International Game Theory Review (IGTR)

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Create citation feed for this series

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.18 0 0 0 0.08 1997 0.22 0 0 0 0.09 1998 0.25 0 0 0 0.1 1999 0.31 0 0 0 0.15 2000 0.42 0 0 0 0.19 2001 0.41 0 0 0 0.16 2002 0.44 0 0 0 0.2 2003 0.46 0 0 0 0.21 2004 0.51 0 0 0 0.23 2005 0.54 33 11 0 0 0.24 2006 0.56 46 7 33 0 2 0.04 0.24 2007 0.04 0.45 47 20 79 3 0 1 0.02 0.21 2008 0.06 0.5 35 6 93 6 0 0.24
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:353-360 THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES (2007).
Cited: 6 times.

(2) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:p:63-72 AN AXIOM SYSTEM FOR A VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM (2005).
Cited: 6 times.

(3) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:01:p:105-118 BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION (2007).
Cited: 4 times.

(4) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:01:p:53-72 FRIENDLINESS AND RECIPROCITY IN EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION (2008).
Cited: 3 times.

(5) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:127-139 PROPORTIONALITY AND NON-MANIPULABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(6) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:04:p:599-635 NETWORK FORMATION UNDER HETEROGENEOUS COSTS: THE MULTIPLE GROUP MODEL (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(7) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:02:p:211-228 HELPING AND SABOTAGING IN TOURNAMENTS (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(8) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:p:43-61 CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(9) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:p:257-278 COMPUTING ALTERNATING OFFERS AND WATER PRICES IN BILATERAL RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT (2008).
Cited: 2 times.

(10) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:307-322 MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(11) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:21-31 HERDING WITH COSTLY INFORMATION (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(12) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:p:25-42 CONVEXITY IN STOCHASTIC COOPERATIVE SITUATIONS (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(13) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:347-351 COMPETITIVE TAX EVASION AND TRANSFER PRICES (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(14) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:02:p:185-218 GUARANTEED INERTIA FUNCTIONS IN DYNAMICAL GAMES (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(15) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:p:229-243 COMPETING FOR ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION IN AN IRREVERSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE PROBLEM: A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(16) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:199-213 ON BARGAINING SETS IN SYMMETRIC GAMES (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(17) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:151-167 EFFECTIVENESS OF COOP ADVERTISING PROGRAMS IN COMPETITIVE DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(18) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:03:p:453-460 A NOTE ON LUENBERGERS ZERO-MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE FOR CORE ALLOCATIONS (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(19) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:p:595-612 BIDDER WELFARE IN AN AUCTION WITH A BUYOUT OPTION (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(20) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:169-181 A REFINEMENT CONCEPT FOR EQUILIBRIA IN MULTICRITERIA GAMES VIA STABLE SCALARIZATIONS (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(21) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:04:p:395-406 SUSTAINABILITY OF COOPERATION OVERTIME IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(22) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:04:p:565-581 THE IMPACT OF ADVERTISING IN A DUOPOLY GAME (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(23) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:01:p:87-104 TRANSFORMING GAMES FROM CHARACTERISTIC INTO NORMAL FORM (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(24) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:03:p:437-452 THE CONSENSUS VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(25) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:p:669-674 A NOTE ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF RATIONALIZABILITY CONCEPTS IN GENERALIZED NICE GAMES (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2008 | 2007 | 2006 | 2005

Recent citations received in: 2008

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2007-04 Marginal contributions and externalities in the value (2007). Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales / Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.6:y:2006:i:1:n:9 Assessing the Likelihood of Panic-Based Bank Runs (2006). The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

(2) RePEc:trf:wpaper:181 How eBay Sellers set “Buy-it-now” prices - Bringing The Field Into the Lab (2006). SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, University of Mannheim / Discussion Papers

Recent citations received in: 2005

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.