Journal of Law, Economics and Organization

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.33 0.18 20 155 40 13 0 0.09 1997 0.37 0.21 18 215 41 15 0 7 0.39 0.08 1998 0.37 0.25 19 102 38 14 0 1 0.05 0.1 1999 0.51 0.32 34 699 37 19 0 8 0.24 0.15 2000 0.77 0.43 20 210 53 41 0 2 0.1 0.19 2001 0.85 0.41 19 92 54 46 0 1 0.05 0.17 2002 0.87 0.44 20 130 39 34 0 14 0.7 0.2 2003 0.59 0.47 20 140 39 23 0 5 0.25 0.22 2004 0.83 0.52 22 52 40 33 0 5 0.23 0.23 2005 0.9 0.56 22 64 42 38 0 6 0.27 0.25 2006 0.8 0.57 21 56 44 35 0 8 0.38 0.24 2007 0.67 0.48 31 10 43 29 0 2 0.06 0.22
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:222-79 The Quality of Government. (1999).
Cited: 461 times.

(2) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:0:p:24-52 Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. (1991).
Cited: 197 times.

(3) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:2:p:181-214 Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations. (1986).
Cited: 98 times.

(4) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:8:y:1992:i:3:p:523-46 The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform. (1992).
Cited: 81 times.

(5) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:3:y:1987:i:2:p:243-77 Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control. (1987).
Cited: 71 times.

(6) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:2:p:201-46 The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation. (1994).
Cited: 62 times.

(7) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:13:y:1997:i:1:p:1-25 The (1997).
Cited: 61 times.

(8) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:2:p:335-61 Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment. (1995).
Cited: 54 times.

(9) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:74-102 The Firm as a Subeconomy. (1999).
Cited: 54 times.

(10) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:18:y:2002:i:1:p:221-277 Courts and Relational Contracts (2002).
Cited: 53 times.

(11) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:13:y:1997:i:2:p:387-409 Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach. (1997).
Cited: 50 times.

(12) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:141-61 The Theory of the Firm Revisited. (1988).
Cited: 48 times.

(13) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:1:p:1-24 The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach. (1996).
Cited: 47 times.

(14) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:2:p:279-303 Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards. (1986).
Cited: 41 times.

(15) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:0:p:84-105 Privatization and Incentives. (1991).
Cited: 39 times.

(16) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:56-73 Informal Authority in Organizations. (1999).
Cited: 38 times.

(17) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:2:p:407-26 The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy. (1994).
Cited: 38 times.

(18) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:6:y:1990:i:2:p:381-409 Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency. (1990).
Cited: 38 times.

(19) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:230-55 Judicial Modification of Contracts between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach. (1993).
Cited: 37 times.

(20) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:19:y:2003:i:1:p:119-140 Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments (2003).
Cited: 32 times.

(21) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:1:p:1-25 The Costs of Organization. (1991).
Cited: 32 times.

(22) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:1:p:1-32 The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement. (1986).
Cited: 32 times.

(23) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:1:y:1985:i:1:p:101-24 Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition. (1985).
Cited: 32 times.

(24) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:1:p:205-26 Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History. (1995).
Cited: 32 times.

(25) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:2:p:334-64 The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment. (2000).
Cited: 31 times.

(26) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:5:y:1989:i:1:p:109-26 Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry. (1989).
Cited: 30 times.

(27) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:8:y:1992:i:2:p:321-45 Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective. (1992).
Cited: 30 times.

(28) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:1:p:1-49 A Theory of Legal Presumptions. (2000).
Cited: 28 times.

(29) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:1:p:1-31 The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development. (1995).
Cited: 28 times.

(30) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:95-117 Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence. (1988).
Cited: 27 times.

(31) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:19:y:2003:i:2:p:281-306 The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina (2003).
Cited: 27 times.

(32) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:199-213 Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited. (1988).
Cited: 27 times.

(33) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:2:p:365-94 On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias. (2000).
Cited: 26 times.

(34) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:205-29 Monopolization by Sequential Acquisition. (1993).
Cited: 26 times.

(35) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:14:y:1998:i:2:p:205-31 Why Dont More Households File for Bankruptcy? (1998).
Cited: 25 times.

(36) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:1:p:155-65 Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests. (2000).
Cited: 25 times.

(37) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:1:y:1985:i:2:p:225-83 Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle. (1985).
Cited: 24 times.

(38) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:1:p:142-59 Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany. (1994).
Cited: 24 times.

(39) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:2:p:201-28 Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form. (1991).
Cited: 24 times.

(40) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:659-84 Optimal Soft or Tough Bankruptcy Procedures. (1999).
Cited: 23 times.

(41) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:2:p:395-423 Contract Renegotiation and Options in Agency Problems. (2000).
Cited: 23 times.

(42) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:181-98 A Legal Basis for the Firm. (1988).
Cited: 22 times.

(43) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:119-39 Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm. (1988).
Cited: 22 times.

(44) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:1:p:25-61 The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier. (1996).
Cited: 22 times.

(45) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:704-36 The Role of Risk in Contract Choice. (1999).
Cited: 21 times.

(46) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:18:y:2002:i:2:p:428-454 An Experimental Bribery Game (2002).
Cited: 21 times.

(47) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:6:y:1990:i:0:p:213-53 Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story. (1990).
Cited: 21 times.

(48) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:1:p:150-63 A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules. (1995).
Cited: 21 times.

(49) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:306-42 Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective. (1999).
Cited: 21 times.

(50) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:637-58 Dispute Prevention without Courts in Vietnam. (1999).
Cited: 21 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:ide:wpaper:7804 The Market for Lawyers: The Value of Information on the Quality of Legal Services. (2007). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(2) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:10:y:2007:i:4:p:439-454 Amended final-offer arbitration over an uncertain value: A comparison with CA and FOA (2007). Experimental Economics

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_575_1065 Limpact des politiques répressives sur loffre de drogues illicites. Une revue de la littérature théorique (2006).

(2) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1673 Evaluation of Researchers: A Life Cycle Analysis of German Academic Economists (2006). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(3) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1847 Should Courts always Enforce what Contracting Parties Write? (2006). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(4) RePEc:knz:hetero:0608 Evaluation of researchers : a life cycle analysis of German academic economists (2006). Research Group Heterogeneous Labor, University of Konstanz/ZEW Mannheim / Working Papers of the Research Group Heterogenous Labor

(5) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12209 Buy, Lobby or Sue: Interest Groups Participation in Policy Making - A Selective Survey (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(6) RePEc:pen:papers:06-024 Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (2006). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(7) RePEc:pra:mprapa:1550 The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence (2006). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(8) RePEc:qed:wpaper:1107 Work-Related Perks, Agency Problems, and Optimal Incentive Contracts (2006). Queen's University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1605 Policy-induced Internal Migration: An Empirical Investigation of the Canadian Case (2005). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(2) RePEc:dkn:econwp:eco_2005_17 Leviathan Resists: The Endogenous Relationship Between Privatisation and Firm Performance. (2005). Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance / Economics Series

(3) RePEc:ecl:stabus:1846r Co-worker Complementarity and the Stability of Top Management Teams (2005). Stanford University, Graduate School of Business / Research Papers

(4) RePEc:trn:utwpde:0517 From Planning to Mature: on the Determinants of Open Source Take Off (2005). Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia / Department of Economics Working Papers

(5) RePEc:use:tkiwps:0532 Bargaining in Mergers: The Role of Outside Options and Termination Provisions (2005). Utrecht School of Economics / Working Papers

(6) RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0507006 From Planning to Mature: on the Determinants of Open Source Take-Off (2005). EconWPA / Industrial Organization

Recent citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:94:y:2004:i:5:p:1635-1653 International Protection of Intellectual Property (2004). American Economic Review

(2) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.141 Bidding for Incompete Contracts (2004). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers

(3) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10587 The Costs of Entrenched Boards (2004). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(4) RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0407 The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees (2004). Universitat Bern, Volkswirtschaftliches Institut / Diskussionsschriften

(5) RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0409 Conditional versus Contingent Fees (2004). Universitat Bern, Volkswirtschaftliches Institut / Diskussionsschriften

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.