Games and Economic Behavior

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.21 0.18 97 848 110 23 0 10 0.1 0.08 1997 0.28 0.22 63 514 146 41 0 15 0.24 0.09 1998 0.29 0.25 61 383 160 47 0 8 0.13 0.1 1999 0.23 0.31 63 436 124 29 0 13 0.21 0.15 2000 0.48 0.42 67 478 124 59 0 26 0.39 0.19 2001 0.36 0.41 75 393 130 47 0 20 0.27 0.16 2002 0.47 0.44 68 411 142 67 0 26 0.38 0.2 2003 0.45 0.46 87 503 143 64 0 24 0.28 0.21 2004 0.67 0.51 88 594 155 104 0 43 0.49 0.23 2005 0.95 0.54 80 412 175 167 0 50 0.63 0.24 2006 1.01 0.56 83 581 168 169 0 74 0.89 0.24 2007 1.06 0.45 81 281 163 173 0 51 0.63 0.21 2008 1.05 0.5 131 194 164 172 0 29 0.22 0.24
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:122-142 Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History (1995).
Cited: 368 times.

(2) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:2:p:293-315 A theory of reciprocity (2006).
Cited: 205 times.

(3) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:47:y:2004:i:2:p:268-298 A theory of sequential reciprocity (2004).
Cited: 178 times.

(4) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:3:p:346-380 Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games (1994).
Cited: 147 times.

(5) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:124-143 Potential Games (1996).
Cited: 132 times.

(6) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:2:y:1990:i:1:p:29-46 Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria (1990).
Cited: 119 times.

(7) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:387-424 The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction (1993).
Cited: 113 times.

(8) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:6-38 Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games (1995).
Cited: 104 times.

(9) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:60-79 Psychological games and sequential rationality (1989).
Cited: 101 times.

(10) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:3:p:347-369 Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments (1994).
Cited: 96 times.

(11) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:4:p:327-360 Renegotiation in repeated games (1989).
Cited: 96 times.

(12) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:2:p:170-190 Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs (1989).
Cited: 75 times.

(13) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:26:y:1999:i:2:p:286-336 A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures (1999).
Cited: 74 times.

(14) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:16:y:1996:i:2:p:181-191 Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games (1996).
Cited: 72 times.

(15) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:2:p:260-281 How to identify trust and reciprocity (2004).
Cited: 71 times.

(16) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:38:y:2002:i:2:p:201-230 The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures (2002).
Cited: 69 times.

(17) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:30:y:2000:i:2:p:163-182 Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game (2000).
Cited: 68 times.

(18) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:90-123 Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division (1996).
Cited: 67 times.

(19) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:20:y:1997:i:2:p:201-237 Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities (1997).
Cited: 60 times.

(20) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:95-121 Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining (1995).
Cited: 58 times.

(21) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:218-254 On Players Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence (1995).
Cited: 58 times.

(22) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:59:y:2007:i:1:p:17-45 A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness (2007).
Cited: 58 times.

(23) repec:eee:gamebe:v:44:y:2003:i:2:p:217-226 ().
Cited: 55 times.

(24) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:15:y:1996:i:2:p:132-148 Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games (1996).
Cited: 53 times.

(25) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:1:p:82-100 Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games (1991).
Cited: 52 times.

(26) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:2:y:1990:i:4:p:378-394 Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility (1990).
Cited: 47 times.

(27) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:320-367 Learning Mixed Equilibria (1993).
Cited: 46 times.

(28) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:4:p:295-326 Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games (1989).
Cited: 45 times.

(29) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:13:y:1996:i:1:p:100-110 Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs (1996).
Cited: 42 times.

(30) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:19:y:1997:i:1:p:46-76 Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results (1997).
Cited: 42 times.

(31) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:425-454 An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction (1993).
Cited: 39 times.

(32) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:1:p:62-91 Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game (1994).
Cited: 39 times.

(33) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:4:p:514-531 Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games (1993).
Cited: 39 times.

(34) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:1:p:1-24 Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism (2006).
Cited: 39 times.

(35) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:79-109 Social Norms and Random Matching Games (1995).
Cited: 38 times.

(36) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:37:y:2001:i:1:p:161-169 The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games (2001).
Cited: 38 times.

(37) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:13-24 The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations (1999).
Cited: 38 times.

(38) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:34:y:2001:i:2:p:331-341 A Dynamic Model of Network Formation (2001).
Cited: 38 times.

(39) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:3:p:445-468 A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects (1994).
Cited: 38 times.

(40) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:62:y:2008:i:1:p:287-303 Testing theories of fairness--Intentions matter (2008).
Cited: 36 times.

(41) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:43:y:2003:i:1:p:57-85 Networks of collaboration in oligopoly (2003).
Cited: 35 times.

(42) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:55:y:2006:i:2:p:297-320 Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction (2006).
Cited: 35 times.

(43) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:21:y:1997:i:1-2:p:40-55 Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium (1997).
Cited: 35 times.

(44) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:12:y:1996:i:2:p:187-218 Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoners Dilemma Games (1996).
Cited: 35 times.

(45) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:41:y:2002:i:2:p:265-291 On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games (2002).
Cited: 34 times.

(46) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:4:p:467-486 Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders (1991).
Cited: 33 times.

(47) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:52:y:2005:i:2:p:460-492 Modeling internal commitment mechanisms and self-control: A neuroeconomics approach to consumption-saving decisions (2005).
Cited: 32 times.

(48) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:20:y:1997:i:1:p:3-24 On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall (1997).
Cited: 32 times.

(49) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:1-18 Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case (1996).
Cited: 31 times.

(50) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:1:p:118-132 Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis (1993).
Cited: 30 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2008 | 2007 | 2006 | 2005

Recent citations received in: 2008

(1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0086 Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design (2008). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers

(2) RePEc:awi:wpaper:0470 Multiple Priors as Similarity Weighted Frequencies (2008). University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(3) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse21_2008 Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information (2008). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers

(4) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001896 Inequality, Happiness and Relative Concerns: What Actually is their Relationship? (2008). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(5) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6807 Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? (2008). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(6) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200873 The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure (2008). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(7) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2008018 Non-cooperative Support for the Asymmetric Nash Bargaining solution (2008). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(8) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2008026 The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure (2008). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(9) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20080034 Simultaneous Pooled Auctions with Multiple Bids and Preference Lists (2008). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(10) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20080076 Positive Expectations Feedback Experiments and Number Guessing Games as Models of Financial Markets (2008). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(11) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20080083 The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure (2008). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(12) RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2008:i:21:p:1-9 On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit (2008). Economics Bulletin

(13) RePEc:edj:ceauch:256 Pricing with markups in industries with increasing marginal costs (2008). Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile / Documentos de Trabajo

(14) RePEc:esi:evopap:2008-11 Generalized projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory (2008). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group / Papers on Econonmics and Evolution

(15) RePEc:got:cegedp:77 The Right of Withdrawal in the Treaty of Lisbon: A game theoretic reflection on different decision processes in the EU (2008). Center for Globalization and Europeanization of the Economy, University of Goettingen (Germany). / CeGE Discussion Papers

(16) RePEc:gue:guelph:2008-5 The Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts (2008). University of Guelph, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(17) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0707 Contracts and Promises - An Approach to Pre-play Agreements (2008). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

(18) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0708 Analogy-based Expectations and the Partially Cursed Equilibrium (2008). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

(19) RePEc:kap:jecinq:v:6:y:2008:i:4:p:351-372 Inequality, happiness and relative concerns: What actually is their relationship? (2008). Journal of Economic Inequality

(20) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14618 Ex Ante Efficiency in School Choice Mechanisms: An Experimental Investigation (2008). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(21) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1467 The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of Matching and Bargaining Mechanisms (2008). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(22) RePEc:pit:wpaper:334 Macroeconomics: A Survey of Laboratory Research (2008). University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(23) RePEc:pra:mprapa:10189 Average tree solutions for graph games (2008). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(24) RePEc:pra:mprapa:7687 The Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts (2008). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(25) RePEc:pra:mprapa:8412 The Discursive Dilemma and Probabilistic Judgement Aggregation (2008). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(26) RePEc:uam:wpaper:200901 The Power of Words: Why Communication fosters Cooperation and Efficiency (2008). Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis / Working Papers

(27) RePEc:usn:usnawp:21 An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game (2008). United States Naval Academy Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers

(28) RePEc:uta:papers:2008_20 The Power of Reasoning: Experimental Evidence (2008). University of Utah, Department of Economics / Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah

(29) RePEc:wrk:warwec:877 The Optimal Choice of Pre-launch Reviewer : How Best to Transmit Information using Tests and Conditional Pricing (2008). University of Warwick, Department of Economics / The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:ags:uersrr:6391 Could Behavioral Economics Help Improve Diet Quality for Nutrition Assistance Program Participants? (2007). United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service / Economic Research Report

(2) RePEc:arx:papers:0706.4432 The minority game: An economics perspective (2007). arXiv.org / Quantitative Finance Papers

(3) RePEc:aub:autbar:677.07 Inequity Version and Team Incentives (2007). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(4) RePEc:aub:autbar:682.07 Organisational structure, communication and group ethics (2007). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(5) RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-7 The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence (2007). Brown University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(6) RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2007-05 Network Architecture and Traffic Flows: Experiments on the Pigou-Knight-Downs and Braess Paradoxes (2007). The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham / Discussion Papers

(7) RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2007-11 The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia (2007). The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham / Discussion Papers

(8) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000850 Social Memory and Evidence from the Past (2007). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(9) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000926 A `Super Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games (2007). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(10) RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000374 What to Put on the Table (2007). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(11) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6257 Unbundling Ownership and Control (2007). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(12) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6476 Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices (2007). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(13) RePEc:cte:werepe:we072010 An experiment on markets and contracts : do social preferences determine corporate culture? (2007). Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía / Economics Working Papers

(14) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1601 Social Memory and Evidence from the Past (2007). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(15) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200753 The Minority Game: An Economics Perspective (2007). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(16) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200757 A General Framework for Cooperation under Uncertainty (2007). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(17) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2007003 First-Price Equilibrium and Revenue Equivalence in a Sequential Procurement Auction Model (2007). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(18) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2007017 Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (2007). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(19) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2007020 Combinatorial Scoring Auctions (2007). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(20) RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:37:p:1-7 Information sharing in emerging credit markets (2007). Economics Bulletin

(21) RePEc:edj:ceauch:237 What to put in the table (2007). Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile / Documentos de Trabajo

(22) RePEc:ema:worpap:2007-05 Road Traffic Congestion and Public Information: An Experimental Investigation (2007). THEMA / Working papers

(23) RePEc:exc:wpaper:2007-11 Trust in Private and Common Property Experiments (2007). Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University / Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series

(24) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.87 Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter (2007). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers

(25) RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~07-07-01 Social Memory and Evidence from the Past (2007). Georgetown University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(26) RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243060_v1 Tax avoidance and the political appeal of progressivity (2007). HAL / Working Papers

(27) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0674 Reciprocity in young children (2007). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

(28) RePEc:ide:wpaper:5969 Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group (2007). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(29) RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2007-21 DOWNSTREAM MERGERS AND ENTRY (2007). Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) / Working Papers. Serie AD

(30) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3200 Deception and Incentives: How Dishonesty Undermines Effort Provision (2007). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(31) RePEc:kap:theord:v:62:y:2007:i:4:p:311-333 Stochastic Evolution of Rules for Playing Finite Normal Form Games (2007). Theory and Decision

(32) RePEc:lau:crdeep:07.05 Fair ultimatum: an experimental study of the Myerson value (2007). Université de Lausanne, Ecole des HEC, DEEP / Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP)

(33) RePEc:man:sespap:0702 Existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in electoral competition games: The hybrid case (2007). School of Economics, The University of Manchester / The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series

(34) RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:0708 What Norms Trigger Punishment (2007). Middlebury College, Department of Economics / Middlebury College Working Paper Series

(35) RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2006_25 Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoners Dilemma Games (2007). Max Planck Institute for Reserach on Collective Goods / Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Reserach on Collective Goods

(36) RePEc:ner:maastr:urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-18235 Weak monotonicity and Bayes? Nash incentive compatibility. (2007). Maastricht University / Open Access publications from Maastricht University

(37) RePEc:ner:maastr:urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-23068 Preferences over income distributions: experimental evidence. (2007). Maastricht University / Open Access publications from Maastricht University

(38) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1448 Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (2007). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(39) RePEc:nys:sunysb:07-03 Aggregate Uncertainty in the Citizen Candidate Model Yields Extremist Parties (2007). SUNY-Stony Brook, Department of Economics / Department of Economics Working Papers

(40) RePEc:oxf:wpaper:304 The Possible and the Impossible in Multi-Agent Learning (2007). University of Oxford, Department of Economics / Economics Series Working Papers

(41) RePEc:pit:wpaper:326 Campaign Rhetoric and the Hide-and-Seek Game (2007). University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(42) RePEc:pra:mprapa:2202 Perfect Competition (2007). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(43) RePEc:pra:mprapa:4051 Conformism and Cooperation in a Local Interaction Model (2007). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(44) RePEc:pra:mprapa:4321 Equilibrium Vengeance (2007). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(45) RePEc:pra:mprapa:5258 Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks (2007). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(46) RePEc:pra:mprapa:9143 Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities (2007). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(47) RePEc:pur:prukra:1201 Cooperation among strangers: an experiment with indefinite interaction (2007). Purdue University, Department of Economics / Purdue University Economics Working Papers

(48) RePEc:roc:wallis:wp50 Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in electoral competition games: The hybrid case (2007). University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy / Wallis Working Papers

(49) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2007:i:1:p:119-135 Imitation, coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium (2007). International Journal of Game Theory

(50) RePEc:van:wpaper:0703 Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling (2007). Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University / Working Papers

(51) RePEc:wsu:wpaper:tgsmith-2 Why the Poor Get Fat: Weight Gain and Economic Insecurity (2007). School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University / Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:3:p:602-629 An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous (2006). American Economic Review

(2) RePEc:ags:aaea06:21276 Estimating Heterogeneous Primal Capacity and Capacity Utilization Measures in a Multi-Species Fishery (2006). American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) / 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Be

(3) RePEc:aub:autbar:664.06 (When) Would I Lie To You? Comment on ?Deception: The Role of Consequences? (2006). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(4) RePEc:aub:autbar:668.06 Weighted Approval Voting (2006). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(5) RePEc:bbk:bbkefp:0614 Links and Architecture in Village Networks (2006). Birkbeck, School of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics / Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance

(6) RePEc:bol:bodewp:559 A Rationale for Searching (Imprecise) Health Information (2006). Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna / Working Papers

(7) RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2006-11 Demand Bargaining and Proportional Payoffs in Legislatures (2006). The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham / Discussion Papers

(8) RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2006-14 An Experiment on Spatial Price Competition (2006). The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham / Discussion Papers

(9) RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2006-21 Private-Collective Innovation and the Fragility of Knowledge Sharing (2006). The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham / Discussion Papers

(10) RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2006-22 Counterintuitive Number Effects in Experimental Oligopolies (2006). The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham / Discussion Papers

(11) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1782 The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions (2006). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(12) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1794 Institution Formation in Public Goods Games (2006). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(13) RePEc:cir:cirwor:2006s-12 Who Gets the Last Word? An Experimental Study of the Effect of a Peer Review Process on the Expression of Social Norms (2006). CIRANO / CIRANO Working Papers

(14) RePEc:cir:cirwor:2006s-30 A Simple Test of Learning Theory (2006). CIRANO / CIRANO Working Papers

(15) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000042 Pinocchios Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth-telling and Deception in Games (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(16) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000092 Moral Norms in a Partly Compliant Society (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(17) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000256 Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winners Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(18) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000457 The Canonical Type Space for Interdependent Preferences (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(19) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000547 Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(20) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000724 A Simple Test of Learning Theory (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(21) RePEc:cor:louvco:2006004 Contests with heterogeneous agents (2006). Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) / Discussion Papers

(22) RePEc:cor:louvco:2006062 On the adjudication of conflicting claims: an experimental study (2006). Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) / Discussion Papers

(23) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5532 Competition and Well-Being (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(24) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5538 On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(25) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5789 Homo Reciprocans: Survey Evidence on Prevalence, Behaviour and Success (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(26) RePEc:cra:wpaper:2006-16 Rewarding Honest Taxpayers? Evidence on the Impact of Rewards from Field Experiments (2006). Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) / CREMA Working Paper Series

(27) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1554 Caller Number Five: Timing Games that Morph from One Form to Another (2006). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(28) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006003 Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof or Maskin Monotonic Choice Rules (2006). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(29) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006029 Institution Formation in Public Goods Games (2006). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(30) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006038 Weighted Approval Voting (2006). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(31) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060037 Gift Exchange and the Separation of Ownership and Control (2006). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(32) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060104 Does Stake Size matter for Cooperation and Punishment? (2006). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(33) RePEc:eab:macroe:1142 Expectations, Animal Spirits, and Evolutionary Dynamics (2006). East Asian Bureau of Economic Research / Macroeconomics Working Papers

(34) RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp06-022 Core and Periphery in Endogenous Networks (2006). Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government / Working Paper Series

(35) RePEc:edn:esedps:153 A Simple Test of Learning Theory? (2006). Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh / ESE Discussion Papers

(36) RePEc:esi:discus:2006-01 Are preferences complete? An experimental measurement of indecisiveness under risk (2006). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(37) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.80 Inequity Aversion May Increase Inequity (2006). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers

(38) RePEc:gat:wpaper:0604 Punishment, Inequality and Emotions (2006). Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure / W

(39) RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00142866_v1 Punishment, Inequality and Emotions (2006). HAL / Post-Print

(40) RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00175045_v1 Punishment, Inequality and Emotions (2006). HAL / Post-Print

(41) RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0219 Bridging the Great Divide in South Africa: Inequality and Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods (2006). Göteborg University, Department of Economics / Working Papers in Economics

(42) RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0221 A Note on the Risk Behavior and Death of Homo Economicus (2006). Göteborg University, Department of Economics / Working Papers in Economics

(43) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0629 Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium (2006). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

(44) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0634 Organizational Structure as the Channeling of Boundedly Rational Pre-play Communication (2006). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

(45) RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0109 Reciprocity and Payment Schemes: When Equality Is Unfair (2006). The Ratio Institute / Ratio Working Papers

(46) RePEc:hit:hituec:a473 Axiomatic barganing theory on opportunity assignments (2006). Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University / Discussion Paper Series

(47) RePEc:inu:caeprp:2006005 The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods (2006). Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington / Caepr Working Papers

(48) RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2006-24 AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF CONDITIONAL COOPERATION (2006). Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) / Working Papers. Serie AD

(49) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2119 Punishment, Inequality and Emotions (2006). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(50) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2205 Homo Reciprocans: Survey Evidence on Prevalence, Behavior and Success (2006). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(51) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2288 Institution Formation in Public Goods Games (2006). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(52) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2500 Reciprocity and Payment Schemes: When Equality Is Unfair (2006). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(53) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:9:y:2006:i:3:p:193-208 Decomposing trust and trustworthiness (2006). Experimental Economics

(54) RePEc:kap:theord:v:61:y:2006:i:3:p:191-204 Formation of a Communication Network Under Perfect Foresight (2006). Theory and Decision

(55) RePEc:lam:wpaper:06-10 An empirical study of determinants in decision-making process (2006). LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier / Working Papers

(56) RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2006-05 Existence of Nash Networks in One-Way Flow Models (2006). Department of Economics, Louisiana State University / Departmental Working Papers

(57) RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2006-18 Heterogeneity in Nash Networks (2006). Department of Economics, Louisiana State University / Departmental Working Papers

(58) RePEc:max:cprwps:86 Estimating Heterogeneous Capacity and Capacity Utilization in a Multi-Species Fishery (2006). Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University / Center for Policy Research Working Papers

(59) RePEc:mcl:mclwop:2006-11 WHO GETS THE LAST WORD? AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF A PEER REVIEW PROCESS ON THE EXPRESSION OF SOCIAL NORMS (2006). McGill University, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers

(60) RePEc:mse:wpsorb:bla06063 Group and individual risk preferences : a lottery-choice experiment. (2006). Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) / Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques

(61) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12588 Optimal Inequality/Optimal Incentives: Evidence from a Tournament (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(62) RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-189390 Essays on Auctions. (2006). Tilburg University / Open Access publications from Tilburg University

(63) RePEc:noj:journl:v:32:y:2006:p:93-112 Unaffected Strangers Affect Contributions (2006). Nordic Journal of Political Economy

(64) RePEc:pse:psecon:2006-38 The strategy structure of some coalition formation games (2006). PSE (Ecole normale supérieure) / PSE Working Papers

(65) RePEc:pur:prukra:1181 A Trackable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness. (2006). Purdue University, Department of Economics / Purdue University Economics Working Papers

(66) RePEc:pur:prukra:1188 Peer Punishment in Teams: Emotional or Strategic Choice? (2006). Purdue University, Department of Economics / Purdue University Economics Working Papers

(67) RePEc:sef:csefwp:169 Are Disadvantaged Bidders Doomed in Ascending Auctions? (2006). Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy / CSEF Working Papers

(68) RePEc:siu:wpaper:10-2006 Expectations, Animal Spirits, and Evolutionary Dynamics (2006). Singapore Management University, School of Economics / Working Papers

(69) RePEc:spr:cejnor:v:14:y:2006:i:4:p:435-454 Positioning of new brands in an experiment (2006). Central European Journal of Operations Research

(70) RePEc:spr:jeicoo:v:1:y:2006:i:2:p:147-169 Can boundedly rational sellers learn to play Nash? (2006). Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination

(71) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:35:y:2006:i:1:p:129-150 Naive audience and communication bias (2006). International Journal of Game Theory

(72) RePEc:use:tkiwps:0611 Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations (2006). Utrecht School of Economics / Working Papers

(73) RePEc:yca:wpaper:2006_7 Auctions with Almost Homogeneous Bidders (2006). York University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(74) RePEc:zur:iewwpx:288 Environmental Morale and Motivation (2006). Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW / IEW - Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0050 Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games (2005). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers

(2) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0059 Minorities and Storable Votes (2005). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers

(3) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0060 A Simple Scheme to Improve the Efficiency of Referenda (2005). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers

(4) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:2:p:340-345 The Neuroeconomics of Mind Reading and Empathy (2005). American Economic Review

(5) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse33_2005 Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2x2 Games (2005). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers

(6) RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-01 Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games (2005). Brown University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(7) RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-02 An Axiomatization of the Inner Core Using Appropriate Reduced Games (2005). Brown University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(8) RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_564_0829 Anomalies de la théorie des préférences. Une interprétation et une proposition de formalisation (2005). Revue économique

(9) RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2005-08 Enlargement and the Balance of Power: an Experimental Study (2005). The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham / Discussion Papers

(10) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1583 Minorities and Storable Votes (2005). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(11) RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000876 A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(12) RePEc:cla:levarc:784828000000000034 Willpower and the Optimal Control of Visceral Urges (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(13) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000914 The Swing Voters Curse in the Laboratory (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(14) RePEc:cla:levrem:172782000000000073 The Brain as a Hierarchical Organization (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(15) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000116 Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(16) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000205 The Brain as a Hierarchical Organization (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(17) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000476 Modeling the Psychology of Consumer and Firm Behavior with Behavioral Economics (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(18) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000539 Discussion of BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(19) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000609 Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(20) RePEc:clu:wpaper:0506-02 Minorities and storable votes (2005). Columbia University, Department of Economics / Discussion Papers

(21) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5278 Minorities and Storable Votes (2005). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(22) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5291 Efficiency, Equity and Timing in Voting Mechanisms (2005). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(23) RePEc:cte:werepe:we055726 INFORMATION TRANSMISSION IN COALITIONAL VOTING GAMES (2005). Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía / Economics Working Papers

(24) RePEc:ctl:louvec:2005036 Networks of Manufacturers and Retailers (2005). Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques / Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Workin

(25) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1479r Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2005). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(26) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1503 Aggregation of Expert Opinions (2005). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(27) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1519 Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces (2005). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(28) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2005117 Learning to be Prepared (2005). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(29) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200553 An Axiomatization of Minimal Curb Sets (2005). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(30) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200584 Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs (2005). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(31) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200594 The Cutting Power of Preparation (2005). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(32) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2005018 The Coordinate-Wise Core for Multiple-Type Housing Markets is Second-Best Incentive Compatible (2005). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(33) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2005053 A Reason for Sophisticated Investors not to seize Arbitrage Opportunities in Markets without Frictions (2005). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(34) RePEc:ecl:prirpe:03-13-2006 The Swing Voters Curse in the Laboratory (2005). Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy / Papers

(35) RePEc:edn:esedps:135 Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria (2005). Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh / ESE Discussion Papers

(36) RePEc:emo:wp2003:0507 Temptation and Self-Control: Some Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (2005). Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta) / Emory Economics

(37) RePEc:gue:guelph:2005-7 Competitive Burnout: Theory and Experimental Evidence. (2005). University of Guelph, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(38) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0583 The cutting power of preparation (2005). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

(39) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0589 An axiomatization of minimal curb sets (2005). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

(40) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0590 Learning to be prepared (2005). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

(41) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1890 Affect as a Source of Motivation in the Workplace: A New Model of Labor Supply, and New Field Evidence on Income Targeting and the Goal Gradient (2005). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(42) RePEc:kap:mktlet:v:16:y:2005:i:3:p:375-386 Decision Neuroscience (2005). Marketing Letters

(43) RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2005-13 Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs (2005). Department of Economics, Louisiana State University / Departmental Working Papers

(44) RePEc:pen:papers:05-014 Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2005). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(45) RePEc:pen:papers:05-016 Aggregation of Expert Opinions (2005). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(46) RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0507001 Enlargement and the Balance of Power: An Experimental Study (2005). EconWPA / Experimental

(47) RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0511006 Auctions with Anticipated Regret (2005). EconWPA / Experimental

(48) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0503010 Dynamic Behavior in Minimum Effort Coordination Games - Some Theory of Group Size and Inter-Group Competition as Coordination Devices (2005). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(49) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0407005 Rationalizing Boundedly Rational Choice: Sequential Rationalizability and Rational Shortlist Methods. (2005). EconWPA / Microeconomics

(50) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0510014 Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations over a Single Good (2005). EconWPA / Microeconomics

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.