International Review of Law and Economics

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.01 0.18 34 71 69 1 0 1 0.03 0.08 1997 0.03 0.22 41 111 64 2 0 1 0.02 0.09 1998 0.07 0.25 31 86 75 5 0 2 0.06 0.1 1999 0.18 0.31 33 81 72 13 0 0.15 2000 0.17 0.42 30 91 64 11 0 0.19 2001 0.13 0.41 18 42 63 8 0 2 0.11 0.16 2002 0.27 0.44 32 61 48 13 0 4 0.13 0.2 2003 0.24 0.46 28 44 50 12 0 3 0.11 0.21 2004 0.22 0.51 30 43 60 13 0 3 0.1 0.23 2005 0.16 0.54 37 33 58 9 0 3 0.08 0.24 2006 0.22 0.56 33 24 67 15 0 4 0.12 0.24 2007 0.2 0.45 16 8 70 14 0 0.21 2008 0.2 0.5 30 18 49 10 0 3 0.1 0.24
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:6:y:1986:i:1:p:45-58 The judgment proof problem (1986).
Cited: 42 times.

(2) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:3:p:371-382 On the joint use of liability and safety regulation (2000).
Cited: 21 times.

(3) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:4:p:509-520 Judicial detection skill and contractual compliance (1997).
Cited: 20 times.

(4) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:1:p:75-87 Casual police corruption and the economics of crime (1997).
Cited: 19 times.

(5) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:1:p:75-106 Socioeconomic and demographic factors of crime in Germany: Evidence from panel data of the German states (2000).
Cited: 17 times.

(6) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:2:y:1982:i:1:p:47-65 Evaluating choice (1982).
Cited: 16 times.

(7) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:15:y:1995:i:1:p:109-126 The effects of criminality and conviction on the labor market status of young British offenders (1995).
Cited: 16 times.

(8) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:11:y:1991:i:1:p:3-10 Optimal criminal procedure: Fairness and deterrence (1991).
Cited: 14 times.

(9) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:13:y:1993:i:2:p:217-224 Optimal sanctions and differences in individuals likelihood of avoiding detection (1993).
Cited: 13 times.

(10) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:1:p:35-51 Casual police corruption and the economics of crime:: Further results (2000).
Cited: 13 times.

(11) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:2:p:275-293 Using decoupling and deep pockets to mitigate judgment-proof problems1 (1999).
Cited: 12 times.

(12) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:12:y:1992:i:2:p:263-279 A positive theory of statutory interpretation (1992).
Cited: 12 times.

(13) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:6:y:1986:i:1:p:101-105 Optimal subsidies and damages in the presence of judicial error (1986).
Cited: 12 times.

(14) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:8:y:1988:i:1:p:109-116 The deterrent effects of settlements and trials (1988).
Cited: 12 times.

(15) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:18:y:1998:i:3:p:341-359 Dissolving the relationship between divorce laws and divorce rates (1998).
Cited: 11 times.

(16) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:10:y:1990:i:3:p:233-239 Re-examining liability rules when injurers as well as victims suffer losses (1990).
Cited: 11 times.

(17) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:1:p:21-34 Efficient standards of due care: Should courts find more parties negligent under comparative negligence? (1994).
Cited: 11 times.

(18) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:22:y:2002:i:2:p:193-216 Rent-seeking through litigation: adversarial and inquisitorial systems compared (2002).
Cited: 11 times.

(19) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:12:y:1992:i:3:p:345-355 A note on marginal deterrence (1992).
Cited: 10 times.

(20) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:4:p:467-477 A positive theory of legal change (1994).
Cited: 10 times.

(21) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:3:p:273-281 Pretrial negotiations with asymmetric information on risk preferences (1994).
Cited: 10 times.

(22) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:2:y:1982:i:1:p:3-27 The optimum enforcement of laws and the concept of justice: A positive analysis (1982).
Cited: 10 times.

(23) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:10:y:1990:i:3:p:271-284 The social value of crime? (1990).
Cited: 10 times.

(24) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:3:p:431-447 The burden of proof in civil litigation: A simple model of mechanism design (1997).
Cited: 10 times.

(25) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:1:p:21-33 Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort (2000).
Cited: 9 times.

(26) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:28:y:2008:i:2:p:106-112 Customary versus technological advancement tests (2008).
Cited: 9 times.

(27) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:21:y:2002:i:4:p:359-372 Secured debt and the likelihood of reorganization (2002).
Cited: 9 times.

(28) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:16:y:1996:i:3:p:315-327 FOCJ: Competitive governments for Europe (1996).
Cited: 9 times.

(29) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:24:y:2004:i:2:p:209-218 The advantage of focusing law enforcement effort (2004).
Cited: 9 times.

(30) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:5:y:1985:i:1:p:3-13 A model in which suits are brought for their nuisance value (1985).
Cited: 9 times.

(31) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:4:p:393-409 The capture of wealth by monopolists and the protection of property rights (1994).
Cited: 9 times.

(32) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:2:p:203-213 The optimal level of corporate liability given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their employees (1997).
Cited: 8 times.

(33) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:13:y:1993:i:3:p:239-257 Should employees be subject to fines and imprisonment given the existence of corporate liability? (1993).
Cited: 8 times.

(34) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:2:p:179-192 Incentive compatibility constraints as an explanation for the use of prison sentences instead of fines (1997).
Cited: 8 times.

(35) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:2:p:227-244 Combining regulation and legal liability for the control of external costs (1999).
Cited: 8 times.

(36) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:1:p:103-119 Does conviction have a persistent effect on income and employment? (1994).
Cited: 8 times.

(37) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:16:y:1996:i:2:p:259-276 Limited liability and the requirement to purchase insurance (1996).
Cited: 8 times.

(38) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:1:p:31-61 Mandatory rotation of company auditors: A critical examination (1997).
Cited: 8 times.

(39) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:18:y:1998:i:3:p:305-324 On offense history and the theory of deterrence (1998).
Cited: 8 times.

(40) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:3:p:295-317 Contingent fees and litigation settlement1 (1999).
Cited: 8 times.

(41) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:21:y:2001:i:3:p:287-307 Collective wage setting when wages are generally binding An antitrust perspective (2001).
Cited: 8 times.

(42) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:10:y:1990:i:2:p:161-171 The influence of litigation costs on deterrence under strict liability and under negligence (1990).
Cited: 8 times.

(43) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:23:y:2003:i:1:p:1-29 Voting control in German corporations (2003).
Cited: 8 times.

(44) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:23:y:2003:i:3:p:253-259 A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders (2003).
Cited: 8 times.

(45) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:16:y:1996:i:1:p:81-99 The political economy of immigration policies (1996).
Cited: 8 times.

(46) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:18:y:1998:i:2:p:187-200 Capital structure, priority rules, and the settlement of civil claims (1998).
Cited: 7 times.

(47) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:1:p:47-68 Do punitive damages promote deterrence?1 (1999).
Cited: 7 times.

(48) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:25:y:2005:i:2:p:209-228 Law and Economics of Obligations (2005).
Cited: 7 times.

(49) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:21:y:2001:i:2:p:197-211 Collective coherence? (2001).
Cited: 7 times.

(50) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:10:y:1990:i:1:p:3-27 The effect of frivolous lawsuits on the settlement of litigation (1990).
Cited: 7 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2008 | 2007 | 2006 | 2005

Recent citations received in: 2008

(1) RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp837 Is Being Soft on Crime the Solution to Rising Crime Rates?: Evidence from Germany (2008). DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research / Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin

(2) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3710 Is Being Soft on Crime the Solution to Rising Crime Rates? Evidence from Germany (2008). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:zbw:zewdip:7521 Crime and the Labour Market: Evidence from a Survey of Inmates (2008). ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research / ZEW Discussion Papers

Recent citations received in: 2007

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp320 Legal capital: an outdated concept (2006). ESRC Centre for Business Research / ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers

(2) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060070 Limiting Limited Liability (2006). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:11:y:2006:i:1:p:1-7 Limiting Limited Liability (2006). Economics Bulletin

(4) RePEc:yor:yorken:06/16 Valuation of the Firms Liabilities when Equity Holders are also Creditors (2006). Department of Economics, University of York / Discussion Papers

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000507 Asset Pricing Implications of Pareto Optimality with Private Information (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(2) RePEc:fiu:wpaper:0517 Cadaveric vs. Live-Donor Kidney Transplants: The Interaction of Institutions and Inequality (2005). Florida International University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(3) RePEc:gla:glaewp:2005_25 CADAVERIC VS. LIVE-DONOR KIDNEY TRANSPLANTS: THE INTERACTION OF INSTITUTIONS AND INEQUALITY (2005). Department of Economics, University of Glasgow / Working Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.