University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton / Working Papers and Published Papers by Peter Cramton and Co-Authors

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.18 0 0 0 0.09 1997 0.18 3 0 0 0 0.09 1998 0.21 30 77 3 0 11 0.37 0.13 1999 0.15 0.29 5 29 33 5 20 2 0.4 0.17 2000 0.23 0.39 4 2 35 8 25 0.2 2001 0.67 0.37 4 56 9 6 16.7 3 0.75 0.18 2002 0.75 0.42 6 136 8 6 0 10 1.67 0.2 2003 1.8 0.43 2 1 10 18 11.1 0.21 2004 2.38 0.49 5 34 8 19 21.1 2 0.4 0.24 2005 0.86 0.5 3 4 7 6 16.7 1 0.33 0.29 2006 1 0.53 2 2 8 8 12.5 1 0.5 0.28 2007 0.2 0.44 12 5 5 1 0 1 0.08 0.24
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98wpdr Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (2002).
Cited: 118 times.

(2) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:02barg Bargaining with Incomplete Information (2001).
Cited: 29 times.

(3) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98wpoe The Optimality of Being Efficient (1999).
Cited: 22 times.

(4) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:01hte Spectrum Auctions (2001).
Cited: 18 times.

(5) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98eer Ascending Auctions (1998).
Cited: 18 times.

(6) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04mit Combinatorial Auctions (2004).
Cited: 17 times.

(7) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04jeea Auctioning Many Divisible Goods (2004).
Cited: 16 times.

(8) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:02eptc Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather (2002).
Cited: 14 times.

(9) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98wpas Auctioning Securities (1998).
Cited: 13 times.

(10) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98jlefcc The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions (1998).
Cited: 11 times.

(11) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:02collude Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions (2002).
Cited: 10 times.

(12) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:85roth Sequential Bargaining Mechanisms (1998).
Cited: 9 times.

(13) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04mit5 The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (2004).
Cited: 5 times.

(14) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:01ej Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma for California and Beyond (2001).
Cited: 5 times.

(15) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98jleer Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

(16) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:01calpx Pricing in the California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch from Uniform Pricing to Pay-as-Bid Pricing? (2001).
Cited: 4 times.

(17) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:99eedecr The Distributional Effects of Carbon Regulation: Why Auctioned Carbon Permits are Attractive and Feasible (1998).
Cited: 4 times.

(18) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:05licap A Capacity Market that Makes Sense (2005).
Cited: 4 times.

(19) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:99wpvic Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing (1999).
Cited: 4 times.

(20) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:91beq Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier: Toward a Theory of Morality in Pratice (1998).
Cited: 3 times.

(21) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:92aer Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data (1998).
Cited: 3 times.

(22) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:87econ Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently (1998).
Cited: 3 times.

(23) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:96slr Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition (1998).
Cited: 3 times.

(24) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98mdi A Review of ISO New Englands Proposed Market Rules (1998).
Cited: 3 times.

(25) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98cra2 Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (1998).
Cited: 2 times.

(26) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07cfem Colombia Firm Energy Market (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(27) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97elec Using Auctions to Divest Generation Assets (1998).
Cited: 2 times.

(28) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:02ubs Unions, Bargaining and Strikes (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(29) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:06mdfra The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(30) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97jems Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions (1998).
Cited: 2 times.

(31) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:93beq Promoting Honesty in Negotiation: An Exercise in Practical Ethics (1998).
Cited: 2 times.

(32) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:91ms Dynamic Bargaining with Transaction Costs (1998).
Cited: 2 times.

(33) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:99ej The Role of the ISO in U.S. Electricity Markets: A Review of Restructuring in California and PJM (1999).
Cited: 2 times.

(34) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07oca An Overview of Combinatorial Auctions (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(35) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04hicss Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(36) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:00jre Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions (1999).
Cited: 1 times.

(37) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:94clr Relational Investing and Agency Theory (1998).
Cited: 1 times.

(38) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:02emd Electricity Market Design: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(39) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:08tara A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(40) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:99reserves Review of the Reserves and Operable Capability Markets: New Englands Experience in the First Four Months (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

(41) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07rggi Comments on the RGGI Market Design (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(42) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:91jleo Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation (1998).
Cited: 1 times.

(43) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07cpm Why We Need to Stick with Uniform-Price Auctions in Electricity Markets (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(44) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:03ferc1 Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

(45) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:00senate Lessons from the United States Spectrum Auctions (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

(46) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07c700mhz The 700 MHz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity to Protect Competition In a Consolidating Industry (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(47) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09cvawln Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction (2009).
Cited: 1 times.

(48) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:08adcfrp Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:07fem Colombia’s Forward Energy Market (2007). University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton / Working Papers and Published Papers by Peter Cramton and Co-Authors

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:mee:wpaper:0609 COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND INVESTMENT IN NEW GENERATING CAPACITY (2006). Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research / Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000222 Interface between Engineering and Market Operations in Restructured Electricity Markets (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

Recent citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04mit4 Simultaneous Ascending Auction (2004). University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton / Working Papers and Published Papers by Peter Cramton and Co-Authors

(2) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04mit5 The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (2004). University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton / Working Papers and Published Papers by Peter Cramton and Co-Authors

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Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.