RAND Journal of Economics

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.18 0 0 0 0.08 1997 0.22 0 0 0 0.09 1998 0.25 0 0 0 0.1 1999 0.31 0 0 0 0.15 2000 0.42 0 0 0 0.19 2001 0.41 0 0 0 0.16 2002 0.44 0 0 0 0.2 2003 0.46 0 0 0 0.21 2004 0.51 0 0 0 0.23 2005 0.54 0 0 0 0.24 2006 0.56 0 0 0 0.24 2007 0.45 0 0 0 0.21 2008 0.5 51 88 0 0 21 0.41 0.24
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:1:p:86-114 Understanding strategic bidding in multi-unit auctions: a case study of the Texas electricity spot market (2008).
Cited: 11 times.

(2) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:3:p:617-635 Academic freedom, private-sector focus, and the process of innovation (2008).
Cited: 7 times.

(3) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:1:p:214-237 Market forces meet behavioral biases: cost misallocation and irrational pricing (2008).
Cited: 6 times.

(4) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:2:p:530-546 Durable goods and residential demand for energy and water: evidence from a field trial (2008).
Cited: 6 times.

(5) RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:2:p:209-233 Prominence and consumer search (2009).
Cited: 5 times.

(6) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:1:p:69-85 Properties of scoring auctions (2008).
Cited: 5 times.

(7) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:3:p:770-789 Buy-out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi-unit demands (2008).
Cited: 5 times.

(8) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:4:p:905-925 Contracting for information under imperfect commitment (2008).
Cited: 5 times.

(9) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:4:p:1042-1058 Price-increasing competition (2008).
Cited: 5 times.

(10) RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:1:p:1-19 Price discrimination in input markets (2009).
Cited: 5 times.

(11) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:2:p:509-529 Learning by bidding (2008).
Cited: 4 times.

(12) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:3:p:636-663 What changes energy consumption? Prices and public pressures (2008).
Cited: 4 times.

(13) RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:4:p:673-687 Rockets and feathers: Understanding asymmetric pricing (2009).
Cited: 4 times.

(14) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:1:p:20-40 Rules of proof, courts, and incentives (2008).
Cited: 4 times.

(15) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:2:p:403-433 Incentives and invention in universities (2008).
Cited: 4 times.

(16) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:2:p:547-564 Search with learning: understanding asymmetric price adjustments (2008).
Cited: 3 times.

(17) RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:1:p:20-46 An empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination (2009).
Cited: 3 times.

(18) RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:3:p:558-581 Comparative advertising: disclosing horizontal match information (2009).
Cited: 3 times.

(19) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:2:p:434-451 Optimal rewards in contests (2008).
Cited: 3 times.

(20) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:2:p:607-616 Laboratory evidence on the effectiveness of corporate leniency programs (2008).
Cited: 3 times.

(21) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:2:p:352-377 Costly contracting in a long-term relationship (2008).
Cited: 2 times.

(22) RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:1:p:103-119 Efficient tournaments within teams (2009).
Cited: 2 times.

(23) RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:3:p:424-454 A welfare analysis of spectrum allocation policies (2009).
Cited: 2 times.

(24) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:1:p:163-183 Imperfect competition and quality signalling (2008).
Cited: 2 times.

(25) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:2:p:378-402 Parallel imports and price controls (2008).
Cited: 2 times.

(26) RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:1:p:47-77 Managerial hedging, equity ownership, and firm value (2009).
Cited: 2 times.

(27) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:4:p:1080-1104 Trade costs and multimarket collusion (2008).
Cited: 2 times.

(28) RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:1:p:173-189 Costly participation and heterogeneous preferences in informational committees (2009).
Cited: 2 times.

(29) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:1:p:305-326 Status and incentives (2008).
Cited: 2 times.

(30) RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:3:p:509-532 Influencing the influencers: a theory of strategic diffusion (2009).
Cited: 2 times.

(31) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:2:p:452-468 Durable goods and conformity (2008).
Cited: 2 times.

(32) RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:2:p:283-295 Preferred suppliers in auction markets (2009).
Cited: 2 times.

(33) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:1:p:1-19 Imperfect durability and the Coase conjecture (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(34) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:4:p:1105-1125 Entrepreneurs and new ideas (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(35) RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:4:p:658-672 Market power, price discrimination, and allocative efficiency in intermediate-goods markets (2009).
Cited: 1 times.

(36) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:4:p:1059-1079 Specific knowledge and performance measurement (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(37) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:4:p:990-1017 Production targets (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(38) RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:2:p:234-257 The ownership of ratings (2009).
Cited: 1 times.

(39) RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:4:p:597-610 Efficiency out of disorder: Contested ownership in incomplete contracts (2009).
Cited: 1 times.

(40) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:3:p:683-698 Illinois Walls: how barring indirect purchaser suits facilitates collusion (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(41) RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:4:p:973-989 Communicating quality: a unified model of disclosure and signalling (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2008 | 2007 | 2006 | 2005

Recent citations received in: 2008

(1) RePEc:bgu:wpaper:0803 Sequential Two-Prize Contests (2008). Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(2) RePEc:cam:camdae:0863 Supply Function Equilibria: Step Functions and Continuous Representations (2008). Faculty of Economics (formerly DAE), University of Cambridge / Cambridge Working Papers in Economics

(3) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6756 On the Impact of Forward Contract Obligations in Multi-Unit Auctions (2008). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(4) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6769 Sequential Two-Prize Contests (2008). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(5) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6960 Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information (2008). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(6) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20080059 From Overt to Tacit Collusion (2008). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(7) RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0774 Strategic supply function competition with private information (2008). IESE Business School / IESE Research Papers

(8) RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp08-034 Comparing Price and Non-Price Approaches to Urban Water Conservation (2008). Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government / Working Paper Series

(9) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2008.66 Comparing Price and Non-price Approaches to Urban Water Conservation (2008). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers

(10) RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2008_13.rdf Design of Multidimensional Franchise Auctions by an Ignorant Principal (2008). Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche / Working Papers Series

(11) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3770 Motivating Altruism: A Field Study (2008). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(12) RePEc:kap:qmktec:v:6:y:2008:i:4:p:339-370 When auction meets fixed price: a theoretical and empirical examination of buy-it-now auctions (2008). Quantitative Marketing and Economics

(13) RePEc:lau:crdeep:09.03 Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity (2008). Université de Lausanne, Ecole des HEC, DEEP / Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP)

(14) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14147 Comparing Price and Non-Price Approaches to Urban Water Conservation (2008). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(15) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14226 Inventor Moral Hazard in University Licensing: The Role of Contracts (2008). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(16) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14402 Fixed Costs and Long-Lived Investments (2008). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(17) RePEc:net:wpaper:0821 Who thinks about the competition? Managerial ability and strategic entry in US local telephone markets (2008). NET Institute / Working Papers

(18) RePEc:net:wpaper:0829 Estimating search with learning (2008). NET Institute / Working Papers

(19) RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-08-22 Comparing Price and Non-price Approaches to Urban Water Conservation (2008). Resources For the Future / Discussion Papers

(20) RePEc:tob:wpaper:0814 Public Procurement Auctions and Competition in Turkey (2008). TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(21) RePEc:trf:wpaper:251 Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information (2008). SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, University of Mannheim / Discussion Papers

Recent citations received in: 2007

Recent citations received in: 2006

Recent citations received in: 2005

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.