts on Tax Morale (2005).
Cited: 6 times.

(31) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199803)154:1_291:fivsmi_2.0.tx_2-j Financial Intermediation Versus Stock Markets in a Dynamic Intertemporal Model (1998).
Cited: 6 times.

(32) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200003)156:1_216:uucfie_2.0.tx_2-q Understanding Underdevelopment: Challenges for Institutional Economics from the Point of View of Poor Countries (2000).
Cited: 6 times.

(33) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200412)160:4_555:tpccis_2.0.tx_2-q Third Party Contingency Contracts in Settlement and Litigation (2004).
Cited: 6 times.

(34) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199903)155:1_181:alatpo_2.0.tx_2-e Auditor Liability and the Precision of Auditing Standards (1999).
Cited: 5 times.

(35) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200303)159:1_132:aegatf_2.0.tx_2-a An Evolutionary Game Approach to Fundamentalism and Conflict (2003).
Cited: 5 times.

(36) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200206)158:2_256:cfwmlt_2.0.tx_2-h Coordination Failure with Multiple-Source Lending, the Cost of Protection Against a Powerful Lender (2002).
Cited: 5 times.

(37) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200509)161:3_374:otarta_2.0.tx_2-b Optimal Transparency and Risk-Taking to Avoid Currency Crises (2005).
Cited: 5 times.

(38) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199809)154:3_499:wdnd_2.0.tx_2-h What do Notaries do?. Overcoming Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: The Case of Paris, 1751 (1998).
Cited: 4 times.

(39) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199909)155:3_405:ocietc_2.0.tx_2-v On Custom in Economics: The Case of Humanism and Trade Regimes (1999).
Cited: 4 times.

(40) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200003)156:1_64:trotsi_2.0.tx_2-1 The Role of the State in Making a Market Economy (2000).
Cited: 4 times.

(41) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200909)165:3_401:ibiatc_2.0.tx_2-c Investment Behaviour in a Two-Period Contest Model (2009).
Cited: 4 times.

(42) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200409)160:3_345:teoho_2.0.tx_2-f The Economics of Hybrid Organizations (2004).
Cited: 4 times.

(43) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200406)160:2_311:ehicam_2.0.tx_2-u Explosive Hyperinflation, Inflation-Tax Curve, and Modeling the Use of Money (2004).
Cited: 4 times.

(44) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200709)163:3_411:masoeo_2.0.tx_2-d Measurement and Sources of Economies of Scope: A Primal Approach (2007).
Cited: 4 times.

(45) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200006)156:2_335:ene_2.0.tx_2-u Evolutionary Norm Enforcement (2000).
Cited: 4 times.

(46) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200206)158:2_286:rsaeac_2.0.tx_2-p R&D Spillovers and Endogenous Absorptive Capacity (2002).
Cited: 4 times.

(47) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200606)162:2_253:elit_2.0.tx_2-q Endogenous Leadership in Teams (2006).
Cited: 4 times.

(48) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200509)161:3_522:gasnac_2.0.tx_2-o Governmental Action, Social Norms, and Criminal Behavior (2005).
Cited: 4 times.

(49) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200309)159:3_439:asas_2.0.tx_2-d Ability, Self-Confidence, and Search (2003).
Cited: 4 times.

(50) RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200006)156:2_360:eiaift_2.0.tx_2-f Endogenous Imitation and Implications for Technology Policy (2000).
Cited: 4 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:cns:cnscwp:200710 Delegation, Externalities and Organizational Design (2007). Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia / Working Paper CRENoS

(2) RePEc:esx:essedp:633 Futures Market: Contractual Arrangement to Restrain Moral Hazard in Teams (2007). University of Essex, Department of Economics / Economics Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:ide:wpaper:7804 The Market for Lawyers: The Value of Information on the Quality of Legal Services. (2007). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(4) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3117 Risk, Delegation, and Project Scope (2007). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5875 Where Do Firms Incorporate? (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2006116 Leaving Hotel California : how incentives affect flows of benefit recipients in the Netherlands (2006). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(3) RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:11:y:2006:i:2:p:1-7 Fairness and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement (2006). Economics Bulletin

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:cra:wpaper:2005-28 The Determinants of Political Discussion: How Important are Audit Courts and Local Autonomy? (2005). Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) / CREMA Working Paper Series

(2) RePEc:use:tkiwps:0506 Soft Regulators, Though Judges (2005). Utrecht School of Economics / Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200474 Econometric modelling in blockholder systems of corporate governance (2004). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(2) RePEc:knz:hetero:0411 Does Venture Capital Syndication Spur Employment Growth and Shareholder Value? : evidence from German IPO Data (2004). Research Group Heterogeneous Labor, University of Konstanz/ZEW Mannheim / Working Papers of the Research Group Heterogenous Labor

(3) RePEc:mar:volksw:200426 Illegal, Immoral, Fattening or What?: How Deterrence and Responsive Regulation Shape Tax Morale (2004). Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) / Working Pap

(4) RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0407 The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees (2004). Universitat Bern, Volkswirtschaftliches Institut / Diskussionsschriften

(5) RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0409 Conditional versus Contingent Fees (2004). Universitat Bern, Volkswirtschaftliches Institut / Diskussionsschriften

(6) RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0419 Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees (2004). Universitat Bern, Volkswirtschaftliches Institut / Diskussionsschriften

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Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.