Theoretical Economics

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.18 0 0 0 0.08 1997 0.18 0 0 0 0.09 1998 0.2 0 0 0 0.12 1999 0.27 0 0 0 0.16 2000 0.37 0 0 0 0.19 2001 0.37 0 0 0 0.18 2002 0.4 0 0 0 0.19 2003 0.41 0 0 0 0.2 2004 0.46 0 0 0 0.22 2005 0.47 0 0 0 0.27 2006 0.5 18 101 0 0 12 0.67 0.27 2007 1.17 0.43 16 58 18 21 0 12 0.75 0.22 2008 1.12 0.41 17 21 34 38 0 5 0.29 0.22
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:the:publsh:144 Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations (2006).
Cited: 19 times.

(2) RePEc:the:publsh:266 Group formation and voter participation (2006).
Cited: 11 times.

(3) RePEc:the:publsh:263 Noisy talk (2007).
Cited: 10 times.

(4) RePEc:the:publsh:139 A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets (2006).
Cited: 9 times.

(5) RePEc:the:publsh:199 Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent (2006).
Cited: 8 times.

(6) RePEc:the:publsh:309 Can intergenerational equity be operationalized? (2007).
Cited: 8 times.

(7) RePEc:the:publsh:140 Interim correlated rationalizability (2007).
Cited: 8 times.

(8) RePEc:the:publsh:164 A model of choice from lists (2006).
Cited: 8 times.

(9) RePEc:the:publsh:163 Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability (2006).
Cited: 7 times.

(10) RePEc:the:publsh:166 Information, evolution and utility (2006).
Cited: 7 times.

(11) RePEc:the:publsh:159 Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria (2006).
Cited: 7 times.

(12) RePEc:the:publsh:229 Secure implementation (2007).
Cited: 6 times.

(13) RePEc:the:publsh:223 Coarse contingencies and ambiguity (2007).
Cited: 6 times.

(14) RePEc:the:publsh:141 Topologies on types (2006).
Cited: 6 times.

(15) RePEc:the:publsh:165 Financial equilibrium with career concerns (2006).
Cited: 6 times.

(16) RePEc:the:publsh:215 Updating preferences with multiple priors (2007).
Cited: 5 times.

(17) RePEc:the:publsh:203 Optimal auctions with ambiguity (2006).
Cited: 5 times.

(18) RePEc:the:publsh:399 Strategy-proofness and single-crossing (2009).
Cited: 5 times.

(19) RePEc:the:publsh:326 Consumer optimism and price discrimination (2008).
Cited: 4 times.

(20) RePEc:the:publsh:168 Competitive markets with externalities (2006).
Cited: 4 times.

(21) RePEc:the:publsh:277 A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence (2007).
Cited: 4 times.

(22) RePEc:the:publsh:334 Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces (2008).
Cited: 4 times.

(23) RePEc:the:publsh:211 A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach (2006).
Cited: 4 times.

(24) RePEc:the:publsh:398 Many inspections are manipulable (2008).
Cited: 3 times.

(25) RePEc:the:publsh:194 Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics (2008).
Cited: 3 times.

(26) RePEc:the:publsh:176 Party platforms in electoral competition with heterogeneous constituencies (2007).
Cited: 3 times.

(27) RePEc:the:publsh:317 Cold feet (2007).
Cited: 3 times.

(28) RePEc:the:publsh:182 Ex post implementation in environments with private goods (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(29) RePEc:the:publsh:153 Contracts and uncertainty (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(30) RePEc:the:publsh:294 Complementarities in information acquisition with short-term trades (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(31) RePEc:the:publsh:375 Caller Number Five and related timing games (2008).
Cited: 2 times.

(32) RePEc:the:publsh:336 Nonlinear pricing, market coverage, and competition (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(33) RePEc:the:publsh:240 Repeated games with incomplete information on one side (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(34) RePEc:the:publsh:427 Topologies on types: Correction (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(35) RePEc:the:publsh:157 Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(36) RePEc:the:publsh:225 Delay aversion (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(37) RePEc:the:publsh:416 Contagion through learning (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(38) RePEc:the:publsh:370 Credible ratings (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(39) RePEc:the:publsh:442 Asymptotic ordinal inefficiency of random serial dictatorship (2009).
Cited: 1 times.

(40) RePEc:the:publsh:425 Rationalizable voting (2010).
Cited: 1 times.

(41) RePEc:the:publsh:167 Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(42) RePEc:the:publsh:453 Robust virtual implementation (2009).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2008 | 2007 | 2006 | 2005

Recent citations received in: 2008

(1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0085 Log-linear Dynamics and Local Potential (2008). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers

(2) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2420 Speculative Attacks: A Laboratory Study in Continuous Time (2008). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(3) RePEc:pen:papers:08-014 Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests (2008). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(4) RePEc:pen:papers:08-015 Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests (2008). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(5) RePEc:rut:rutres:200807 Log-linear Dynamics and Local Potential (2008). Rutgers University, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1958 Majority-efficiency and Competition-efficiency in a Binary Policy Model (2007). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(2) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2171 American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity Contest? (2007). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(3) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001638 Common Belief Foundations of Global Games (2007). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(4) RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000210 Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors (2007). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(5) RePEc:cte:werepe:we081207 The theory of implementation : what did we learn? (2007). Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía / Economics Working Papers

(6) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2007017 Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (2007). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(7) RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0699 Secure Implementation in Economies with Indivisible Objects and Money (2007). Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University / ISER Discussion Paper

(8) RePEc:gue:guelph:2007-8 American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity Contest? (2007). University of Guelph, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(9) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2993 Choice Over Time (2007). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(10) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1448 Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (2007). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(11) RePEc:pra:mprapa:6288 Paretian evaluation of infinite utility streams: an egalitarian criterion (2007). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(12) RePEc:pra:mprapa:6300 American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity Contest? (2007). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001188 Interim Correlated Rationalizability (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(2) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001211 Metastable Equilibria (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(3) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000272 Two Comments on the Principle of Revealed Preference (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(4) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5538 On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox (2006). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(5) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006003 Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof or Maskin Monotonic Choice Rules (2006). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(6) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006041 Farsightedly Stable Networks (2006). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(7) RePEc:fip:fedmsr:383 Private monitoring with infinite histories (2006). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis / Staff Report

(8) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1417 Topologies on Type (2006). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(9) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1438 Voting in small networks with cross-pressure (2006). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(10) RePEc:pen:papers:07-007 Mediocracy (2006). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(11) RePEc:roc:wallis:wp43 Robust Rational Turnout (2006). University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy / Wallis Working Papers

(12) RePEc:roc:wallis:wp44 Robust Rational Turnout (2006). University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy / Wallis Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2005

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Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.