Review of Economic Design

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.14 0.18 19 37 22 3 33.3 2 0.11 0.08 1997 0.22 6 20 19 0 0.09 1998 0.12 0.25 16 42 25 3 0 0.1 1999 0.23 0.31 22 84 22 5 0 1 0.05 0.15 2000 0.21 0.42 18 1 38 8 0 0.19 2001 0.18 0.41 13 0 40 7 0 0.16 2002 0.44 24 36 31 0 1 0.04 0.2 2003 0.03 0.46 55 23 37 1 0 1 0.02 0.21 2004 0.08 0.51 24 18 79 6 0 2 0.08 0.23 2005 0.09 0.54 16 10 79 7 0 1 0.06 0.24 2006 0.56 15 14 40 0 2 0.13 0.24 2007 0.19 0.45 18 14 31 6 0 3 0.17 0.21 2008 0.06 0.5 21 6 33 2 0 2 0.1 0.24
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:173-203 Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments (1994).
Cited: 22 times.

(2) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:1-14 Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions (1994).
Cited: 20 times.

(3) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:35-55 Responsibility, talent, and compensation: A second-best analysis (1999).
Cited: 20 times.

(4) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:193-209 On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making (1996).
Cited: 14 times.

(5) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:13-33 Monotonic extensions on economic domains (1999).
Cited: 14 times.

(6) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:371-387 Efficient venture capital financing combining debt and equity (1998).
Cited: 9 times.

(7) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:57-72 Feasible implementation of taxation methods (1999).
Cited: 8 times.

(8) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2004:i:4:p:383-411 Organizations and overlapping generations games: Memory, communication, and altruism (2004).
Cited: 8 times.

(9) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:75-91 Achieving the first best in sequencing problems (2002).
Cited: 7 times.

(10) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:27-43 Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory (2002).
Cited: 7 times.

(11) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:29-43 Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods (1997).
Cited: 7 times.

(12) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:45-56 How to get firms to invest: A simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation (2002).
Cited: 6 times.

(13) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:307-343 A profit-center game with incomplete information (1999).
Cited: 6 times.

(14) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:2:p:205-215 Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems (2003).
Cited: 6 times.

(15) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:2:p:137-147 Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market (1998).
Cited: 6 times.

(16) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:45-55 Redistribution and individual characteristics (1997).
Cited: 6 times.

(17) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2004:i:4:p:359-372 Link bidding in laboratory networks (2004).
Cited: 6 times.

(18) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:275-287 Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets (1994).
Cited: 6 times.

(19) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:2:p:93-127 The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Efficient networks (1998).
Cited: 6 times.

(20) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:461-480 First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge (2002).
Cited: 6 times.

(21) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:295-305 Organizational restructuring in response to changes in information-processing technology (1999).
Cited: 6 times.

(22) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:237-255 A mechanism design approach to an optimal contract under ex ante and ex post private information (1998).
Cited: 6 times.

(23) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:255-272 Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem (1999).
Cited: 6 times.

(24) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:329-345 Managerial costs for one-shot decentralized information processing (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

(25) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:1-12 Decision-making under risk: Editing procedures based on correlated similarities, and preference overdetermination (1999).
Cited: 5 times.

(26) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:3:p:269-292 Optimal design of trade institutions (2003).
Cited: 5 times.

(27) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:10:y:2006:i:3:p:183-203 Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists (2006).
Cited: 5 times.

(28) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2005:i:2:p:73-90 The condominium problem; auctions for substitutes (2005).
Cited: 4 times.

(29) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:357-379 Taxation in an economy with private provision of public goods (1999).
Cited: 4 times.

(30) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:147-162 Replicating Walrasian equilibria using markets for membership in labor-managed firms (1996).
Cited: 4 times.

(31) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:75-89 Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian (1997).
Cited: 4 times.

(32) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:371-396 Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment (2002).
Cited: 4 times.

(33) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:311-324 Double implementation of the Lindahl equilibrium by a continuous mechanism (1996).
Cited: 3 times.

(34) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:195-213 Fair allocation in a general model with indivisible goods (1998).
Cited: 3 times.

(35) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:89-97 A continuous double implementation of the constrained Walras equilibrium (1996).
Cited: 3 times.

(36) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:3:p:249-268 Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules (2003).
Cited: 3 times.

(37) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:69-100 The theory of contests: a survey (2007).
Cited: 3 times.

(38) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:413-428 Trust and social efficiencies (2002).
Cited: 3 times.

(39) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:257-269 Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior (1998).
Cited: 3 times.

(40) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:273-292 Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment (1999).
Cited: 3 times.

(41) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:1:p:85-98 Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions (2003).
Cited: 3 times.

(42) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:139-163 Endogenous coalition formation in contests (2007).
Cited: 3 times.

(43) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:325-337 Double implementation of the ratio correspondence by a market mechanism (1996).
Cited: 3 times.

(44) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:215-236 On durable goods monopolies and the Coase-Conjecture (1998).
Cited: 3 times.

(45) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:15-27 The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Essential networks (1997).
Cited: 3 times.

(46) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:381-387 Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness (1999).
Cited: 3 times.

(47) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:379-397 Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly (1996).
Cited: 3 times.

(48) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:2:p:121-141 Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions with costly information (2003).
Cited: 3 times.

(49) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:10:y:2006:i:2:p:73-84 New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule (2006).
Cited: 3 times.

(50) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:12:y:2008:i:2:p:75-117 Matching, search and intermediation with two-sided heterogeneity (2008).
Cited: 2 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2008 | 2007 | 2006 | 2005

Recent citations received in: 2008

(1) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1472 Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses (2008). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:wrk:warwec:858 Regulating a Monopolist with unknown costs and unknown quality capacity (2008). University of Warwick, Department of Economics / The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2007-27 ALL-PAY AUCTION EQUILIBRIA IN CONTESTS (2007). Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) / Working Papers. Serie AD

(2) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2007:i:2:p:177-207 Fair and efficient student placement with couples (2007). International Journal of Game Theory

(3) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:69-100 The theory of contests: a survey (2007). Review of Economic Design

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2006-26 Fixed priced plus rationing: An experiment (2006). Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) / Working Papers. Serie AD

(2) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:2:p:231-249 The TAL-Family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems (2006). Social Choice and Welfare

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:ucn:wpaper:200525 Auctioning Horizontally Differentiated Items (2005). School Of Economics, University College Dublin / Working Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.