UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.6 0.18 10 78 5 3 100 1 0.1 0.08 1997 0.42 0.18 24 154 12 5 80 7 0.29 0.09 1998 0.47 0.2 8 27 34 16 6.3 4 0.5 0.12 1999 0.28 0.27 15 115 32 9 0 8 0.53 0.16 2000 0.65 0.37 13 42 23 15 6.7 6 0.46 0.19 2001 0.5 0.37 36 272 28 14 21.4 14 0.39 0.18 2002 0.47 0.4 11 77 49 23 13 4 0.36 0.19 2003 0.89 0.41 69 149 47 42 7.1 18 0.26 0.2 2004 0.34 0.46 40 119 80 27 7.4 7 0.18 0.22 2005 0.32 0.47 33 55 109 35 2.9 7 0.21 0.27 2006 0.68 0.5 35 71 73 50 8 12 0.34 0.27 2007 0.41 0.43 32 92 68 28 0 24 0.75 0.22 2008 0.82 0.41 36 12 67 55 3.6 2 0.06 0.22
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:cla:levarc:1276 Debt Constrained Asset Markets (1993).
Cited: 158 times.

(2) RePEc:cla:levarc:394 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (1994).
Cited: 145 times.

(3) RePEc:cla:levarc:2058 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (1994).
Cited: 128 times.

(4) RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001080 Global Games: Theory and Applications (2001).
Cited: 96 times.

(5) RePEc:cla:levarc:563824000000000143 Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device (2001).
Cited: 85 times.

(6) RePEc:cla:levarc:1889 A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition (1997).
Cited: 73 times.

(7) RePEc:cla:levarc:508 Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (1989).
Cited: 70 times.

(8) RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000813 Sequential Equilibrium (2003).
Cited: 57 times.

(9) RePEc:cla:levarc:1098 Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information (1985).
Cited: 56 times.

(10) RePEc:cla:levarc:43 Asset Trading Mechanisms and Expansionary Policy (1991).
Cited: 53 times.

(11) RePEc:cla:levarc:2147 Self-Confirming Equilibrium (1993).
Cited: 48 times.

(12) RePEc:cla:levarc:238 Reputation and Imperfect Information (1999).
Cited: 47 times.

(13) RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000003 The Case Against Intellectual Property (2002).
Cited: 42 times.

(14) RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000000442 International Protection of Intellectual Property (2004).
Cited: 40 times.

(15) RePEc:cla:levarc:219 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games (1983).
Cited: 40 times.

(16) RePEc:cla:levarc:78 Does Market Incompleteness Matter (2001).
Cited: 35 times.

(17) RePEc:cla:levarc:228400000000000002 Market Size in Innovation: Theory and Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry (2004).
Cited: 34 times.

(18) RePEc:cla:levarc:625018000000000192 Perfectly Competitive Innovation (2002).
Cited: 34 times.

(19) RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001334 Who is “Behavioral”? Cognitive Ability and Anomalous Preferences (2006).
Cited: 31 times.

(20) RePEc:cla:levarc:1954 Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets (1996).
Cited: 29 times.

(21) RePEc:cla:levarc:227 On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements (1988).
Cited: 29 times.

(22) RePEc:cla:levarc:1873 Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies (1985).
Cited: 27 times.

(23) RePEc:cla:levarc:563824000000000155 The Spite Dilemma in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments (2001).
Cited: 27 times.

(24) RePEc:cla:levarc:2047 Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments (1997).
Cited: 22 times.

(25) RePEc:cla:levarc:321307000000000870 Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task (2007).
Cited: 22 times.

(26) RePEc:cla:levarc:470 Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play (1996).
Cited: 21 times.

(27) RePEc:cla:levarc:373 Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium (1993).
Cited: 21 times.

(28) RePEc:cla:levarc:2060 Strategy and Equity: An ERC Analysis of the Guth-van Damme Game (1998).
Cited: 20 times.

(29) RePEc:cla:levarc:596 Robust Permanent Income and Pricing (1997).
Cited: 18 times.

(30) RePEc:cla:levarc:627 Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (1994).
Cited: 18 times.

(31) RePEc:cla:levarc:220 Limit Games and Limit Equilibria (1986).
Cited: 17 times.

(32) RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000876 A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control (2005).
Cited: 16 times.

(33) RePEc:cla:levarc:784828000000000581 The Case for Mindless Economics (2005).
Cited: 15 times.

(34) RePEc:cla:levarc:172 Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (1999).
Cited: 15 times.

(35) RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000784 Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice (2003).
Cited: 14 times.

(36) RePEc:cla:levarc:592 Does Observation of Others Affect Learning in Strategic Environments? An Experimental Study (1997).
Cited: 14 times.

(37) RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001419 How Important is Money in the Conduct of Monetary Policy? (2007).
Cited: 14 times.

(38) RePEc:cla:levarc:471 Conditional Universal Consistency (1997).
Cited: 14 times.

(39) RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000748 Bertrand and Walras Equilibria Under Moral Hazard (2003).
Cited: 13 times.

(40) RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000000167 An Empirical Look at Software Patents (2004).
Cited: 13 times.

(41) RePEc:cla:levarc:81 Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (1999).
Cited: 13 times.

(42) RePEc:cla:levarc:96 When Are Agents Negligible? (1995).
Cited: 13 times.

(43) RePEc:cla:levarc:321307000000000880 Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies (2007).
Cited: 12 times.

(44) RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001148 Convergence: An Experimental Study (2006).
Cited: 11 times.

(45) RePEc:cla:levarc:624 The Theory of Learning in Games (1996).
Cited: 11 times.

(46) RePEc:cla:levarc:2092 Financial Contagion (1999).
Cited: 10 times.

(47) RePEc:cla:levarc:2028 Growth Cycles and Market Crashes (1999).
Cited: 10 times.

(48) RePEc:cla:levarc:2184 Regularity in Overlapping Generations Exchange Economies (1984).
Cited: 9 times.

(49) RePEc:cla:levarc:563824000000000090 A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity (2001).
Cited: 9 times.

(50) RePEc:cla:levarc:2122 Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population (2000).
Cited: 9 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2008 | 2007 | 2006 | 2005

Recent citations received in: 2008

(1) RePEc:ner:ucllon:http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/17321/ Comments on the potential significance of neuroeconomics for economic theory. (2008). University College London / Open Access publications from University College London

(2) RePEc:pra:mprapa:7928 Neuroeconomics: A Critique of Neuroeconomics: A Critical Reconsideration (2008). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0099 Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant (2007). Center for Economic and Financial Research / CEFIR Working Papers

(2) RePEc:chb:bcchwp:415 Defining Inflation Targets, the Policy Horizon and the Output-Inflation Tradeoff (2007). Central Bank of Chile / Working Papers Central Bank of Chile

(3) RePEc:cla:levarc:321307000000000875 Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy Tasks (2007). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(4) RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000009 Repeated Games with Frequent Signals (2007). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(5) RePEc:clu:wpaper:0607-06 Does a two-pillar Phillips curve justify a two-pillar monetary policy strategy? (2007). Columbia University, Department of Economics / Discussion Papers

(6) RePEc:col:000094:004291 La inflación y la política monetaria colombianas del período 1996-2006: una interpretación (2007). TITULARIZADORA COLOMBIANA / INFORMES

(7) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6447 Does a Two-Pillar Phillips Curve Justify a Two-Pillar Monetary Policy Strategy? (2007). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(8) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6451 Culture as Learning: The Evolution of Female Labour Force Participation Over a Century (2007). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(9) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6497 Vote-share Contracts and Democracy (2007). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(10) RePEc:cte:werepe:we077140 Knowledge disclosure as intellectual property rights (2007). Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía / Economics Working Papers

(11) RePEc:ecl:prirpe:03-10-2008 War and Endogenous Democracy (2007). Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy / Papers

(12) RePEc:edb:cedidp:07-13 DEMOCRATIZATION AND GROWTH (2007). Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University / CEDI Discussion Paper Series

(13) RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2007/57 Social Capital as Good Culture (2007).

(14) RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2007/58 Technology Adoption and the Selection Effect of Trade (2007).

(15) RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2007_030 Does Money Growth Granger-Cause Inflation in the Euro Area? Evidence from Out-of-Sample Forecasts Using Bayesian VARs (2007). Uppsala University, Department of Economics / Working Paper Series

(16) RePEc:igi:igierp:330 Institutions and Culture (2007). IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University / Working Papers

(17) RePEc:inn:wpaper:2007-29 Who is going to save us now? Bureaucrats, Politicians and Risky Tasks (2007). Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck / Working Papers

(18) RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2007-23 THE INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF GENDER ROLE ATTITUDES AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION (2007). Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) / Working Papers. Serie AD

(19) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2889 Should Market Liberalization Precede Democracy? Causal Relations between Political Preferences and Development (2007). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(20) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13373 Culture as Learning: The Evolution of Female Labor Force Participation over a Century (2007). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(21) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13546 The Impact of Milton Friedman on Modern Monetary Economics: Setting the Record Straight on Paul Krugmans Who Was Milton Friedman? (2007). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(22) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13712 Social Capital as Good Culture (2007). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(23) RePEc:pra:mprapa:5024 Forever Minus a Day? Some Theory and Empirics of Optimal Copyright (2007). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(24) RePEc:pse:psecon:2007-17 Should market liberalization precede democracy? Causal relations between political preferences and development (2007). PSE (Ecole normale supérieure) / PSE Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001299 The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Nash Equilibrium Procedures (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(2) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000364 Information Processing and Learning: Testing the Analogy-based Expectation Approach (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(3) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000391 Self-Control through Second-Order Preferences (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(4) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000541 Information Processing, Learning and Analogy-based Expectation: an Experiment (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(5) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6009 Competition Fosters Trust (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(6) RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp06-048 Who Misvotes? The Effect of Differential Cognition Costs on Election Outcomes (2006). Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government / Working Paper Series

(7) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2451 Who Misvotes? The Effect of Differential Cognition Costs on Election Outcomes (2006). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(8) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12365 Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much? (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(9) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12615 Time Preference, Time Discounting, and Smoking Decisions (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(10) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12709 Who Misvotes? The Effect of Differential Cognition Costs on Election Outcomes (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(11) RePEc:tky:fseres:2006cf415 Voluntarily Separable Prisoners Dilemma (2006). CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo / CIRJE F-Series

(12) RePEc:tky:fseres:2006cf450 Patterns of Non-exponential Growth of Macroeconomic Models: Two-parameter Poisson-Dirichlet Models (2006). CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo / CIRJE F-Series

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2005-007 Option Exercise with Temptation (2005). Department of Economics, Boston University / Boston University Working Papers Series

(2) RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000925 Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of Surplus from Creation (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(3) RePEc:cla:levarc:784828000000000034 Willpower and the Optimal Control of Visceral Urges (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(4) RePEc:cla:levarc:784828000000000576 Menu Choice, Environmental Cues and Temptation: A “Dual Self” Approach to Self-control (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(5) RePEc:cla:levrem:172782000000000073 The Brain as a Hierarchical Organization (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(6) RePEc:egc:wpaper:930 Deposit Collectors (2005). Economic Growth Center, Yale University / Working Papers

(7) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0501006 Buridans Ass and a Menu of Options. (2005). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.