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 Updated January, 4 2010 234.510 documents processed, 5.249.629 references and 2.248.145 citations

 

 
 

Social Choice and Welfare

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.18471190010.020.09
19970.020.21408647100.08
19980.080.2539153877070.180.1
19990.220.32431537917040.090.15
20000.180.43321088215030.090.19
20010.330.41452097525060.130.17
20020.220.44561547717090.160.2
20030.40.476312110140080.130.22
20040.240.52607511928090.150.23
20050.210.5665108123267.770.110.25
20060.260.577892125329.4160.210.24
20070.240.4873631433517.1160.220.22
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:1:p:135-153 Core in a simple coalition formation game (2001).
Cited: 56 times.

(2) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:4:p:655-708 A crash course in implementation theory (2001).
Cited: 43 times.

(3) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:4:p:639-653 Characterizations of Lorenz curves and income distributions (2000).
Cited: 37 times.

(4) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:3:p:431-464 The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting (2001).
Cited: 36 times.

(5) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:2:p:231-257 An axiomatic approach to sustainable development (1996).
Cited: 26 times.

(6) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:1:p:69-93 Multidimensional poverty indices (2002).
Cited: 24 times.

(7) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:4:p:557-567 Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods (1999).
Cited: 23 times.

(8) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:2:p:183-196 Intersecting generalized Lorenz curves and the Gini index (1999).
Cited: 22 times.

(9) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1997:i:4:p:513-525 Non-cooperative implementation of the core (1997).
Cited: 21 times.

(10) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:2:p:263-287 The measurement of opportunity inequality: a cardinality-based approach (1998).
Cited: 20 times.

(11) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:2:p:187-199 Opting out of publicly provided services: A majority voting result (1998).
Cited: 19 times.

(12) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:30:y:2008:i:1:p:119-173 Cross-country determinants of life satisfaction: exploring different determinants across groups in society (2008).
Cited: 17 times.

(13) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:24:y:2005:i:1:p:171-197 Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations (2005).
Cited: 16 times.

(14) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:2:p:455-471 Equality of opportunity: A progress report (2002).
Cited: 16 times.

(15) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:3:p:343-355 Redistribution and compensation (*) (1996).
Cited: 16 times.

(16) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:3:p:445-454 Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions (1998).
Cited: 15 times.

(17) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:21:y:2003:i:1:p:39-61 Farsighted stability in hedonic games (2003).
Cited: 15 times.

(18) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:3:p:533-558 Negatively interdependent preferences (2000).
Cited: 14 times.

(19) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1997:i:3:p:427-438 A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation (1997).
Cited: 14 times.

(20) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:2:p:349-367 Envy, malice and Pareto efficiency: An experimental examination (2002).
Cited: 14 times.

(21) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:4:p:567-582 Axiomatizations of the normalized Banzhaf value and the Shapley value (1998).
Cited: 14 times.

(22) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:3:p:349-371 On the power of poverty orderings (1999).
Cited: 14 times.

(23) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1997:i:1:p:67-80 Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights (1997).
Cited: 12 times.

(24) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:24:y:2005:i:1:p:155-169 Yardstick competition and political agency problems (2005).
Cited: 12 times.

(25) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:3:p:569-580 Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules (2002).
Cited: 12 times.

(26) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:57-64 Equitable opportunities in economic environments (1996).
Cited: 11 times.

(27) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:23:y:2004:i:1:p:1-20 Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003 (2004).
Cited: 11 times.

(28) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:23:y:2004:i:3:p:383-413 The McDonald’s Equilibrium. Advertising, empty calories, and the endogenous determination of dietary preferences (2004).
Cited: 11 times.

(29) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:4:p:619-653 An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions (2001).
Cited: 11 times.

(30) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:25:y:2005:i:2:p:457-474 Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting (2005).
Cited: 11 times.

(31) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:1:p:17-40 Consequences, opportunities, and procedures (1998).
Cited: 10 times.

(32) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:289-301 Characterizing uncertainty aversion through preference for mixtures (2001).
Cited: 10 times.

(33) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:24:y:2005:i:2:p:253-267 Multi-profile welfarism: A generalization (2005).
Cited: 10 times.

(34) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:97-112 Opportunity sets and individual well-being (1996).
Cited: 10 times.

(35) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:4:p:481-488 When is Condorcets Jury Theorem valid? (1998).
Cited: 10 times.

(36) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:129-145 Utilities, preferences, and substantive goods (1996).
Cited: 9 times.

(37) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:28:y:2007:i:4:p:529-565 A generalised model of judgment aggregation (2007).
Cited: 9 times.

(38) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:3:p:373-394 Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: A survey and open questions (1999).
Cited: 9 times.

(39) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:2:p:233-258 Using equivalent income of equivalent adults to rank income distributions (1999).
Cited: 9 times.

(40) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1997:i:4:p:479-502 Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case (1997).
Cited: 9 times.

(41) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:4:p:655-672 Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule (2000).
Cited: 9 times.

(42) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1997:i:1:p:113-119 Endogenous reference points and the adjusted proportional solution for bargaining problems with claims (1997).
Cited: 8 times.

(43) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:4:p:799-816 Horizontal inequity comparisons (2001).
Cited: 8 times.

(44) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:21:y:2003:i:2:p:243-263 The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian (2003).
Cited: 8 times.

(45) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:4:p:569-583 Cooperative production with unequal skills: The solidarity approach to compensation (1999).
Cited: 8 times.

(46) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:22:y:2004:i:1:p:187-210 Measuring and implementing equality of opportunity for income (2004).
Cited: 8 times.

(47) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:20:y:2003:i:3:p:457-465 How to cut a pizza fairly: Fair division with decreasing marginal evaluations (2003).
Cited: 8 times.

(48) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:1:p:179-191 More on preference and freedom (2001).
Cited: 8 times.

(49) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:20:y:2003:i:2:p:307-350 From preference to happiness: Towards a more complete welfare economics (2003).
Cited: 8 times.

(50) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:47-56 Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies (1996).
Cited: 8 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:aub:autbar:714.07 Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Gregarious Preferences (2007). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(2) RePEc:cep:stidar:93 Distributional Orderings: An Approach with Seven Flavours (2007). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE / STICERD - Distributional Analysis Research Programme Papers

(3) RePEc:cep:stipep:26 Group deliberation and the transformation ofjudgments: an impossibility result (2007). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE / STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series

(4) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6263 Choosing the Legal Retirement Age in Presence of Unemployment (2007). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(5) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2007008 Size Approval Voting (2007). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(6) RePEc:ema:worpap:2007-26 A comparison between the methods of apportionment using power indices: the case of the U.S. presidential election (2007). THEMA / Working papers

(7) RePEc:icr:wpicer:33-2007 Modelling Politics (2007). ICER - International Centre for Economic Research / ICER Working Papers

(8) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2618 Individual Well-Being in a Dynamic Perspective (2007). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(9) RePEc:kap:jecinq:v:5:y:2007:i:3:p:339-351 A deprivation-based axiomatic characterization of the absolute Bonferroni index of inequality (2007). Journal of Economic Inequality

(10) RePEc:nav:ecupna:0703 Size Approval Voting (2007). Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra / Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navar

(11) RePEc:oxf:wpaper:321 Inefficiencies on Linking Decisions (2007). University of Oxford, Department of Economics / Economics Series Working Papers

(12) RePEc:pab:wpaper:07.05 The Role of Mediation in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Negotiations. (2007). Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Departamento de Economi­a / Working Papers

(13) RePEc:sgc:wpaper:150 A short note on joint welfare maximization assumptions (2007). Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University / Working Papers

(14) RePEc:slp:islawp:islawp26 Asymmetric Bargaining (2007). ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy / ISLA Working Papers

(15) RePEc:spr:joecth:v:32:y:2007:i:3:p:589-594 Extreme inequality aversion without separability (2007). Economic Theory

(16) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:29:y:2007:i:1:p:19-33 Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation (2007). Social Choice and Welfare

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:cor:louvco:2006062 On the adjudication of conflicting claims: an experimental study (2006). Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) / Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5478 The European Commission - Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.10 A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games (2006). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers

(4) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.127 Formation of Segregated and Integrated Groups (2006). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers

(5) RePEc:mtl:montde:2006-03 Consistent Relations (2006). Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques / Cahiers de recherche

(6) RePEc:mtl:montde:2006-13 Non-Deteriorating Choice without Full Transitivity (2006). Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques / Cahiers de recherche

(7) RePEc:mtl:montde:2006-15 Population Ethics (2006). Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques / Cahiers de recherche

(8) RePEc:rif:dpaper:999 The European Commission - Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations (2006). The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy / Discussion Papers

(9) RePEc:rut:rutres:200629 Decentralizing Aid with Interested Parties (2006). Rutgers University, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers

(10) RePEc:rut:rutres:200630 Migrants, Ethnicity and Strategic Assimilation (2006). Rutgers University, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers

(11) RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:19:y:2006:i:4:p:703-723 The struggle over migration policy (2006). Journal of Population Economics

(12) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:1:p:25-28 Mixed Strategies in Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital–Intern Markets (2006). Social Choice and Welfare

(13) RePEc:spr:specre:v:8:y:2006:i:3:p:227-237 Composition, Securement, and Concede-and-divide (2006). Spanish Economic Review

(14) RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp6 The European Commission – Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations (2006). Aboa Centre for Economics / Discussion Papers

(15) RePEc:unu:wpaper:rp2006-06 Decentralizing Aid with Interested Parties (2006). World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) / Working Papers

(16) RePEc:upf:upfgen:900 Voting with Preferences over Margins of Victory (2006). Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Economics Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0068 The (Im)Possibility of a Paretian Rational (2005). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers

(2) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1531 Making Statements and Approval Voting (2005). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:ifr:wpaper:2006-02 Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare (2005). University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations / Working Papers

(4) RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2005-24 BARGAINING IN COMMITTEES OF REPRESENTATIVES: THE OPTIMAL VOTING RULE (2005). Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) / Working Papers. Serie AD

(5) RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:124:y:2005:i:3:p:329-352 Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation: (2005). Public Choice

(6) RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:125:y:2005:i:1:p:17-41 A critical reappraisal of some voting power paradoxes (2005). Public Choice

(7) RePEc:mtl:montde:2005-06 Intertemporal Social Evaluation (2005). Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques / Cahiers de recherche

Recent citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:aub:autbar:623.04 Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint (2004). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(2) RePEc:erp:eiopxx:p0117 Draft constitution and the decision-making rule for the Council of Ministers of the EU – Looking for alternative solution (2004). European Integration online Papers (EIoP)

(3) RePEc:esi:discus:2004-03 Senss Capability Approach to Welfare Economics (2004). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(4) RePEc:kap:jecinq:v:2:y:2004:i:1:p:11-30 Ranking Income Distributions According to Equality of Opportunity (2004). Journal of Economic Inequality

(5) RePEc:kap:theord:v:57:y:2004:i:1:p:5-24 A Comparison of Some Distance-Based Choice Rules in Ranking Environments (2004). Theory and Decision

(6) RePEc:mse:wpsorb:b04044 Médianes métriques et latticielles. (2004). Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) / Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques

(7) RePEc:rug:rugwps:04/240 Equality of opportunity versus equality of opportunity sets (2004). Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration / Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent Univers

(8) RePEc:tky:fseres:2004cf304 Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems (2004). CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo / CIRJE F-Series

(9) RePEc:usi:wpaper:429 Freedom, Time Constraints and Progressive Taxation (2004). Department of Economics, University of Siena / Experimental Economics

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

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