Working Papers

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.18 14 0 11 0 0.09 1997 0.18 14 2 24 0 0.09 1998 0.2 26 11 28 0 1 0.04 0.12 1999 0.18 0.26 13 5 40 7 42.9 2 0.15 0.16 2000 0.36 3 0 39 0 0.17 2001 0.06 0.35 8 12 16 1 100 1 0.13 0.17 2002 0.27 0.4 18 44 11 3 0 7 0.39 0.19 2003 0.19 0.4 11 0 26 5 0 0.2 2004 0.07 0.44 5 2 29 2 0 0.22 2005 0.06 0.46 16 10 16 1 100 2 0.13 0.27 2006 0.29 0.48 9 4 21 6 16.7 1 0.11 0.24 2007 0.04 0.4 9 12 25 1 0 0.2 2008 0.33 0.4 14 0 18 6 33.3 0.2 2009 0.22 0.36 17 6 23 5 20 3 0.18 0.21
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:bie:wpaper:330 Moral property rights in bargaining (2002).
Cited: 19 times.

(2) RePEc:bie:wpaper:345 Power measurement as sensitivity analysis : a unified approach (2002).
Cited: 13 times.

(3) RePEc:bie:wpaper:008 A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, where 4 are Few and 6 are Many (1973).
Cited: 12 times.

(4) RePEc:bie:wpaper:023 Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games (1974).
Cited: 12 times.

(5) RePEc:bie:wpaper:018 The Chain Store Paradox (1974).
Cited: 7 times.

(6) RePEc:bie:wpaper:332 Convex fuzzy games and participation monotonic allocation schemes (2002).
Cited: 6 times.

(7) RePEc:bie:wpaper:392 Do social preferences matter in competitive markets? (2007).
Cited: 5 times.

(8) RePEc:bie:wpaper:395 Network formation with closeness incentives (2007).
Cited: 5 times.

(9) RePEc:bie:wpaper:301 Implementation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies (1998).
Cited: 4 times.

(10) RePEc:bie:wpaper:328 The Pazner-Schmeidler Social Ordering: A Defense (2001).
Cited: 4 times.

(11) RePEc:bie:wpaper:308 Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions (1999).
Cited: 4 times.

(12) RePEc:bie:wpaper:292 The Positive Prekernel of a Cooperative Game (1998).
Cited: 4 times.

(13) RePEc:bie:wpaper:310 A universal meta bargaining realization of the Nash solution (1999).
Cited: 3 times.

(14) RePEc:bie:wpaper:367 Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods (2005).
Cited: 3 times.

(15) RePEc:bie:wpaper:322 Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory? (2001).
Cited: 3 times.

(16) RePEc:bie:wpaper:393 On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(17) RePEc:bie:wpaper:333 Social Choice and Just Institutions: New Perspectives (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(18) RePEc:bie:wpaper:417 Indivisible commodities and an equivalence theorem on the strong core (2009).
Cited: 2 times.

(19) RePEc:bie:wpaper:323 A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(20) RePEc:bie:wpaper:375 Government versus opposition: Who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag? (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(21) RePEc:bie:wpaper:420 Voronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals (2009).
Cited: 2 times.

(22) RePEc:bie:wpaper:449 Competitive Outcomes and the Inner Core of NTU Market Games (2011).
Cited: 2 times.

(23) RePEc:bie:wpaper:321 Game theory (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(24) RePEc:bie:wpaper:373 A taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(25) RePEc:bie:wpaper:443 Existence of Financial Equilibria in Continuous Time with Potentially Complete Markets (2010).
Cited: 1 times.

(26) RePEc:bie:wpaper:360 Cephoids : Minkowski sums of prisms (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(27) RePEc:bie:wpaper:274 Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend: A Drawback for a Revenue-Neutral Tax Reform (1997).
Cited: 1 times.

(28) RePEc:bie:wpaper:379 Polluting technologies and sustainable economic development (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(29) RePEc:bie:wpaper:418 Strong core equivalence theorem in an atomless economy with indivisible commodities (2009).
Cited: 1 times.

(30) RePEc:bie:wpaper:372 Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(31) RePEc:bie:wpaper:300 Fair-Negotiation Procedures (1998).
Cited: 1 times.

(32) RePEc:bie:wpaper:326 The positive core of a cooperative game (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(33) RePEc:bie:wpaper:430 Representation of TU games by coalition production economies (2010).
Cited: 1 times.

(34) RePEc:bie:wpaper:268 The Selection of Mixed Strategies in 2x2 Bimatrix Games (1997).
Cited: 1 times.

(35) RePEc:bie:wpaper:377 On top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(36) RePEc:bie:wpaper:369 Sustainable economic development and the environment: Theory and evidence (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(37) RePEc:bie:wpaper:299 Supporting Cooperative Multi-Issue Negotiations (1998).
Cited: 1 times.

(38) RePEc:bie:wpaper:385 An axiomatic approach to composite solutions (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(39) RePEc:bie:wpaper:429 Optimal Stopping Under Ambiguity in Continuous Time (2010).
Cited: 1 times.

(40) repec:bie:wpaper:340 ().
Cited: 1 times.

(41) RePEc:bie:wpaper:306 On the Nash program for the Nash bargaining solution (1999).
Cited: 1 times.

(42) RePEc:bie:wpaper:413 The Best Choice Problem under ambiguity (2009).
Cited: 1 times.

(43) RePEc:bie:wpaper:331 Hypercubes and compromise values for cooperative fuzzy games (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(44) RePEc:bie:wpaper:454 Competitive Outcomes and the Core of TU Market Games (2011).
Cited: 1 times.

(45) RePEc:bie:wpaper:295 Adjusted Winner: An Algorithm for Implementing Bargaining Solutions in Multi-Issue Negotiations (1998).
Cited: 1 times.

(46) repec:bie:wpaper:383 ().
Cited: 1 times.

(47) RePEc:bie:wpaper:339 How to cope with division problems under interval uncertainty of claims? (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(48) RePEc:bie:wpaper:374 On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(49) RePEc:bie:wpaper:304 Should High-Tax Countries Pursue Revenue-Neutral Ecological Tax Reforms? (1998).
Cited: 1 times.

(50) RePEc:bie:wpaper:361 A superadditive solution (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | 2006

Recent citations received in: 2009

(1) RePEc:bie:wpaper:417 Indivisible commodities and an equivalence theorem on the strong core (2009). Working Papers

(2) RePEc:bie:wpaper:418 Strong core equivalence theorem in an atomless economy with indivisible commodities (2009). Working Papers

(3) RePEc:bie:wpaper:419 Core allocations may not be Walras allocations in any large finite economy with indivisible commodities (2009). Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2008

Recent citations received in: 2007

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:bie:wpaper:378 Coalition formation in simple games: The semistrict core (2006). Working Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.