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Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.18 0 0 0 0.09 1997 0.18 0 0 0 0.09 1998 0.21 0 0 0 0.13 1999 0.29 0 0 0 0.17 2000 0.39 0 0 0 0.2 2001 0.37 0 0 0 0.18 2002 0.42 0 0 0 0.2 2003 0.43 1 6 0 0 0.21 2004 1 0.49 5 13 1 1 100 0.24 2005 0.5 0.5 12 28 6 3 33.3 7 0.58 0.29 2006 0.41 0.53 10 44 17 7 14.3 8 0.8 0.28 2007 0.27 0.44 5 9 22 6 0 1 0.2 0.24
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:dekel-04-08-13-01-21-07 Evolution of Preferences (2006).
Cited: 23 times.

(2) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:peters-04-02-18-01-42-09 The Pre-Marital Investment Game (2006).
Cited: 13 times.

(3) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:celik-04-09-13-05-42-19 Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision (2008).
Cited: 10 times.

(4) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:damiano-04-08-11-03-02-02 Unraveling of Dynamic Sorting (2004).
Cited: 8 times.

(5) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:norman-04-11-21-09-39-13 An Efficiency Rationale for Bundling of Public Goods (2005).
Cited: 8 times.

(6) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:damiano-05-01-25-10-08-07 Competing Matchmaking (2005).
Cited: 7 times.

(7) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:halevy-04-10-29-10-08-43 Strotz meets Allais: Diminishing Impatience and the Certainty Effect (2008).
Cited: 6 times.

(8) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:shneyerov-03-12-17-09-36-43 Convergence of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information to Perfect Competition (2003).
Cited: 6 times.

(9) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:damiano-05-03-21-12-21-58 Price Discrimination and Efficient Matching (2005).
Cited: 5 times.

(10) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:tan-04-01-24-10-08-06 Equilibria in Second Price Auctions with Participation Costs (2006).
Cited: 5 times.

(11) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:marmer-07-11-22-02-26-44 What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach (2007).
Cited: 4 times.

(12) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:damiano-05-01-25-10-14-13 First in village or second in Rome? (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(13) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:vadim_marmer-2008-14 Comparison of Misspecified Calibrated Models: The Minimum Distance Approach (2009).
Cited: 2 times.

(14) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:shneyerov-07-05-01-03-43-25 The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of a Simple Matching and Bargaining Mechanism (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(15) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:shneyerov-04-12-17-02-54-18 Dynamic Matching,Two-sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(16) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:robson-04-02-12-12-44-46 Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Bayesian Views (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(17) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:peters-05-03-30-03-06-03 Internet Auctions with Many Traders (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(18) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:peters-03-12-16-01-57-39 An Ascending Double Auction (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(19) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:halevy-04-10-29-09-59-47 Diminishing Impatience: Disentangling Time Preference from Uncertain Lifetime (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(20) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:shneyerov-07-05-01-03-38-04 Bilateral Matching and Bargaining with Private Information (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(21) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:norman-05-02-08-08-39-42 A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(22) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:peters-05-06-13-01-50-30 Unobservable Heterogeneity in Directed Search (2009).
Cited: 1 times.

(23) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:han-04-01-29-10-05-13 Menu Theorems for Bilateral Contracting (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(24) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:norman-05-04-22-05-35-30 Overcoming Participation Constraints (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(25) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:halevy-04-02-13-07-48-37 A Bayesian Approach to Uncertainty Aversion (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(26) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:han-05-12-02-10-57-12 A Bargaining Model of Tax Competition (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(27) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:halevy-05-07-26-11-51-13 Ellsberg Revisited: an Experimental Study (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(28) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:celik-05-05-09-03-55-40 Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:arx:papers:0710.0114 Reinforcement learning in market games (2007). arXiv.org / Quantitative Finance Papers

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000553 Job Market Signalling of Relative Position, or Becker Married to Spence (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(2) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000621 Which Inequality? The Inequality of Resources Versus the Inequality of Rewards (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(3) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5543 The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(4) RePEc:deg:conpap:c011_034 Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market (2006). Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade (DEGIT) / Conference Papers

(5) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2454 Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market (2006). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(6) RePEc:pra:mprapa:934 Endogenous entry and auctions design with private participation costs (2006). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(7) RePEc:pra:mprapa:943 Auctions design with private costs of valuation discovery (2006). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(8) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:peters-05-12-16-12-42-35 The Pre-Marital Investment Game: Addendum (2006). Microeconomics.ca Website / Micro Theory Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:fal:wpaper:05005 A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions? (2005). Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University / Working Papers

(2) RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-220 Competing for Talents (2005). University of Toronto, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(3) RePEc:trf:wpaper:85 The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals (2005). SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, University of Mannheim / Discussion Papers

(4) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:damiano-05-01-25-10-08-07 Competing Matchmaking (2005). Microeconomics.ca Website / Micro Theory Working Papers

(5) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:damiano-05-01-25-10-14-13 First in village or second in Rome? (2005). Microeconomics.ca Website / Micro Theory Working Papers

(6) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:norman-05-04-22-05-35-30 Overcoming Participation Constraints (2005). Microeconomics.ca Website / Micro Theory Working Papers

(7) RePEc:ubc:pmicro:norman-05-06-10-08-19-02 To Bundle or Not to Bundle (2005). Microeconomics.ca Website / Micro Theory Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2004

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Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.