Economics Working Papers

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.18 0 0 0 0.09 1997 0.18 0 0 0 0.09 1998 0.2 0 0 0 0.12 1999 0.26 0 0 0 0.16 2000 0.36 0 0 0 0.17 2001 0.35 12 101 0 0 4 0.33 0.17 2002 0.25 0.4 13 41 12 3 33.3 2 0.15 0.19 2003 0.76 0.4 6 38 25 19 10.5 0.2 2004 1.05 0.44 15 128 19 20 10 5 0.33 0.22 2005 1.05 0.46 12 26 21 22 0 2 0.17 0.27 2006 1.11 0.48 15 94 27 30 3.3 13 0.87 0.24 2007 0.59 0.4 5 12 27 16 0 1 0.2 0.2 2008 0.7 0.4 6 7 20 14 0 1 0.17 0.2 2009 0.36 0.36 6 19 11 4 0 7 1.17 0.21
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0025 Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation (2006).
Cited: 73 times.

(2) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0020 The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government (2004).
Cited: 60 times.

(3) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0047 Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting (2004).
Cited: 36 times.

(4) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0006 Implementation Theory (2001).
Cited: 29 times.

(5) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0003 Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium (2001).
Cited: 23 times.

(6) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0049 A Model of Add-on Pricing (2004).
Cited: 16 times.

(7) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0018 Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems (2001).
Cited: 16 times.

(8) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0046 Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia (2004).
Cited: 15 times.

(9) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0007 Arms Races and Negotiations (2001).
Cited: 14 times.

(10) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0019 Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint (2002).
Cited: 11 times.

(11) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0021 Fair Income Tax (2002).
Cited: 11 times.

(12) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0033 The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules (2003).
Cited: 10 times.

(13) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0088 Group Inequality (2009).
Cited: 10 times.

(14) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0031 Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High-Bid Auctions (2003).
Cited: 9 times.

(15) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0005 The Emergence and Persistence of the Anglo-Saxon and German Financial Systems (2001).
Cited: 8 times.

(16) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0090 Continuous Implementation (2009).
Cited: 7 times.

(17) RePEc:ads:wpaper:9602 Auctions and Efficiency (2001).
Cited: 7 times.

(18) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0056 Secure Implementation (2005).
Cited: 7 times.

(19) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0032 Rejecting Small Gambles Under Expected Utility (2003).
Cited: 7 times.

(20) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0026 Credit Rationing, Wealth Inequality, and Allocation of Talent (2002).
Cited: 7 times.

(21) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0069 Willpower and the Optimal Control of Visceral Urges (2006).
Cited: 7 times.

(22) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0030 Beauty is a Beast, Frog is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities (2003).
Cited: 7 times.

(23) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0079 Consumption Risk-sharing in Social Networks (2007).
Cited: 6 times.

(24) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0068 The (Im)Possibility of a Paretian Rational (2005).
Cited: 5 times.

(25) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0078 Changing Identity: The Emergence of Social Groups (2007).
Cited: 5 times.

(26) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0098 Evolution and the Growth Process: Natural Selection of Entrepreneurial Traits (2011).
Cited: 5 times.

(27) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0008 On Indescribable Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts (2001).
Cited: 4 times.

(28) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0029 Mistakes in Cooperation: the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworths Recontracting (2003).
Cited: 4 times.

(29) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0042 Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare (2004).
Cited: 4 times.

(30) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0058 On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules (2006).
Cited: 4 times.

(31) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0081 Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals (2008).
Cited: 4 times.

(32) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0099 Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided? Evidence from Africa (2011).
Cited: 4 times.

(33) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0053 Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships (2005).
Cited: 4 times.

(34) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0059 Minorities and Storable Votes (2005).
Cited: 3 times.

(35) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0075 Public-private Partnerships and Government Spending Limits (2006).
Cited: 3 times.

(36) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0067 Is it Possible to Define Subjective Probabilities in Purely Behavioral Terms? A Comment on Epstein-Zhang (2001) (2006).
Cited: 3 times.

(37) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0054 The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession (2005).
Cited: 3 times.

(38) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0015 Social Orderings for the Assignment of Indivisible Objects (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(39) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0034 Decision-Making in the Context of Imprecise Probabilistic Beliefs (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(40) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0014 Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(41) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0040 The Measurement of Intellectual Influence: the Views of a Sceptic (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(42) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0022 On the Equivalence between Welfarism and Equality of Opportunity (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(43) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0073 Demand Theory and General Equilibrium: From Explanation to Introspection, a Journey down the Wrong Road (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(44) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0017 The Evolution of Focal Points (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(45) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0061 Distinguishing Social Preferences from Preferences for Altruism (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(46) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0027 Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(47) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0072 Bernoulli Without Bayes: A Theory of Utility-Sophisticated Preferences under Ambiguity (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(48) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0011 The Demand Bargaining Set: General Characterization and Application to Majority Games (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(49) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0085 Log-linear Dynamics and Local Potential (2008).
Cited: 2 times.

(50) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0045 Decentralization and Political Institutions (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | 2006

Recent citations received in: 2009

(1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0089 Public Disagreement (2009). Economics Working Papers

(2) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1697 Rationalizable Implementation (2009). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:pra:mprapa:18575 Group Reputation and the Endogenous Group Formation (2009). MPRA Paper

(4) RePEc:pra:mprapa:18765 Group Reputation and the Dynamics of Statistical Discrimination (2009). MPRA Paper

(5) RePEc:pra:mprapa:18767 Lifetime Network Externality and the Dynamics of Group Inequality (2009). MPRA Paper

(6) RePEc:wrk:warwec:902 Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium (2009). The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)

(7) RePEc:wrk:warwec:903 Hydrogen Transport and the Spatial Requirements of Renewable Energy (2009). The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)

Recent citations received in: 2008

(1) RePEc:roc:wallis:wp59 Information and Voting: the Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses (2008). Wallis Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-007 Personal Identity in the Dictator Game (2007). Jena Economic Research Papers

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0067 Is it Possible to Define Subjective Probabilities in Purely Behavioral Terms? A Comment on Epstein-Zhang (2001) (2006). Economics Working Papers

(2) RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_573_0347 Impacts économiques de la révolution numérique (2006). Revue économique

(3) RePEc:cde:cdewps:142 Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights (2006). Working papers

(4) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1847 Should Courts always Enforce what Contracting Parties Write? (2006). CESifo Working Paper Series

(5) RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0064 Patents vs Trade Secrets: Knowledge Licensing and Spillover (2006). Working Papers

(6) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000391 Self-Control through Second-Order Preferences (2006). Levine's Bibliography

(7) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5481 Patents, Imitation and Licensing in an Asymmetric Dynamic R&D Race (2006). CEPR Discussion Papers

(8) RePEc:fiu:wpaper:0602 Impact of Intellectual Property Rights Reforms on the Diffusion of Knowledge through FDI (2006). Working Papers

(9) RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~06-06-07 Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (2006). Working Papers

(10) RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00177614 Patent Systems for Encouraging Innovation: Lessons from Economic Analysis (2006). Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)

(11) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12615 Time Preference, Time Discounting, and Smoking Decisions (2006). NBER Working Papers

(12) RePEc:pen:papers:06-024 Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (2006). PIER Working Paper Archive

(13) RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2006/17 How Much Should Society Fuel the Greed of Innovators? On the Relations between Appropriability, Opportunities and Rates of Innovation (2006). LEM Papers Series

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.