Journal of Law, Economics and Organization

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.33 0.18 20 162 40 13 0 0.08 1997 0.34 0.22 18 209 41 14 0 5 0.28 0.09 1998 0.37 0.25 19 100 38 14 0 1 0.05 0.1 1999 0.51 0.31 34 770 37 19 0 8 0.24 0.15 2000 0.77 0.42 20 223 53 41 0 1 0.05 0.19 2001 0.83 0.41 19 101 54 45 0 1 0.05 0.16 2002 0.82 0.44 20 138 39 32 0 14 0.7 0.2 2003 0.62 0.46 20 160 39 24 0 5 0.25 0.21 2004 0.83 0.51 22 60 40 33 0 5 0.23 0.23 2005 0.9 0.54 22 77 42 38 0 7 0.32 0.24 2006 0.77 0.56 21 73 44 34 0 8 0.38 0.24 2007 0.67 0.45 31 12 43 29 0 2 0.06 0.21 2008 0.56 0.5 21 21 52 29 0 7 0.33 0.24
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:222-79 The Quality of Government. (1999).
Cited: 513 times.

(2) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:0:p:24-52 Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. (1991).
Cited: 193 times.

(3) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:2:p:181-214 Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations. (1986).
Cited: 102 times.

(4) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:8:y:1992:i:3:p:523-46 The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform. (1992).
Cited: 81 times.

(5) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:3:y:1987:i:2:p:243-77 Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control. (1987).
Cited: 80 times.

(6) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:74-102 The Firm as a Subeconomy. (1999).
Cited: 60 times.

(7) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:2:p:201-46 The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation. (1994).
Cited: 60 times.

(8) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:2:p:335-61 Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment. (1995).
Cited: 59 times.

(9) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:18:y:2002:i:1:p:221-277 Courts and Relational Contracts (2002).
Cited: 59 times.

(10) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:13:y:1997:i:1:p:1-25 The (1997).
Cited: 57 times.

(11) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:141-61 The Theory of the Firm Revisited. (1988).
Cited: 53 times.

(12) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:1:p:1-24 The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach. (1996).
Cited: 51 times.

(13) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:13:y:1997:i:2:p:387-409 Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach. (1997).
Cited: 49 times.

(14) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:2:p:279-303 Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards. (1986).
Cited: 42 times.

(15) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:2:p:407-26 The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy. (1994).
Cited: 42 times.

(16) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:6:y:1990:i:2:p:381-409 Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency. (1990).
Cited: 42 times.

(17) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:56-73 Informal Authority in Organizations. (1999).
Cited: 41 times.

(18) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:0:p:84-105 Privatization and Incentives. (1991).
Cited: 41 times.

(19) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:1:y:1985:i:1:p:101-24 Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition. (1985).
Cited: 37 times.

(20) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:230-55 Judicial Modification of Contracts between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach. (1993).
Cited: 37 times.

(21) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:1:p:205-26 Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History. (1995).
Cited: 36 times.

(22) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:2:p:334-64 The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment. (2000).
Cited: 36 times.

(23) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:1:p:1-25 The Costs of Organization. (1991).
Cited: 34 times.

(24) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:19:y:2003:i:1:p:119-140 Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments (2003).
Cited: 34 times.

(25) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:1:p:1-32 The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement. (1986).
Cited: 32 times.

(26) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:8:y:1992:i:2:p:321-45 Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective. (1992).
Cited: 32 times.

(27) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:95-117 Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence. (1988).
Cited: 32 times.

(28) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:1:p:1-31 The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development. (1995).
Cited: 31 times.

(29) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:19:y:2003:i:2:p:281-306 The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina (2003).
Cited: 30 times.

(30) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:5:y:1989:i:1:p:109-26 Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry. (1989).
Cited: 29 times.

(31) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:1:p:1-49 A Theory of Legal Presumptions. (2000).
Cited: 27 times.

(32) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:2:p:365-94 On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias. (2000).
Cited: 27 times.

(33) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:199-213 Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited. (1988).
Cited: 26 times.

(34) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:6:y:1990:i:0:p:213-53 Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story. (1990).
Cited: 25 times.

(35) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:14:y:1998:i:2:p:205-31 Why Dont More Households File for Bankruptcy? (1998).
Cited: 25 times.

(36) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:205-29 Monopolization by Sequential Acquisition. (1993).
Cited: 25 times.

(37) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:1:p:25-61 The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier. (1996).
Cited: 24 times.

(38) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:1:p:155-65 Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests. (2000).
Cited: 24 times.

(39) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:181-98 A Legal Basis for the Firm. (1988).
Cited: 24 times.

(40) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:2:p:201-28 Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form. (1991).
Cited: 24 times.

(41) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:306-42 Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective. (1999).
Cited: 23 times.

(42) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:2:p:395-423 Contract Renegotiation and Options in Agency Problems. (2000).
Cited: 23 times.

(43) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:119-39 Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm. (1988).
Cited: 23 times.

(44) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:1:y:1985:i:2:p:225-83 Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle. (1985).
Cited: 23 times.

(45) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:1:p:150-63 A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules. (1995).
Cited: 23 times.

(46) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:1:p:142-59 Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany. (1994).
Cited: 23 times.

(47) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:659-84 Optimal Soft or Tough Bankruptcy Procedures. (1999).
Cited: 23 times.

(48) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:637-58 Dispute Prevention without Courts in Vietnam. (1999).
Cited: 22 times.

(49) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:1:p:214-33 The Formation of Cooperative Relationships. (1996).
Cited: 22 times.

(50) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:18:y:2002:i:2:p:428-454 An Experimental Bribery Game (2002).
Cited: 22 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2008 | 2007 | 2006 | 2005

Recent citations received in: 2008

(1) RePEc:aah:aarhec:2008-16 Aligning Ambition and Incentives (2008). Department of Economics, University of Aarhus / Department of Economics, Working Papers

(2) RePEc:ags:aaea08:6204 Statutory Rewards to Environmental Self-Auditing: Do They Reduce Pollution and Save Regulatory Costs? Evidence from a Cross-State Panel (2008). American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) / 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, O

(3) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060111 Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations (2008). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(4) RePEc:emo:wp2003:0810 The Economics of Search Warrants (2008). Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta) / Emory Economics

(5) RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:134:y:2008:i:3:p:247-254 Voting to anger and to please others (2008). Public Choice

(6) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14239 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs (2008). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(7) RePEc:net:wpaper:0826 WHO BENEFITS FROM ONLINE PRIVACY? (2008). NET Institute / Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:ide:wpaper:7804 The Market for Lawyers: The Value of Information on the Quality of Legal Services. (2007). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(2) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:10:y:2007:i:4:p:439-454 Amended final-offer arbitration over an uncertain value: A comparison with CA and FOA (2007). Experimental Economics

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_575_1065 Limpact des politiques répressives sur loffre de drogues illicites. Une revue de la littérature théorique (2006). Revue économique

(2) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1673 Evaluation of Researchers: A Life Cycle Analysis of German Academic Economists (2006). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(3) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1847 Should Courts always Enforce what Contracting Parties Write? (2006). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(4) RePEc:knz:hetero:0608 Evaluation of researchers : a life cycle analysis of German academic economists (2006). Research Group Heterogeneous Labor, University of Konstanz/ZEW Mannheim / Working Papers of the Research Group Heterogenous Labor

(5) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12209 Buy, Lobby or Sue: Interest Groups Participation in Policy Making - A Selective Survey (2006). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(6) RePEc:pen:papers:06-024 Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (2006). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(7) RePEc:pra:mprapa:1550 The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence (2006). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(8) RePEc:qed:wpaper:1107 Work-Related Perks, Agency Problems, and Optimal Incentive Contracts (2006). Queen's University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:aea:jecper:v:19:y:2005:i:2:p:99-120 The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond (2005). Journal of Economic Perspectives

(2) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1605 Policy-induced Internal Migration: An Empirical Investigation of the Canadian Case (2005). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(3) RePEc:dkn:econwp:eco_2005_17 Leviathan Resists: The Endogenous Relationship Between Privatisation and Firm Performance. (2005). Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance / Economics Series

(4) RePEc:ecl:stabus:1846r Co-worker Complementarity and the Stability of Top Management Teams (2005). Stanford University, Graduate School of Business / Research Papers

(5) RePEc:trn:utwpde:0517 From Planning to Mature: on the Determinants of Open Source Take Off (2005). Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia / Department of Economics Working Papers

(6) RePEc:use:tkiwps:0532 Bargaining in Mergers: The Role of Outside Options and Termination Provisions (2005). Utrecht School of Economics / Working Papers

(7) RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0507006 From Planning to Mature: on the Determinants of Open Source Take-Off (2005). EconWPA / Industrial Organization

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.