Economics and Politics

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.09 0.18 15 16 32 3 0 0.08 1997 0.45 0.22 16 30 31 14 0 2 0.13 0.09 1998 0.16 0.25 14 56 31 5 0 0.1 1999 0.23 0.31 15 87 30 7 0 1 0.07 0.15 2000 0.14 0.42 15 222 29 4 0 4 0.27 0.19 2001 0.43 0.41 15 104 30 13 0 2 0.13 0.16 2002 0.7 0.44 15 42 30 21 0 1 0.07 0.2 2003 0.63 0.46 14 29 30 19 0 3 0.21 0.21 2004 0.48 0.51 15 73 29 14 0 10 0.67 0.23 2005 0.59 0.54 15 90 29 17 0 16 1.07 0.24 2006 0.87 0.56 16 44 30 26 0 4 0.25 0.24 2007 0.74 0.45 18 33 31 23 0 3 0.17 0.21 2008 0.65 0.5 16 16 34 22 4.5 7 0.44 0.24
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:7:y:1995:i:3:p:207-227 INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS-COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES (1995).
Cited: 280 times.

(2) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:1:p:1-31 The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth (2000).
Cited: 120 times.

(3) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:1:p:69-81 Causality and Feedback Between Institutional Measures and Economic Growth (2000).
Cited: 50 times.

(4) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:17-39 POLITICALLY CONTESTABLE RENTS AND TRANSFERS (1989).
Cited: 37 times.

(5) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:201-220 The Political Economy of the IRS (2001).
Cited: 30 times.

(6) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:3:y:1991:i:3:p:177-200 THE PARADOX OF POWER (1991).
Cited: 28 times.

(7) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:79-108 ELECTIONS AND THE THEORY OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: A SURVEY AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1992).
Cited: 27 times.

(8) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:2:y:1990:i:1:p:1-23 THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE REVIVAL OF TRADE: THE LAW MERCHANT, PRIVATE JUDGES, AND THE CHAMPAGNE FAIRS (1990).
Cited: 27 times.

(9) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:37-75 PROPOSAL FOR A NEW MEASURE OF CORRUPTION, ILLUSTRATED WITH ITALIAN DATA (2005).
Cited: 26 times.

(10) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:3:p:225-253 Aid, Taxation and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (1999).
Cited: 20 times.

(11) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:2:p:155-182 Corruption, Income Distribution, and Growth (2000).
Cited: 20 times.

(12) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:1-30 MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS IN OECD DEMOCRACIES (1992).
Cited: 20 times.

(13) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:1:p:1-27 Political Institutions and Policy Volatility (2004).
Cited: 20 times.

(14) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:177-213 WHICH VARIABLES EXPLAIN DECISIONS ON IMF CREDIT? AN EXTREME BOUNDS ANALYSIS (2005).
Cited: 19 times.

(15) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:2:y:1990:i:3:p:241-258 ARE EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS IN GOVERNMENT TRANSFER POLICIES SELF-DEFEATING IN POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM? (1990).
Cited: 19 times.

(16) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:3:p:275-297 Aid, Growth and Democracy (1999).
Cited: 19 times.

(17) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:171-199 Does Distributional Skewness Lead to Redistribution? Evidence from the United States (1999).
Cited: 18 times.

(18) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:2:y:1990:i:2:p:157-171 A THEORY OF KLEPTOCRACY WITH PROBABILISTIC SURVIVAL AND REPUTATION (1990).
Cited: 18 times.

(19) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:1:p:63-83 Political Control of Administrative Spending: The Case of Local Governments in Norway (1998).
Cited: 18 times.

(20) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:3:p:225-245 Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance (2000).
Cited: 18 times.

(21) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:129-157 Do Crises Induce Reform? Simple Empirical Tests of Conventional Wisdom (2001).
Cited: 17 times.

(22) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:4:y:1992:i:2:p:117-136 PROMISE KEEPING IN THE GREAT SOCIETY: A MODEL OF CREDIT INFORMATION SHARING (1992).
Cited: 17 times.

(23) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:9:y:1997:i:3:p:205-205 Introduction (1997).
Cited: 16 times.

(24) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:18:y:2006:i:3:p:339-365 PROMISES MADE, PROMISES BROKEN: A MODEL OF IMF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION (2006).
Cited: 16 times.

(25) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:3:y:1991:i:1:p:1-20 INTERNATIONAL TRADE BARGAINING AND THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE (1991).
Cited: 15 times.

(26) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:19:y:2007:i:3:p:317-344 THE QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (2007).
Cited: 14 times.

(27) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:4:y:1992:i:3:p:255-276 THE REVELATION OF INFORMATION THROUGH THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS (1992).
Cited: 14 times.

(28) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:1-35 ACCOUNTABILITY AND CORRUPTION: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS MATTER (2005).
Cited: 14 times.

(29) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:2:p:127-142 Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange (1998).
Cited: 13 times.

(30) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:14:y:2002:i:3:p:225-257 Democracy and the Variability of Economic Performance (2002).
Cited: 13 times.

(31) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:109-144 Do Gatt Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments? (1999).
Cited: 13 times.

(32) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i::p:321-345 VOTING TRANSPARENCY, CONFLICTING INTERESTS, AND THE APPOINTMENT OF CENTRAL BANKERS (2004).
Cited: 12 times.

(33) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:1:p:53-76 The Influence of IMF Programs on the Re-election of Debtor Governments (2004).
Cited: 12 times.

(34) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:3:p:275-295 Delays of Inflation Stabilizations (2000).
Cited: 12 times.

(35) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:18:y:2006:i:2:p:103-120 SOCIAL COHESION, INSTITUTIONS, AND GROWTH (2006).
Cited: 12 times.

(36) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:3:p:237-256 Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants: Evidence From Argentina (2001).
Cited: 11 times.

(37) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:3:p:311-342 Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality (2001).
Cited: 11 times.

(38) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:151-176 ELECTIONS AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY CYCLES (2005).
Cited: 11 times.

(39) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:1:p:1-17 Rationalizing the Political Business Cycle: A Workhorse Model (1998).
Cited: 10 times.

(40) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:15:y:2003:i:2:p:135-162 Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot Be Divorced from Its Governance (2003).
Cited: 10 times.

(41) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:3:y:1991:i:2:p:93-109 ON BUYING LEGISLATURES (1991).
Cited: 10 times.

(42) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:2:p:109-135 Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information (2000).
Cited: 9 times.

(43) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:2:p:117-146 Adjustments in Different Government Systems (2004).
Cited: 9 times.

(44) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:2:y:1990:i:2:p:193-221 THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY: ITS EXPLANATORY POWER FOR LDCs (1990).
Cited: 9 times.

(45) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:3:p:281-309 The ratification of ILO conventions: A hazard rate analysis (2001).
Cited: 9 times.

(46) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:21:y:2009:i:1:p:42-92 INSTABILITY AND THE INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTION (2009).
Cited: 9 times.

(47) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:9:y:1997:i:1:p:27-54 Politically Motivated Fiscal Deficits: Policy Issues in Closed and Open Economies (1997).
Cited: 8 times.

(48) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:14:y:2002:p:41-63 Private Investment and Political Institutions (2002).
Cited: 8 times.

(49) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:15:y:2003:i:3:p:225-246 Educational Policy: Egalitarian or Elitist? (2003).
Cited: 7 times.

(50) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:5:y:1993:i:2:p:85-104 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION: AN ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION (1993).
Cited: 7 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2008 | 2007 | 2006 | 2005

Recent citations received in: 2008

(1) RePEc:anp:en2008:200807181549410 The Choices Governors Make: The Roles of Checks and Balances and Political Competition (2008). ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics] / Anais do XXXVI Encontr

(2) RePEc:cam:camdae:0861 A Theory of the Corrupt Keynesian (2008). Faculty of Economics (formerly DAE), University of Cambridge / Cambridge Working Papers in Economics

(3) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6898 Do Interest Groups Affect US Immigration Policy? (2008). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(4) RePEc:eca:wpaper:2008_024 Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Is There a Substitution Effect? (2008). Université Libre de Bruxelles, Ecares / Working Papers

(5) RePEc:imf:imfwpa:08/244 Do Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy? (2008). International Monetary Fund / IMF Working Papers

(6) RePEc:pra:mprapa:10329 A Politico-Economic Analysis of the European Union’s R&D Policy (2008). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(7) RePEc:sol:wpaper:08-030 The not so dark side of trust: does trust increase the size of the shadow economy? (2008). Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Business School, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB) / Working Papers CEB

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3183 Do Interest Groups Affect Immigration? (2007). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4113 Location decisions of foreign banks and competitive advantage (2007). The World Bank / Policy Research Working Paper Series

(3) RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:19:y:2007:i:6:p:735-753 Trade facilitation, regulatory quality and export performance (2007). Journal of International Development

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:cgd:wpaper:85 The Economics of Young Democracies: Policies and Performance (2006). Center for Global Development / Working Papers

(2) RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/210 Growth and Reforms in Latin America: A Survey of Facts and Arguments (2006). International Monetary Fund / IMF Working Papers

(3) RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:128:y:2006:i:3:p:383-405 Everyone likes a winner: An empirical test of the effect of electoral closeness on turnout in a context of expressive voting (2006). Public Choice

(4) RePEc:pra:mprapa:553 The Economics of Young Democracies: Policies and Performance (2006). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:ags:aaea05:19544 Reelection Incentives and Political Corruption: Evidence from Brazilian Audit Reports (2005). American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) / 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Provide

(2) RePEc:cam:camdae:0540 Growth, Governance and Corruption in the Presence of Threshold Effects: Theory and Evidence (2005). Faculty of Economics (formerly DAE), University of Cambridge / Cambridge Working Papers in Economics

(3) RePEc:cem:jaecon:v:8:y:2005:n:2:p:203-225 Sustaining fixed rates: The political economy of currency pegs in Latin America (2005). Journal of Applied Economics

(4) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1502 Costly Revenue-Raising and the Case for Favoring Import-Competing Industries (2005). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(5) RePEc:csl:devewp:202 Prolonged Use and Conditionality Failure: Investigating the IMF Responsibility (2005). Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano / Development Working Papers

(6) RePEc:csl:devewp:206 IMF Concern for Reputation and Conditional Lending Failure: Theory and Empirics (2005). Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano / Development Working Papers

(7) RePEc:fgv:epgewp:597 Special Interests and Political Business Cycles (2005). Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil) / Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE)

(8) RePEc:idc:wpaper:idec05-5 Short-run and Long-run Effects of Corruption on Economic Growth: Evidence from State-Level Cross-Section Data for the United States (2005). International and Development Economics / International and Development Economics Working Papers

(9) RePEc:kof:wpskof:05-118 Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions (2005). Swiss Institute for Business Cycle Research (KOF), Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH), / Working papers

(10) RePEc:pra:mprapa:17772 The Shadowing Role of Redistributive Institutions in the Relationship Between Income Inequality and Redistribution (2005). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(11) RePEc:pra:mprapa:17773 The Role of Efficiency of Redistributive Institutions on Redistribution: An Empirical Assessment (2005). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(12) RePEc:pra:mprapa:8219 Measuring Governance Using Cross-Country Perceptions Data (2005). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(13) RePEc:taf:regstd:v:39:y:2005:i:5:p:603-617 Public capital and total factor productivity: New evidence from the Italian regions, 1970--98 (2005). Regional Studies

(14) RePEc:tky:fseres:2005cf348 Short-run and Long-run Effects of Corruption on Economic Growth: Evidence from State-Level Cross-Section Data for the United States (2005). CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo / CIRJE F-Series

(15) RePEc:usi:wpaper:447 IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: theory and empirics (2005). Department of Economics, University of Siena / Experimental Economics

(16) RePEc:wpa:wuwpit:0510016 Political and Public Finance Motives for Tariffs (2005). EconWPA / International Trade

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.